Is it time to do something? Even bigger projects would be reluctant at that price. I expect it will cost over $5,000 by January.
No refund if your proposal fails. Between here and discord thier is enough ways to build support before diving in and making a proposal.It does have the benefit of keeping out spam and petty proposals, but if someone fronts the money and the Masternodes vote no, they are out a lot of money now. I don't think that's the way Dash wants to treat its fans, personally. Maybe keep the proposal cost fairly high like 2.5 Dash and refund 50% of failed proposals? That way there is still a risk for bad or scam proposals.
The reason it would change is because the network is growing. There is much greater interest and a lot more money to be sought after.Its not fair to count recurring proposals. Having actually submitted two proposals (technically 3), it is not just monetary loss but loss in time as well if your proposal doesn't pass. I would argue that anything over 1 dash does more harm then good at this point. Proposals use to be $50 and there was no spam problem, why would that change? Soon it may not be bad proposals that don't pass but rather better proposals and a lack of available funds that month.
I think asking someone to risk $3000-$5000 for a proposal is too much. It's punishing the community. We will also miss out on great ideas because people do not want to risk such a large sum of money. I don't get a vote on it but I would support 1 Dash. Also, why not a partial refund? If you maintain some loss you will still deter spam. Do you think someone with bad ideas and good faith deserves to be punished?
I agree that refunding the fee for net positive votes would alleviate this issue while maintaining the effectiveness of the spam prevention and deterrent to bad proposals. If it was done automatically then it would mean proposal owners would not even need to keep tacking on the fee to their requested amount as well.One thing that might work is to refund the fee if the net votes are positive and burn the fee if the net votes are negative. This way the masternodes get to decide on a case by case basis.
Thank you for the feedback, we are more than willing to produce a well written and detailed pre-proposal as well as the video explaining our mission statement and goals.If you make a high quality pre-proposal with an engaging and convincing video explaining your project and a detailed budget and plan, I think there are ways to help with the proposal fee.
I like this solution as well. I do think scam proposals should have negative consequences. As well as those who put little effort into their proposal. I still think the Dash core team needs a discretionary budget to fund proposals that they feel are worthwhile. Along with maybe someone to work on treasury issues full time?I agree that refunding the fee for net positive votes would alleviate this issue while maintaining the effectiveness of the spam prevention and deterrent to bad proposals. If it was done automatically then it would mean proposal owners would not even need to keep tacking on the fee to their requested amount as well.
I would be fine with this, but does the core team have time to go through lots of low quality proposals to find a few that might be worthwhile?I still think the Dash core team needs a discretionary budget to fund proposals that they feel are worthwhile.
Interesting ideas, few comments:When the fee was low there was a much lower amount of money available.
I have three possible suggestions:
1) masternode vote which proposals do not get back their fee. So the votes become (Yes, Abstain, No, No and do not get back the fee)
the last one only used for spammy proposals. And from then on we stop people adding the proposal fee to the cost of the proposal
2) the fee must be proportional to the money you are asking. If you ask n dash, then the fee will be n/k (and we need to decide what would have to be k, but we can just pick the average of the last period)
3) people use the fee they want, but proposals are ordered by fee spent.
Do you think it will be approved? or would you?If approved, the proposal can be reimbursed....this can effectively prevent excessive fraud suggestions..
This is a government decision, but who is gonna paid 5 dash for it?I like the idea that any proposals with more 'Yes' than 'No' votes should be refunded (even if the proposal does not pass).
This means the proposer is on the right track but needs to make some improvements and revisions to get it passed in the future.
Hi @UdjinM6 , thanks for replying me. If the system needs to lower the number of proposals that are considered it means that the governance is too centralised, and we have to redesign it (I am available, you know). We don't need all masternodes to evaluate all the proposals. The system can randomly select some masternode to evaluate some proposals. So each proposal is always evaluated by at least x masternodes (x > 100). And the bigger the fee requested is, the more masternode need to evaluate it. So I would say that the fee structure should only be to prevent spam. If not we are tying our own legs. Basically this is telling me that DASH is working much better than all the other systems. We have much more money available than other systems, there are a lot of ideas how to use this money. But masternodes are unable to follow all of those proposals and have become the bottleneck. To avoid this you force people to pay 3000$ for each proposal. What a terrible idea!1) We could probably use another "signal" for that e.g. "endorsed" which is not used right now (we only use "funding" for manual voting now). So it would be smth like adding a rule "if AbsoluteYesCount for `endorsed` is < 0 then withhold the fee otherwise pay fee back automatically". This would separate funding support from actual anti-spam actions by MNOs a bit more clearly IMO and should already fit into existing vote structure.
You made the same assumption that @UdjinM6 did. That the proposals should be judged in a limited time frame, then expire and be rejected for ever.We don't need all masternodes to evaluate all the proposals. The system can randomly select some masternode to evaluate some proposals. So each proposal is always evaluated by at least x masternodes (x > 100). And the bigger the fee requested is, the more masternode need to evaluate it.
There is no way, as long as the proposals expire within a month. But proposals should never expire, should always be available to be voted. And the MNOs should be allowed to browse the proposal tree and vote an old or a new proposal, whithout time constrains.... there is no way MNOs can review 250+ single proposals of this size IMO. .
No proposal should be rejected or expire. All proposals should stay always alive (and classified in a proposal tree), waiting for a (predecided/voted) threshold of YES votes to be reached in order for them to be able to get funded by the monthly budget. This system will always spend 100% of the available money.
That's a completely different model. And an interesting one. I would't just agree to it as I would need to see the consequences. Like what if people suggest things that are not neutral or beneficial to the dash network, but hinder it. You might not want to find those proposals even if they were the only one to remain. Also money that is not used is not printed. And the less money is printed, the more the dash value will grow. So some masternodes might decide that a proposal is not worth the inflation it induces.No proposal should be rejected. All proposals should stay always alive (and classified in a proposal tree), waiting for a (predecided/voted) threshold of YES votes to be reached in order for them to be able to get funded by the monthly budget. This system will always spend 100% of the available money.
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The YES threshold could be defined as a percentage of the total MNO population. In case people tend to suggest bad things in the proposal tree, this adaptive and voted YES threshold could increase, in order for the proposals to be able to be reviewed by more MNOs. In that case of course, and as long as the precentage of the YES votes is (adaptively) voted by the MNOs to be too high, then there is no garanty that 100% of the monthly budget will be spend. But if we allow the MNOs to vote this threshold number repeatedly and adaptively, then they will finally discover the optimal equilibrium that fits the best to the current community needs.That's a completely different model. And an interesting one. I would't just agree to it as I would need to see the consequences. Like what if people suggest things that are not neutral or beneficial to the dash network, but hinder it. You might not want to find those proposals even if they were the only one to remain.
I dont understand this argument. The proposal tree will allow searching, tags, and classification. So no need to browse it all. Each masternode could browse only the part of the branch that he is specialized to it, or interested in it, and delegate to another masternode the rest of the branch.Also money that is not used is not printed. And the less money is printed, the more the dash value will grow. So some masternodes might decide that a proposal is not worth the inflation it induces.