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Decision Proposal: Increase Proposal System Flexibility & Efficiency

Re-read the quote in context, Ryan. It's very clear from the previous sentence that I was comparing the MNO allocations of our respective plans to the status quo (i.e. 45%). The MNO plan yields 44% for MNOs if we allocate 20% to proposals. The lowest that the DCG plan yields is 48%, which is higher than the status quo, so MNOs are guaranteed to be increasing their yield under your plan.
Thank you for clarifying. It was not apparent - at least to me - that you were comparing to a scenario prior to the passing of the reallocation proposal (even after re-reading). Given that the other proposal introducing the reallocation is already passed and implemented on the network, that comparison wouldn't be relevant for this particular decision. The network is making a choice between status quo (which includes the reallocation proposal) leaving the proposal system unchanged, the "MNO plan", or the "DCG Plan". Between those three choices, DCG's plan does not guarantee the highest payout of the three choices. That was the correction I'm seeking to make.
 
Well that was a shitty swing back to the DCG Plan, what happened?

Just so DCG understand, if the DCG Plan eventually passes and is implemented, I will vote Yes on every single proposal, crap or otherwise, just not to feed miners free money. If someone wants to fork dash, count me in.
 
Where are you seeing that? Still a few days to go and the MNO plan seems to be a long way behind (needs 700+) but the DCG plan is still a long way from passing (needs 300+). If neither pass that means another vote before implementation, no? I'd imagine either would need considerable tweaking to pass that stage, hard to say for sure as most seem to be voting YES-NO or NO-YES, I'd have expected a lot more YES-YES if there was a major support for the points both proposals have in common.

Someone suggested an alternative on Telegram that sounded a bit clunky to me at first but on reflection it's an ideal stepping stone implementation imo. Keep the 10% budget as-is, unspent coins aren't created but if we go over the 10% it comes out of MN rewards.

He'd suggested limiting that to 10% (20% total) but I don't think a limit would be necessary, if MNs want to give 50% of their reward to some seriously kickass proposal then that's great, they'd be very reluctant to go over that 10% for anything other than seriously kickass proposals and they're not being given the option to vote themselves extra funds. Win win imo.

EDIT, post quote:
Daniel Lerch, [13.11.20 21:21]
Hmmm.... I guess it's probably not a good idea to use Sporks against unexpected voting behavior.
I could imagine leaving the 10 % treasury as it is and give the Masternodes the opportunity to spend another 10 % from their own part of the blockreward if they see a need for more. or something like this.
 
I'm okay with the overall budget increasing to either 15% or 20% (even 25% under very specific circumstances). DCG have said they would not be asking 60% of the increased budget size.

But I'm annoyed, under the DCG Plan, that miners would be incentivized to become MNOs. If that's the case, we don't need MNOs at all. It's just plain ridiculous for Ryan to suggest that swings on the miners side are more tolerable than those on the MNO side. And Ryan suggesting that paying miners is just a by-product of the math. *rolls eyes*

Dash has two very distinct network types; miners and masternodes. If dash ever gets a constitution, then the separation of those two networks should in cast in stone. Maybe that's something for the Trust Protectors. The masternode network is the executive arm and I refuse to pay miners when they contribute zero to my decisions. I'd rather have a burn address than pay them.
 
Here are both plans in a nutshell:

RT -- Plan is easier to explain without a spreadsheet. Successful proposals get paid out of MNOs and Miners rewards proportionately 60/40 so MNOs don't get too miserly.

RG -- Miners get a fixed reward. All successful proposals get paid out of MNO rewards. Don't worry about MNOs, they will do the right thing.
 
Imagine if masternodes reported the dash price (as oracle) and for every price increase (between superblocks), MNOs would get all the reward.
 
Well that was a shitty swing back to the DCG Plan, what happened?

Just so DCG understand, if the DCG Plan eventually passes and is implemented, I will vote Yes on every single proposal, crap or otherwise, just not to feed miners free money. If someone wants to fork dash, count me in.
I suspect you are not alone. I think many MNOs will use this reasoning in the future: "Might as well fund more proposals, up to the limit, because otherwise it just get's wasted in heat and electricity from mining, and it really doesn't cost me personally all that much".

Where are you seeing that? Still a few days to go and the MNO plan seems to be a long way behind (needs 700+) but the DCG plan is still a long way from passing (needs 300+). If neither pass that means another vote before implementation, no? I'd imagine either would need considerable tweaking to pass that stage, hard to say for sure as most seem to be voting YES-NO or NO-YES, I'd have expected a lot more YES-YES if there was a major support for the points both proposals have in common.
Not sure where you came up with a 700+ vote spread. It's never been that high. Right now the spread is ~400 votes, but it's effectively ~200 votes because most people vote for one proposal and against the other, giving each MNO two effective votes. So 200 votes for the MNO plan and against the DCG plan would bring it back to even. Or, 100 votes currently voting for DCG could change to vote for MNO (and against DCG) would also bring it back to even. Definitely still possible.

Here are both plans in a nutshell:

RT -- Plan is easier to explain without a spreadsheet. Successful proposals get paid out of MNOs and Miners rewards proportionately 60/40 so MNOs don't get too miserly.

RG -- Miners get a fixed reward. All successful proposals get paid out of MNO rewards. Don't worry about MNOs, they will do the right thing.
Not a bad summary Geert but RT just claimed that his plan is easier to explain, but the MNO plan is just as simple (if not more so): "miners get 36%, MNO's get the rest but can use up to 20% to fund proposals"
 
Just so DCG understand, if the DCG Plan eventually passes and is implemented, I will vote Yes on every single proposal, crap or otherwise, just not to feed miners free money. If someone wants to fork dash, count me in.

A working definition of "stupid" is "tending toward self destruction." What you are saying is, by that definition, stupid.
 
A working definition of "stupid" is "tending toward self destruction." What you are saying is, by that definition, stupid.

Having principles is stupid? Whatever.

By definition, this proposed incentive is having the opposite effect on me, whether you name it stupid or not.
 
...I will vote Yes on every single proposal, crap or otherwise, just not to feed miners free money...

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As you can see from the above table, maxing out the budget would hurt MNOs more than miners, which is why I termed your idea self-destructive as you are an MNO.
 
It's a fundamental economic law that both parties who enter into a voluntary exchange of things they own for things they wish to own do so because they consider it in their own best interest. The MNO plan more closely resembles this scenario. If MNOs max out the budget it's because it maximizes their expected return. The two most obvious forms of increasing return are:
  1. accumulation - you get more Dash
  2. appreciation - your Dash gains value
Maxing out the budget (at least in the MNO plan) can mean that MNOs are aiming for 2) at the expense of 1). Pretty simple really. This isn't the case with the DCG plan though, because MNOs are spending other people's (miners') money. If the DCG plan passes there is more reason to max out budget. In addition to it being easier to spend other people's money, it's economical to reduce mining allocation, because the added 4% (36% - 32%) isn't adding any value, it's just waste. Why not give it to some contractor that at least has a 1% chance of adding some value to Dash.
 
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The MNOs actually have more power IMO in the DCG plan. MNOs can control funds normally set aside for miners and redirect them toward some (hopefully) beneficial purpose.
 
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The MNOs actually have more power IMO in the DCG plan. MNOs can control funds normally set aside for miners and redirect it toward some (hopefully) beneficial purpose.

Huh? - I'm lost. Unspent is split between miners and MNOs, isn't it? If the half that goes to me is my incentive, why is the other half not an incentive? As Ryan put it, the share going to the miners is "just a consequence of the math". Maybe my half is also just a consequence of the math. Bottom line, with the MNO Plan you can blame me entirely for making bad decisions, and with the DCG Plan I can say, "why should I bother when my vote counts so little anyway.. and then you go and take my reward and give it to a security guard at the door". This isn't Robin Hood you know.
 
Huh? - I'm lost...

I am talking about the DELTA. Any increase in spending forces miner rewards lower. There is a dynamic element to this that you seem to be missing. We are sharing rewards with miners in any event. The issue is should miners be forced to contribute more when the DAO needs to spend over 10% or should they not? What is your opinion?
 
I am talking about the DELTA. Any increase in spending forces miner rewards lower. There is a dynamic element to this that you seem to be missing. We are sharing rewards with miners in any event. The issue is should miners be forced to contribute more when the DAO needs to spend over 10% or should they not? What is your opinion?

In an ideal world I wouldn't put forward either of these proposals, but to answer your question, miners should be paid to the secure the chain with sufficient leg room and that's all. Rion has already explained the economics of mining very well. And from a technical point of view, I want to see the two very different network types (masternodes and miners) to maintain distance.. that too is a security issue. Incentivizing miners to be more than mining, where is that going to lead us?
 
The voting and proposal process consists of two phases:

Phase 1 - the two proposal options are evaluated against each other
Phase 2 - the favored option from Phase 1 is evaluated against our current system


In Phase 1 (this phase) you are asked to vote for which option you prefer. Regardless of degree, the option with the most net yes votes will proceed to the next phase. DCG will implement the Phase 2 upgrade option if it exceeds the normal 10% criterion of 10% net yes votes in Phase 2. In the unlikely event the higher ranked proposal exceeds the 10% net yes votes during Phase 1, Phase 2 would not be necessary.

Both decision proposals failed to reach the treshold of 10% by a considerable margin, so what is next ? I would have preferred if neither decision proposal managed to pass the 10% treshold (as is the case today), that it was simply over and done with, without a phase 2.

Since we do have a phase 2 and the DCG plan had more net yes votes then the MNO Plan, i guess the DCG plan will get evaluated to our current system ?
Does that mean another DCG Plan Decision Proposal, that we will need to vote over ? The exact same DCG Plan Decision Proposal ? Or a revised DCG Plan Decision Proposal ?

Only one Decision Proposal ? Or possibly two Decision Proposals ? (Current System versus DCG Plan ?)
I am not looking forward to doing the discussions all over again on a DCG Plan, that did not even reach the 10% treshold.
 
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DCG or the DIT will run the DCG proposal again, and if it passes we will implement the plan described therein. If if does not pass, we continue with the current system.
 
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