- Sep 19, 2014
Well, I understand how it works now. But, if you could use a smaller-scale version of the "facebook-of-crypto" to treat the VIN as an alias? Or create an alias association to the VINs. That way the payment doesn't hit the 1000 vin anymore, but the network still knows which identity is supposed to be getting paid.Interesting idea, however MNs are identified not by the payee address but by the vin really (we need to know if it's still unspent), so even if from blockchain perspective it could look like address has nothing to do with MN for online node it should be obvious which MN is getting payed every block (or there is no consensus). "Facebook-of-crypto" functionality for end users does not affect consensus in any way.
My interest being, right now it is really easy to track masternode payments. They report IPs. IP is owned by a known person. So, every payment can be attributed to that person and proven in the blockchain. We really don't have an easy way to change that from the IP side. Blinding sill isn't a thing, either...
But, it seems the construct for using a new address for every payment is feasible. Just make the MN's VIN into a pay-to alias just like the "facebook-of-crypto" idea. Since it's all pretty much network defined, strip out all the unnecessary features and use it like a minimal test of the larger concept.
Totally different way to attack the matter: Simply add an argument to the masternode start(-many) for inclusion of a public deterministic seed? All payments go to that, the network keeps track.
Even simpler: Just specify an address(es) argument in the masternode start(-many) as an alternative to the vin. Can update it at any time. Use mathgic so that it isn't visible as an association.
Maybe include automixing before delivery? MN/miner payments pass through PS before delivery?
While this still doesn't hide MNOs, it at least disconnects the actual payments from the obvious connection they have now.
Just a bunch of crazy ideas... They all seem feasible and would at least insulate the network from a bulk bureaucratic attack. We don't need the entire MN network being taken down by IRS auditors on fishing expeditions. If they can't actually prove real numbers and names, they can't make their move... Sure, they'll still be able to see the average network numbers and divide it by the number of masternodes. They could even still know how many MNs a person is running. But they wouldn't be able to prove the payments with certainty or precision. Maybe there were PoS penalties in effect? Maybe it went offline for a while? It would make the network less vulnerable to guvthug coercion in at least a small way by making their so-called "job" harder.
In what is supposed to be PrivacyCoin, there is scant little attention given to keeping the entire 2nd tier safe from this form of attack. DASH being more than a toy, it may be considered a real threat to the evil powers that be, and you have to consider this.