You understood correctly. QE and i looked at scenarios that are close to extreme. So yes, if a whale owned 100 nodes, then we'd have calculated for 120/140 nodes.
Let's do the same calculation with 20% more than they currently have
1k Solution: P = (1 - (1 - 0.0013)^8544) = 38.66%
4k Solution: P = (1 - (1 - 0.0003)^8544) = 5.84%
10k Solution: 0 (best, +20% can never give them ability to stop network)
There is a technical limit to what is optimal for performance of the currently implemented Platform (Evo) while using acceptable number of nodes for decentralization. Mentioned was something around 200. So take 200 as the target number of nodes and propose the initial fee storage costs from that 200 count. Cap the number of possible Evo nodes to 200 - there cannot be more.we get into the problem that since we don't know how many nodes their will be (there is no optimal market equilibrium) we can't propose initial fee storage costs.
I will answer tomorrow
At network start (no fees generated) AND Assuming platform nodes get slightly more rewards (educated guesses on how the system will stabilise).
All nodes run platform: 6.11%
4K split system:
10K split system:
At network start (no fees generated) AND Assuming platform nodes get slightly more rewards AND platform nodes run stronger hardware to better server the network and ensure their profits(educated guesses on how the system will stabilize and hardware used).
All nodes run platform: 6.11%
4K split system:
10K split system:
Looking at QE's answer the whale owning 20% more (instead of 40% more) then he currently has, leads to the following percentages :
source : https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/...gh-performance-nodes.53374/page-7#post-232375
Is that correct ? Or do we only use the percentages as mentioned here ? --> https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/...h-performance-nodes.53374/page-10#post-232464 (and calculate them further over the entire time frame)
Maybe it is better to get some verification of the percentage numbers on both 20% more nodes for whales and 40% more nodes for whales, calculated over the entire time frames for each solution. For easy comparising. I feel like i am comparing apples to oranges right now.
Current proposed solutions : Platform on all nodes, 4K HPM system, 10K HPM system.
1: If Tendermint has a deterministic protocol and TenderDash is a fork of Tendermint, why are the Platform rewards not deterministic of nature as well ? Why are they probabilistic of nature ? (causing a certain degree of uncertainty in their payouts after an epoch)
2 : If we look at your statement from one of your previous posts ... How come estimates for rewards gives HP masternodes on the 4K HPM and 10K HPM solution a higher annual yield return, then normal masternodes ?
There is a technical limit to what is optimal for performance of the currently implemented Platform (Evo) while using acceptable number of nodes for decentralization. Mentioned was something around 200. So take 200 as the target number of nodes and propose the initial fee storage costs from that 200 count. Cap the number of possible Evo nodes to 200 - there cannot be more.
Keep Evo nodes out from getting core rewards, which probably means they no longer need to support core. In other words, anybody can start running Evo node and compete for being in the group of 200. That is the most open scenario for competition. In my opinion that is OK to start with - to see the demand of the network to have Evo up and running. This option does not require any voting, because it will be non-coercive upgrade as usual associated with a software package for Evo node. The vote is running an Evo node.
For sake of security though it might be required to prove ownership of 1, 2, 3 or more master-nodes in order to run Evo node. That may or may not be introduced later. The requirement of proving MN ownership would provide some level of decentralization (or at least its analysis) based on the MN network.
For the performance sake there must be a way to measure / evaluate the performance - there is no way around that, no matter the size or juiciness of a "carrot". Start with some trivial evaluation, such as reading /proc/cpuinfo and /proc/meminfo to test the machine before installation and at every start-up. Obviously DCG would later have to figure out some mechanism how an Evo node can be evaluated for performance from other machine over the net. And thus keep up the competition for nodes performing bellow certain threshold level by being potentially replaced with a new candidate node of a sufficient performance.
I am not sure what you are asking, there are three scenarios, two of which where the HPM get slightly more yield. Are you asking why we chose to model the stabilisation of the yield at such values? Because there are social factors at play on top of the economical ones. Upgrading takes some efforts, might be scary as it's a change, if your node goes down it's scarier... There is a certain value gain where probably most nodes if not all would simply not bother doing the upgrade for. As to what that value is if it exists, i do not know, Rion made the bulk of calculations and then QE looked at what happens if the yield have such a slight difference. Hence the "educated guess" part.
The subject is quite simple.
Increasing collateral means decreasing the number of entities involved in quorums. That's an act of centralization by pure definition. So the question is: do we want to trade some decentralization for better perfomance, lesser fees, higher speed and easier coding?
My answer is NO.
Take your choice, guys.
- If all the nodes support Platform and a state order falls in say... America to not support Platform, all nodes at AWS for example will go down. A lot of MNs are hosted at AWS right, qwizzie? This feels to me like a very unsafe possibility. And it has happened to other projects in the recent past afaik. ^ this is in my opinion perhaps the most important thing to consider with this poll. Forcing all nodes to participate does not make it more censorship resistant but instead makes the network weaker. ^
- This number of nodes can be tweaked in the future to what suits the network best.
No, i am more interested in this part of my question to you (although it is not really framed as a question, more as an observation) :
These percentage numbers on estimated annual yield from DCG research team and your own statement that having a separate set of node does not put whales at an economic advantage, seem to mismatch. There does seem to be an economic advantage for whales (although a very small one).
This is by looking at the percentage numbers provided by QE (obtained i assume, from his research team).
See : https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/...gh-performance-nodes.53374/page-7#post-232371
I highlighted that economic advantage in green in my previous post.
I am unsure of the point you are trying to convey, but blockchain as a field is heavily based on game theory. Such analysis simply follow the path set forth by the whole field previously.
What if the 10K HPM solution is voted in and it turns out that most of the 10K HPM's are setup through AWS ?
Same problem, correct ? Maybe even more of a problem as this group is much smaller....
Anyways, this is the current state (pretty decent decentralized at the moment)
View attachment 11460
Source : https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/#!network
If Platform is banned, it must not impact the Core chain.
Also, as stated, if censorship do happen and some Platform nodes go down, a free market situation does enable other nodes in another country to simply take over the now increased yield.
No it is not, the trigger that made Satoshi nakamto build bitcoin was because of the abuse of the centralized powers during 2008 banking crisis.
It seems like Dash its leadership has lost it's roots completely, decentralisation just seems like a marketing term at this point, and Dash is really not going to get away with it with just 180HP masternodes, 450 does not sound much better either.
This is where Evan Duffield was aiming at when he decided on the number a 1000Dash. A number to high to cause centralisation, but low enough that it would still be fast enough to serve the whole world one day.
Stop thinking with just your logical part of the brain, use your emotional part of the brain, research and realize that what I am saying has been proven to be truth time and time again.
In a way it would be much more difficult to ban Dash Platform on the Platform on all nodes solution (you would need to ban Dash as cryptocurrency everywhere), then to ban Dash Platform on the 4K HPM solution or the 10K HPM solution (you can just single out HPM's).
That's exactly what I fear most: censorship happen and nodes decided to censor the network ARE NOT going down.
But thank you for your answer. Yes, indeed, there is a certain point of balance in centralization / decentralization. Right now there are about 1000 of entities validating the network through PoS and unknown number of miners doing their job with PoW. With HPMNs Platform will only have a few or several dozens of PoS validators - that's the same with market right now and absolutely not enough, as it seems to me.