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Should Platform run on all nodes or should Platform run only on High Performance nodes ?

Yes, we can. The power of the nodes will always be dictated by what it takes to get paid and nothing more, we live in a capitalist society where optimizations will be made such that profits are maximised, this is normal and something that socialists don't understand.
You may live in a capitalist society, but Dash is not the mirror of the society you live. Whether Dash will be capitalism, socialism, or whatever, its up to the Dash voters to decide.
Of course profits should be maximised, but the question is, which and what kind of profits should be maximized, and who and how many will benefit from these profits...

For the glory of Rome......

 
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140 MNs coming online in the past 24 hrs. Previously told it's possibly due to people updating their nodes but this line is not staggered, it looks like a single entity.

I agree. It looks like a single entity to me too and as yet an unidentified one.


This thread was started Sep 23, and if you look at the 90 day chart you will see this reversal started around the same time. The 90 day chart is up for debate but the past 24 hours looks like someone is priming their nodes for voting. I hope mnowatch is on this.

We are, I plan to analyse the data and identify this cluster.
 
I still dont understand how requiring a large collateral size makes impossible for the large stake holders to form a majority.
Could you provide a url link having both the rationale and the calculations?

Calculations were already given to us by virgile and QE, but you can imagine how it would work if you have a network of say 1000 1k nodes and one whale with say 100 nodes and everyone else is much smaller, if then you wish to create a new pool of evo nodes also at 1k Dash and that pool size will be 500 nodes (estimated) because 50% of the block reward is reserved just for them, then the 100 node whale can make up as much as 20% of the pool size. If however, we increase the collateral requirement to 4k Dash and still allocate 50% of the reward there, then the pool size should be about 125 nodes and our whale could only make 25 of such nodes which is also 20%, but the evo pool will get more fees from evo and have reduced costs in hosting, so will attract more nodes than 125, which would dilute the whale's stake in the pool. So it all comes down to fine tuning the amount of reward allocated to the evo pool and the size of the collateral, which Virgile and QE can speak to.
 
Simple answer: it doesn't
Its a lie.
What it does is the exact opposite, a much higher collateral will favor only the few large stakeholders. Nobody else can participate (unless Trustless Shares are introduced).
Now they talk about Trustless Shares being a solution for a problem which is both, self-imposed and totally unnecessary.
And nobody will run a 4K HPMN anyway (for long), unless its economically viable. It will have to at least match the profitability of running 4 regular 1K masternodes.
We have provided the math and the spreadsheets. Calling it a lie without disproving the math or explaining why it is a lie makes me think that you are just imagining it to be a lie because you don't like the solution.
 
We have provided the math and the spreadsheets. .

The math and referenced spreadsheets, thats all mostly based on estimations .. correct ?
I mean the whole problem is and always has been from the start the lack of solid concrete verifiable data in this discussion.

Which as you said previously could be provided later by DCG, but it would come too late for this discussion or too late for the upcoming decision proposals or it would postpone the release of Dash Platform end of this year ? (i remember you saying something like that).

Edit : found the discussion about this between you and me
Knipsel.JPG

Source : https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/...gh-performance-nodes.53374/page-3#post-232206

At this point all we have are estimations with regards to all solutions out there. No concrete numbers, no hard data to support any solution.
I think it is important for everyone to keep this in mind.

Estimations, speculations, assumptions. People will come across these throughout this thread.
Concrete verifiable data, not so much.
 
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Calculations were already given to us by virgile and QE, but you can imagine how it would work if you have a network of say 1000 1k nodes and one whale with say 100 nodes and everyone else is much smaller, if then you wish to create a new pool of evo nodes also at 1k Dash and that pool size will be 500 nodes (estimated) because 50% of the block reward is reserved just for them, then the 100 node whale can make up as much as 20% of the pool size. If however, we increase the collateral requirement to 4k Dash and still allocate 50% of the reward there, then the pool size should be about 125 nodes and our whale could only make 25 of such nodes which is also 20%, but the evo pool will get more fees from evo and have reduced costs in hosting, so will attract more nodes than 125, which would dilute the whale's stake in the pool. So it all comes down to fine tuning the amount of reward allocated to the evo pool and the size of the collateral, which Virgile and QE can speak to.

I understand your rationale but you are missing some very important variables. My answer to your arguments remains the same.

Of course profits should be maximised, but the question is, which and what kind of profits should be maximized, and who and how many will benefit from these profits... Of course you should fine tune the amount of reward (allocated to the evo pool) and the size of the collateral, but also fine tune the number of individuals who will benefit from your set up. By having in mind that the number of individuals should be considered as the most important factor, and by giving priority to this factor over the other factors. I think the calculations of @QuantumExplorer and @virgile do not take into account the number of individuals, do they?

Neither of course they took into account the Proof of Service, and this is the worst part of their development and analysis. Because whatever stake or reward you calculate, and no matter how many individuals receive this reward, if you dont have a decent service (having a decent of service requires a proof of service, a bandwidth proof of service more precisely) you are doomed.

 
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The math and referenced spreadsheets, thats all mostly based on estimations .. correct ?
I mean the whole problem is and always has been from the start the lack of solid concrete verifiable data in this discussion.

Which as you said previously could be provided later by DCG, but it would come too late for this discussion or too late for the upcoming decision proposals or it would postpone the release of Dash Platform end of this year ? (i remember you saying something like that).

Edit : found the discussion about this between you and me
View attachment 11492
Source : https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/...gh-performance-nodes.53374/page-3#post-232206

At this point all we have are estimations with regards to all solutions out there. No concrete numbers, no hard data to support any solution.
I think it is important for everyone to keep this in mind.

Estimations, speculations, assumptions. People will come across these throughout this thread.
Concrete verifiable data, not so much.

When you allow people choice you can never know things for sure, which is why I have given estimates based on market theory. This theory is the basis of capitalism.

So what is the way to be sure of the values? Take people's choice away from them?

No, I can't be sure. But I would gladly always take a little bit of the unknown in the pursuit of more freedom.
 
@QuantumExplorer

I'm curious. You say the collateral options for HPMNs will be either 4x or 10x greater than a regular MN. So does it still work if we make HPMNs 1000 dash and MNs 4x or 10x smaller? e.g. 250 dash or 100 dash.

If it does still work, why isn't this a voting option?
If it does not work, why not?

i just saw QE quoted me to check how it'd look like on platform side. I'll do it tomorrow as i finished my day of work.
 
We have provided the math and the spreadsheets. Calling it a lie without disproving the math or explaining why it is a lie makes me think that you are just imagining it to be a lie because you don't like the solution.

Dream all you want about your 4K and 10K "solutions", Trustless Shares, 0.25K masternodes and whatnot, but you will be unable to obtain a passing Governance Proposal for any of this.
And i am sure you won´t realize how lucky you are if none of this passes, because that´s the best outcome you could possibly hope for, because if your 4K Platform Network would come to fruition and soon thereafter break down due to lack of profitability, Dash price may very well crash to $20 levels from this debacle, and guess whose head everyone will demand on a spike by then. Certainly not mine.

Dash is not a freaking Video Game. Nearly half a billion dollars are at stake.
Just stop acting like a teenager playing a Video Game.
 
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Calculations were already given to us by virgile and QE, but you can imagine how it would work if you have a network of say 1000 1k nodes and one whale with say 100 nodes and everyone else is much smaller, if then you wish to create a new pool of evo nodes also at 1k Dash and that pool size will be 500 nodes (estimated) because 50% of the block reward is reserved just for them, then the 100 node whale can make up as much as 20% of the pool size. If however, we increase the collateral requirement to 4k Dash and still allocate 50% of the reward there, then the pool size should be about 125 nodes and our whale could only make 25 of such nodes which is also 20%, but the evo pool will get more fees from evo and have reduced costs in hosting, so will attract more nodes than 125, which would dilute the whale's stake in the pool. So it all comes down to fine tuning the amount of reward allocated to the evo pool and the size of the collateral, which Virgile and QE can speak to.

Are you talking about allocating a portion of Core Rewards to an Evo Pool?
Halving the profitability of thousands of masternodes, in order to boost the earnings of a few hundred Platform nodes, which are mostly owned by few whales?
And you feel no shame proposing this as a noble idea? Give me a break.
 
Calculations were already given to us by virgile and QE, but you can imagine how it would work if you have a network of say 1000 1k nodes and one whale with say 100 nodes and everyone else is much smaller, if then you wish to create a new pool of evo nodes also at 1k Dash and that pool size will be 500 nodes (estimated) because 50% of the block reward is reserved just for them, then the 100 node whale can make up as much as 20% of the pool size. If however, we increase the collateral requirement to 4k Dash and still allocate 50% of the reward there, then the pool size should be about 125 nodes and our whale could only make 25 of such nodes which is also 20%, but the evo pool will get more fees from evo and have reduced costs in hosting, so will attract more nodes than 125, which would dilute the whale's stake in the pool. So it all comes down to fine tuning the amount of reward allocated to the evo pool and the size of the collateral, which Virgile and QE can speak to.
You do realize that the impulse to limit whales here is anti-capitalistic in nature, right?

Making educated guesses in attempt to identify MNO clusters and whales is all fine and good, but we should not be making any direction-changing decisions based on the data. Don't get me wrong, that mnowatch feature is cool and I appreciate it, but it first and foremost should serve as a reminder to multi-MN owners to protect their privacy better and randomize votes and other behavior.

This desire to limit so-called whales rubs me the wrong way, as it does not sound like a property of uncensorable, equal-opportunity and fungible money. Sounds more like socialistic central planning. If you have a proper race condition with good incentives, then the market will figure it out.

For a long time, I've seen the trend for people in the Dash community to talk about "MNOs" and this is actually wrong in my opinion. From the network's perspective, we don't have masternode owners, we have 1000Dash masternodes. One masternode is one vote, and that's it. The network does not and should not care how many human operators are controlling which number of nodes.

That's not to say this limiting impulse is completely without merit. One thing that might matter about this "whale danger" is a lack of diversity in server hardware and physical jurisdictions. I'm sure there are other pratical considerations. But again, the free market should balance itself out eventually.

One could say Bitcoin mining is somewhat "centralized" over time as a result of a completely free and open PoW consensus, as those with more ability and resources will garner more of the reward for a while. But it's still a meritocracy that is self-balancing as it adapts to the ever-evolving conditions of market price, power costs, ASIC development, rents, etc., and in my opinion it is still not a dangerous level of centralization given the conditions and incentives surrounding mining hardware investments.

I'd also like to point out that there's really no such thing as a "100-node whale" individual. Unless you're doing KYC on actual addresses and proving ownership with private keys, you can't prove how many individual humans own what--and actually we really shouldn't care. In this thread Quantum keeps mentioning that "one entity" shouldn't have too much power or too many nodes. While I understand this desire to encourage a more distributed network, we should understand that it is absolutely not "capitalistic" to try to prevent individuals (or corporations) from amassing power. Money is a representation of merit and like it or not, even corporations like Binance are entitled to whatever power they wield with their investment. Just because the 200+ nodes might come from one corporation, does not mean those 200+ votes are any less valid or might have opinions that are "wrong" for the network. On the contrary, investing in a Dash MN means you get to dictate what is right for it.

Unfortunately, I think the only way to build a truly fair decentralized system is to allow this potential for "one entity" to gain a large amount of power. Trying to absolutely prevent this outcome is the pathway to all the things we don't like about the fiat system and legacy central banking systems that have led to the creation of Bitcoin in the first place. The opportunity to become a powerful whale absolutely must exist in the system, otherwise it won't be "fair." I know it sounds backwards but I think that's the only way you can truly prevent centralization -- is to allow for its potential so that everyone has an equal chance.

As Solarguy recently pointed out, large investment is sorely needed ATM and we should be building things that entice and encourage more potential whales, not dissuade them.
 
This desire to limit so-called whales rubs me the wrong way, as it does not sound like a property of uncensorable, equal-opportunity and fungible money.

I agree with your post. There is a problem though. This platform is not bitcoin POW, it is proof of stake. These limited number of MNOs whale can choose to turn it into a censorship tool or censor the system entirely by bringing it down.
 
I agree with your post. There is a problem though. This platform is not bitcoin POW, it is proof of stake. These limited number of MNOs whale can choose to turn it into a censorship tool or censor the system entirely by bringing it down.

One of my points was that in a free and fungible money system, we don't get to know who the whales are or if they even exist. It's just quantities of Dash, not people. If the network gets taken down by its own money, then it deserved to get taken down. That's simple. You're right though, I guess maybe this could be an argument against proof of stake in general, because it seems like the tools needed to guard against its pitfalls lead to the same social-engineering and central banking systems we seek to avoid by using crypto.

We can't really design network policy around something that cannot fully and ideally should not even be able to be proven. Yes mnowatch proves that there are currently some sloppy individuals and/or corporations that might not hide their tracks well enough, but that is temporary and unreliable, and furthermore identification and limitation should not be goals of an uncensorable and decentralized network at all.
 
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Many PoS systems have been overcome by single controlling entities or cartels and in each case the project was forked e.g. Steemit -> Hive. Or take a look at how many Ethereum validators are now OFAC compliant.

Do you support transaction censorship on dash?

We are slowly but surely approaching the day when a very small group of people will be submitting proposals and swinging the votes in their favor. There will be no successful counter proposals. This trend has been going on in dash for two years and shows no sign of stopping.

We could say, DCG sucking 60%+ of the treasury had a negative impact on the project. DCG is considered the owner of the dash protocol, thus, nearly every third-party governance proposal failed. Even the change in proposal fees took a year to implement and push out.

Or we might recognize recent masternode activation of 140+ nodes / votes that may swing the final outcome.

Or we might say, the voters of CrowdNode do not have any real skin in the game. For they do not themselves select and manage nodes. And their customers put their faith in CrowdNode to cast votes fairly. That CrowdNode will not move vote boundaries to weaken or strengthen certain proposals. If the outcome of CrowdNode votes contradict all others, should we value them more or less?

In all of the above examples (DCG, MNO whales, CrowdNode), we can see how trusted Layer 1 systems can be corrupted by Layer 2 systems. It is akin to the Lightning Network stealing transaction fees from miners.

This, you suggest, is the free market, capitalism. I agree with this philosophy, the people will move to other platforms or forks. The admission here is that dash is not antifragile. Dash is yet to be so universal, accessible, ubiquitous that people feel they could move to other projects. I'm most definitely not a maximalist, but I think the following quote from Unchained Capital sums it up well:

"There is no silver-bullet that kills bitcoin; there is no competitor that can magically overtake it; there is no government that can shut it down."

This - antifragility - is what dash should be aiming for. All this talk about node whales proves we've still got a long way to go.
 
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Am i correct in my assumption, that the 4K and 10K solution intends to re-allocate a portion of Core Rewards to an EVO Pool,
from which the Platform Rewards would be paid to the Platform Nodes?
I understand that in such a scenario the frequency of payments in the Core Network will increase (because of the fewer 1K Core Nodes).

But if this is the way you plan to compensate Platform Nodes with Platform Credits, you must not try to hide this fact in the upcoming Governance proposals.
Like not informing all the MNO that by approving 4K or 10K a portion of the Core Rewards will be re-allocated, and then later claiming, the MNO approved just that.

You cannot even clearly define percentages of such a re-allocation of the Core Rewards, without knowing how many 4K Nodes will get setup and how many 1K MN will vanish from the Core Network due to the conversion to 4K.
The Core Reward portion going to the EVO Pool would need to be variable, and dynamically calculated according to the number of running 4K Nodes.
Because the amount of 4K Nodes would change over time, you couldn't even set a fixed percentage in stone.
Unless you want to aim for a specific number of 4K Nodes, like say, 100 Platform Nodes, then i guess a fixed percentage could be calculated.
(it would be something around 1/12th or 1/15th of the Core Reward for Masternodes, which would need to get re-allocated to the EVO Pool, if you strive for only 100 4K Nodes)
The exact formula would be 300 / (Blocks of Current Payment Cycle ~ 3697)
If there would be fewer than 100 4K Nodes, then they would get over-paid, so more MNOs would get lured to setup a 4K Node.
If there would be more than 100 4K Nodes, then they would get under-paid, and MNOs would get discouraged from setting up more 4K Nodes.

But question comes to mind, whether this all is really necessary. Its totally complicating everything. But you guys just love that, right?
It would make more sense to put up just two proposals:

1K Mandatory Upgrade to run Platform for all MN (without messing with Core Blockreward allocations)
or
1K Voluntary Adherence to run Platform for all MN (without messing with Core Blockreward allocations)

Use that EVO Pool for the various EVO fees exclusively, rather than constantly subsidizing it from Core Rewards in order to offset missed-out Core Rewards of such higher-collateral Nodes with massive amounts of Platform Credits.
 
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@QuantumExplorer

I'm curious. You say the collateral options for HPMNs will be either 4x or 10x greater than a regular MN. So does it still work if we make HPMNs 1000 dash and MNs 4x or 10x smaller? e.g. 250 dash or 100 dash.

If it does still work, why isn't this a voting option?
If it does not work, why not?

It would in theory do the same... If you quadruple the amount of nodes supporting platform compared to a 4 solution because then the top whale would get 4 times as much nodes. Beside this issue, i only see downsides compared to shares+4K or w.e-is-higher-than-1K+shares.
 
It would in theory do the same... If you quadruple the amount of nodes supporting platform compared to a 4 solution because then the top whale would get 4 times as much nodes. Beside this issue, i only see downsides compared to shares+4K or w.e-is-higher-than-1K+shares.

Huh, what downsides? When you say "it would in theory do the same" but then dismiss it without explanation, then it sounds more like bias than math. There must be extraneous factors to make you say this and I think an explanation would be helpful to everyone.
 
It would in theory do the same... If you quadruple the amount of nodes supporting platform compared to a 4 solution because then the top whale would get 4 times as much nodes. Beside this issue, i only see downsides compared to shares+4K or w.e-is-higher-than-1K+shares.

The grand total of collateral would not change and according to Sam's math, the node types would find equilibrium. So what could possibly be the problem?
 
The grand total of collateral would not change and according to Sam's math, the node types would find equilibrium. So what could possibly be the problem?

I guess the problem of such a 0.25K solution would be, that there would be ~ 4000 Platform Nodes (much more than they obviously are aiming at),
while at the same time a completely missing group of 0.25K masternodes (at least at the time of introducing this), but that could grow over time easily to 10000+ such 0.25K Nodes. But nobody could say for sure, how fast 0.25K masternodes would getting setup. So that is a big unknown in this hypothetical scenario.

If paying such 0.25K Nodes the same Core Rewards like 1K Nodes (same like they plan for 4K or 10K), 0.25K would obviously over time increase the Deterministic Payment Queue to 10000, perhaps 15000 Core Nodes in total.
And a portion of Core Rewards would of course still need to get re-allocated to the 1K Platform Nodes, in order to make them economically competitive in comparison to running just 4 separate 0.25K Nodes.
 
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