- Aug 26, 2015
We are not even spending the 10% budget for a while now and you're concerned we will suddenly spend 20%, even if it's mostly coming out of our pockets? Pfft back to you!
Upping it to 100% of MN rewards would be fine, allowing MNs to get the 10% if they downvote everything is the problem.it was garbage, they wanted to up the treasury to 20% and only have 60% of that come from MNs! Pfft!
The MNO proposal was less objectionable with 100% coming from the MNs.
plan yes no abstainImho you're in denial over the real reason both those proposals failed. Take a look at the results, neither had strong support in either round of voting.
Those figures speak for themselves, "for" and "against" are fairly close to equal. If the common points in those proposals had even reasonable support then both proposals would've had more "for" than "against".plan yes no abstain
DCG 636 435 23
MNO 406 625 40
The results of the first vote demonstrates that the DCG plan would have passed if MNO proponents had accepted defeat and supported the other plan.
I voted against the DCG plan because it was vastly inferior to the MNO plan and contained the risk of a run-away budget due to socalised spending.Did the proponents of the MNO plan refuse to support the DCG plan in the second vote because they thought they would be able to pass the less popular MNO plan at a later date?! Are these people that stubborn?
It might have stood a chance if it's proposed changes had been discussed on more than just Discord. Both plans would have but I doubt we'd have ended up with two competing proposals in that case, we'd have ended up with just one that would have stood a much better chance of passing.Ok, so we will keep the current system. No big deal. But you should acknowledge that the MNO plan is dead. It died when forro proposed it, and it died again when Rion and Hilawe proposed it. It's DOA. Drop it.
Gerhard, Ryan's proposal to lift the budget to 20% of the emitted supply while allowing the MNOs to spend 40% of someone else's money IMO would have caused continued frivolous spending into low value proposals such as DASH.Nigeria for example which recently turned into another KuvaCash, no surprise there. I felt that the only way a 20% budget uplift could be safely forked into the network is if the MNs paid it in full from their own precious rewards. This would mean on the whole any one cycle would not spend the full 20% allotment while also leaving the option to spend the entire compliment when an actual good proposal comes along such establishing a GBTC style Trust.@xkcd would you please explain in detail exactly what you mean when you say that the DCG plan risked "run-away budget due to socalised [sic] spending." I don't think you can because what you've written is nonsense. Just admit that you didn't like it because it was conceived by DCG.
The report in question comes from the MNOWatch.org website and this one https://mnowatch.org/the_results_dashd_2020-11-25-08-25-44.uniqueHashVotes.314.html You will need to use the filters to get the data you want, the two search terms are:@xkcd, do you have records of the final votes on the two proposals? I tried pulling them yesterday but I'm assuming historic votes are pruned out now, only current proposals listed on my client here.
The risk of squandering away 20% of the coinbase for little to no value was too high, I'm sorry. Best to stick to 10% for the time being.We could have implemented the DCG plan and refined it down the road if it was not having the desired effect. Jumping right to 100% MNO funding of proposals was deemed by RT to be too risky. You might have the temerity to disregard RT's advice. I don't.
Thanks to @forro for inviting me to speak on this topic. This is the first time in months I've got some time to contribute.
The concept of financially incentivizing MNO to vote so that they can weed out projects, on the surface appears as though it would work by aligning a financial incentive so that non-worthwhile projects don't get through. However, on further consideration about this issue I realised that it may not actually work the way we want in practical terms. The reasons I say this are as follows:
1. I don't believe that financial incentives should be the primary motivating factor for MNOs to assess a project. The reason for this is their motive would then be purely financial driven. If a person's thinking is solely motivated by finances alone then we are unlikely to get quality decisions made, rather decisions made that would benefit the user financially. If everything comes down to finances we have a type of environment that is all about money and only money.
2. I feel the primary motive for an MNO assessing a project for funding should be driven by something more than just personal financial gain. This is a real desire by the MNO to find and assess a proposal for the benefit of the Dash project as a whole. Such people would have their true intentions of assisting the network first in the heart and mind when looking at a project and will decide on a project based on if it will definitely improve the network as a whole, and not necessarily if they will benefit financially.
3. I feel a much better way to get MNO quality decisions and assessments on projects is for MNOs with a proven track record of positive and constructive contributions to the proposals to have voting keys delegated to those MNOs and for those MNOs to make the decisions and write a report before the funding cycle the reasons why they want to vote for a particular project. An MNO who has delegated their keys can always withdraw the voting keys at any time if they are not happy with the decisions of findings of the delegated MNO.
4. I would, however, like to see a new type of fund setup, from the remaining amount of budget left over from a funding cycle to go to a special fund to create a separate development team from the DCG and that DCG could not access or use this fund. The reason I'm suggesting this is that it would diversify the development team ensuring that we have greater decentralization in the project. My concern is that DCG, and with particular reference to Ryan Taylor is having too much influence in too many management aspects of Dash. Ryan is CEO of Dash core group, he also has involvement with the Trust Protectors and now he is also a member of the DIF where he is clearly, at least from my point of view, influencing other members of the DIF to make decisions that are not in the spirit with a decentralized project. One such example Darren Tapp had formally stated in a written document that no funding would be spent by the DIF without first getting voting decision approval from the network - indeed the network had previously also successfully voted on this very point. However, a week later Darren Tapp and the entire DIF members unilaterally changed their decision and stated they will be making their own decisions without approval from the network - a 180 degree turnaround from what was voted by the network. How is that possible? Since the decision by the DIF matches exactly what Ryan Taylor had stated previously about how the DIF should operate it is clear that Ryan had a strong influence on the DIF to go against what the network had voted for and wanted. It is noted that Darren Tapp works with Arizona State University - the same university which Ryan Taylor funded for a research project that Darren Tapp was a part of if I'm not mistaken. When looking at financial incentives we need to also consider factors such as this which have been shown to have influence on people's decisions whether they wish to acknowledge it or not.
Ryan needs to appreciate and understand that he is likely undermining the reputation and credibility of DASH as a decentralized project by having so many key roles with the management of different Dash projects. I am deeply concerned about this myself. Ryan is clearly creating an atmosphere of centralization and clearly centralized decisions are now happening under Ryan's influence on other DIF members. Clearly Ryan did not like the MNO network vote against his ideas on how the DIF should operate and has now decided to get more closely involved with the DIF to ensure his views of how it should be run are actioned.
I feel we need to actively promote and encourage the creations of more decentralized development groups so that all the power and decision making is not left with just one person or small group of people in DCG. If not, Dash is in danger of becoming centralized and already I can see the the negative effects this is having on the DIF decisions.
Therefore I would really like to see the creation of a new fund to create a new independent development team of DCG and is separately funded and separately managed and is not controlled by DCG. The fund would be derived from the remaining amount of money from the treasury. The fund would not be accessible to DCG. Instead it would go toward developing another independent Dev team that could work on features that DCG does not have the time to address and look into building new functionality on the Dash platform that can increase the attractiveness of DASH as a payment system. Some examples could be creating a Directory of businesses that accept Dash as a payment from within the app.
Creating a decentralized voting system for MNOs to make decisions for the network where the only requirement is to have a Dash Masternode to vote. This could help build the Dash Decentralization Charter that I talked about in my other post here:
Part 4: This post will discuss the concept of a Dash Decentralisation Charter (DDC) a document that stores Dash project core values, guiding principles, best practises, concepts and vision of the DASH cryptocurrency project. The DDC would be similar to the concept of the "Declaration of...www.dash.org
We need to actively work to build and protect Dash as a decentralized project. In order to do this we need funds. We could get the funds from the leftovers of a funding proposal.
This new fund could be called the "Dash Decentalizion promotion fund" which would fund dev and marketing projects completely independently managed of DCG. It would also provide a little competition towards DCG which currently enjoy a monopoly.
In addition if we were to setup an independent Dev team working on some valuable features for DASH that can increase its market penetration then MNOs could then compare the projects funded by the Dash Decentralization project Vs other independent projects and we could then chose which one is likely to give more value to the network.
My view is we have too many eggs in one basket with DCG the way that it is and at the top of the triangle of power sits one person, and we all know what road that goes down....