The 10 Properties of Blockchain governance

Which governance property would you like dash to incorporate or improve?

  • Pseudonymity

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Verifiability

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Sustainable Development

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Sustainable Participation

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Sufrage

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    2

vazaki3

Active Member
Jul 1, 2019
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Dash Address
XnpT2YQaYpyh7F9twM6EtDMn1TCDCEEgNX
Cardano is the coin that substituted Dash as the dominant governance coin in coinmarketcap. (due to the well known stupid decisions of the Dash masternodes )

According to this cardano reseatch paper
SoK: Blockchain Governance - IOHK Research
Overleaf Example (arxiv.org)
there are 10 properties of blockchain governance
  1. Secrecy
  2. Pseudonymity
  3. coercion-resistance
  4. Individual and Universal Verifiability
  5. Pareto Efficiency
  6. Accountability
  7. Sustainable Development
  8. Sustainable Participation
  9. Liveness
  10. Suffrage
Dash is mentioned in the paper.
Aggelos Kiayias. Philip Lazos said:
Dash
Like Bitcoin, Dash [66] uses a proof-of-work consensus mechanism. However, Dash’s approach to governance takes a formal, on-chain form. The Dash Governance System (DGS) uses a ‘budget and masternode voting system’ to govern and fund the underlying blockchain’s development and maintenance. Masternodes are nodes that can place at least a 1, 000 DASH, the platform’s native token, as a collateral to participate in the consensus protocol and governance process. Each masternode has a single, public, approval vote expressing which improvement proposals the masternode approves of. In each voting cycle (which is roughly a month long), project proposals are submitted and then voted on. Even though anyone can submit a proposal, doing so comes at a cost of 5 DASH to ensure that only serious proposals are voted on. The DGS implements a system very similar to Project Catalyst with one difference: A proposal is eligible for funding if the number of ‘Yes’ votes minus the number of ‘No’ votes is at least 10% of the total masternode count. Additionally, if there are two proposals with the same approval, then the one with a larger proposal transaction hash is ranked higher. The treasury is funded through various channels. When new blocks are mined, 45% of the block reward is reserved for the miner, 10% for the budget and 45% for the masternodes’ reward.
Aggelos Kiayias. Philip Lazos said:
We now perform evaluations of the Dash DGS against the properties developed in Section II.
  1. Confidentiality: – Secrecy: Since the masternodes vote publicly, the DGS does not satisfy secrecy.
  2. Pseudonymity: Masternodes are not required to reveal their real-life identities to participate in the governance process; therefore pseudonymity is satisfied.
  3. Coercion-resistance: Since masternode votes are tied to their chosen pseudo-identities, coercion resistance is not satisfied.
  4. Verifiability. Since the votes and final tally are all public, verifiability is, by definition, satisfied.
  5. Pareto Efficiency. As with Project Catalyst, Pareto Efficiency is only somewhat satisfied.
  6. Accountability. Although masternodes are required to lock 1, 000 DASH to vote, if a group of masternodes vote in a malicious proposal, they will face no negative consequences and will be able to unlock their funds before the malicious proposal is enacted. Therefore, accountability is not satisfied.
  7. Sustainability: Sustainable Development. Although there is no explicit incentive or reward given to the proposing group or individual, it is the responsibility of the proposer to request the amount which represents the value of their work. Therefore, sustainable development is satisfied.
  8. Sustainability: Sustainable Participation. Masternodes are rewarded with part of the block reward for their participation in the consensus and governance process. Therefore, sustainable participation is satisfied.
  9. Liveness. Given the lack of flexibility of the on-chain governance model, the DGS is incapable of taking inputs of urgency and responding to them in accordance to the severity of the issue. Although a Github issue or a pull request could be initiated without going through the formal on-chain route, it is still not the officially defined way by which the system processes inputs. Therefore, liveness is not satisfied.
  10. Suffrage. Since voting eligibility depends on only having at least 1, 000 DASH, token-based suffrage is satisfied.
 
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vazaki3

Active Member
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Unfortunately the poll does not allow me to rank my voting choices, but I consider accountability as the most important one, then liveness.
<vote history>
Which governance property would you like dash to incorporate or improve?

  • Secrecy
    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Pseudonymity
    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Coercion-resistance
    Votes: 1 100.0%
  • Verifiability
    Votes: 00.0%
  • Pareto Efficiency
    Votes: 1 100.0%
  • Accountability
    Votes: 1 100.0%
  • Sustainable Development
    Votes: 00.0%
  • Sustainable Participation
    Votes: 00.0%
  • Liveness
    Votes: 1 100.0%
  • Sufrage
    Votes: 00.0%
  • Total voters 1
</vote history>
 
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vazaki3

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XnpT2YQaYpyh7F9twM6EtDMn1TCDCEEgNX
Aggelos Kiayias. Philip Lazos said:
Definition 6. A blockchain governance system satisfies the property of accountability if whenever participants bring in a change, they are held individually responsible for it in a clearly defined way by the platform.
Examples outside the blockchain space include the work done in Sacco et al. [37], where participants review publications and those having more ‘skin in the game’ (evaluating publications in which they will be marked as co-authors) have an increased individual interest in ensuring that a study’s ambiguously reported methods and analyses are clarified prior to submission. Examples in the blockchain space include Polkadot’s governance system [38], where voters who vote in favour of a proposal will have their stake locked until the proposal is ‘enacted’ or deployed
Polkadot is the only governance system that implements accountability, and not by chance is the second dominant governance crypto (after cardano) in coinmarketcap.

polkadot.network said:
Polkadot institutes a cutting-edge governance model designed to achieve a healthy network that adapts to its users' needs. It is designed to enable rapid and representative community engagement by leveraging blockchain technology for transparency and accountability. The DOT token enables low-friction engagement in Polkadot and provides an innovative level of sophistication and participation in distributed global governance.
Dash had the chance to incorporate accountability. There was a Dash pre-proposal for that, but unfortunatley the forum admins and the Dash masternodes, either due to stupidity or due to deep-shit corruption, they censored the thread.

The voting outcome of the accountability preproposal, just before the shutdown, was:
<vote history>
if there is no delivarable from lamassu, should the Masternodes who voted for it to pay the loss?

</vote history>
 
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peter

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Apr 1, 2015
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voters who vote in favour of a proposal will have their stake locked until the proposal is ‘enacted’ or deployed
IMO a good idea. It's probably not too hard to implement. I would vote for it. Could you please make a proposal?
Peter
 

vazaki3

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IMO a good idea. It's probably not too hard to implement. I would vote for it. Could you please make a proposal?
Peter
I have already made a pre-proposal , for this very issue.

demo said:
The cost of the project was approximately 7000 dash, and 1459 masternodes voted yes so each one of them must give approximately 5 dash , to cover the loss.
And to make it more interesting maybe the 1459 who voted yes should give the money to the 486 who voted no
Why spend 5 dash proposal fee, when the few masternodes that reside here in dashtalk (who at least are able to read) disagree with it?
If those who know how to read disagree with it, what makes you believe that the vote outcome when we include the illiterate masternodes will be better?

You can do it by yourself. Cast a new pre-proposal poll for the subject here in dashtalk, revive the accountability pre-proposal, and observe how stupidity evolves.

 
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vazaki3

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Yes, but it's not the same idea. Refunding is not equal to locking the stake.
My pre-proposal is not about refunding. It is about giving back the money that is lost forever (due to your stupid vote), back to the community. I think it is a better solution than locking the stake for ever.

Think of it, what is the better solution?
Locking the stake forever (this would be the case for Lamassu, in case we had accountability here in Dash) or just give the money back?
What is the benefit of locking the stake forever? The money is lost that way, isnt it? So why not use that money instead of burying it?

" The money you bury deep into the ground, belongs to the poor. You were unfair to as many people as you could have helped and you did not." -- Basil of Caesarea
 
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KateNickolson

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The money you bury deep into the ground, belongs to the poor. You were unfair to as many people as you could have helped and you did not - what beautiful words...
 

vazaki3

Active Member
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Vote history and accountability, it is the same thing.

Stupid mob of masternodes, one day you will be accountable for whatever you voted, and whatever you didnt.

<vote history>
Which governance property would you like dash to incorporate or improve?
  • Secrecy
    Votes: 1 - 50.0%
  • Pseudonymity
    Votes: 0 - 0.0%
  • Coercion-resistance
    Votes: 2 - 100.0%
  • Verifiability
    Votes: 0 - 0.0%
  • Pareto Efficiency
    Votes: 1 - 50.0%
  • Accountability
    Votes: 2 - 100.0%
  • Sustainable Development
    Votes: 0 - 0.0%
  • Sustainable Participation
    Votes: 0 - 0.0%
  • Liveness
    Votes: 2 - 100.0%
  • Sufrage
    Votes: 0 - 0.0%
</vote history>

 
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