Self-sustainable Decentralized Governance by Blockchain

[fulltimegeek]

I like the way Solarminer presented it much better. Time scales in months or years are useless, you might as well go join the Bitcoiners.

There needs to be some sort of time commitment by the masternodes that voted YES to the spending proposal or they can easily change thier vote within 2.5 minutes after all is said and done. If I was a developer with DASH payouts as my only source of income, I would need the security of knowing that I am at least getting payments of those who initially voted "YES" for the yearly, spending proposal.

This concept would give the Masternode OPs The Power Of The Purse just like congress. Either we vote to spend on the DASH government(spending proposal) or save money into an escrow for next year's spending proposal. Saving is beneficial in multiple ways, it decreases supply and also acts as a nest egg for large-scale projects if the need arises.

Edit:

Also, since only one spending proposal can be elected via votes per year, the submitter would pretty much be the point of contact as to how things are running (if they're not anonymous). He/she would most likely be the representative/face of the DASH governance for that years time. I, as a MNO, am not going to be reading about every project in the proposal but will depend heavily on the reputation of the submitter(s) of the spending proposal(i.e. Evan Duffield).

 

[Solarminer]

The only problem you bring up that is valid is, is the wallet that holds these funds safe? That question has to be answered by Evan er al, because I don't know how funds can be secured from theft completely.

Ah, you are seeing the light.

The question of the safety of the wallet is not just a developer/technical dilemma. The crypto space has attacks from all entities. All that has to happen is 1 DASH is involved in a drug deal, terrorist activity, money laundering, or transaction that is too big, or....and the government/banking system will go after the "masterfund" that supports it all. It may not even make sense, it may not even be a legal confiscation. Why even make the target?

 

[thelonecrouton]

There needs to be some sort of time commitment by the masternodes that voted YES to the projects or they can easily change thier vote within 2.5 minutes after all is said and done. If I was a developer with DASH payouts as my only source of income, I would need the security of knowing that I am at least getting payments of those who initially voted "YES" for the spending proposal.

Both the Solarminer and Camosoul variants of the funding proposal can accommodate such requirements. Remember that it's up to the proposer to lay out their proposal and specify what they need in terms of funding, and when they need it. Not all proposals are going to be the same or have identical requirements, and we shouldn't try to shoe horn them all into the same mold. There's plenty of flexibility possible.

This concept would give the Masternode OPs The Power Of The Purse just like congress. Either we vote to spend on the DASH government(spending proposal) or save money into an escrow for next year's spending proposal. Saving is beneficial in multiple ways, it decreases supply and also acts as a nest egg for large-scale projects if the need arises.

See the many previous posts explaining why the pork barrel is a terrible idea.

 

[thelonecrouton]

How is this different from when it was taken from the miners and given to the masternodes? Why shouldn't a third arm that provides services (development) be paid?

They should be paid, in the same way that miners and MNs are paid - as they go and upon service provided, not upfront.

Given the piss-poor job miners as a whole do of securing the blockchain, with 90% of the lazy sods mining on the same 3 pools, I think 40% to the miners is generous. Blockchain security is the very foundation of DASH, the miners should be subject to minimum decentralisation performance standards. :tongue: And I say that as a miner.

The situation is different this time in that with the introduction of MNs, 100% of block reward was still going to infrastructure providers.

 

[chatterbox]

Mandatory payment, or taxation, to fund the development would certainly provide funding, but only at the cost our monetary freedom. Mandatory payment should be avoided, and I think it can be. I think implementing a system that allows the people to donate to projects that have been approved will prove satisfactory in funding of development. If a certain minimum is not met, funding from a source controlled by the foundation may be called to provide for that minimum. (The minimum would need to be defined)

Implementing a system for voting based on current stake for the lower decisions and master-node owners at the upper is a more fair and appropriate organization, IMO.

This would be similar to the US legislative body House and Senate. There could then be self-governing rules in place to act as checks-and-balances. Perhaps each house gets 50/50 vote.

On top of this, the Dash Foundation should reserve the right to propose core development and to veto decisions with a 2/3 vote majority or more.

Finally, if the people cannot get along, they may fork (revolution)?

 

[Solarminer]

They should be paid, in the same way that miners and MNs are paid - as they go and upon service provided, not upfront.

Given the piss-poor job miners as a whole do of securing the blockchain, with 90% of the lazy sods mining on the same 3 pools, I think 40% to the miners is generous. Blockchain security is the very foundation of DASH, the miners should be subject to minimum decentralisation performance standards. :tongue: And I say that as a miner.

The situation is different this time in that with the introduction of MNs, 100% of block reward was still going to infrastructure providers.

As a past pool owner, I can say that there is almost no money in running a pool. It would also be much easier for a pool to just take miners funds than to try to do an attack on the network. So I don't see that mining to 3 pools is that big of a deal. If we pushed a reward out to P2P nodes we could force some decentralized hashrate. I don't see this as an issue. But if there are others that think it is important it could be brought up to a vote.

 

[Solarminer]

Mandatory payment, or taxation, to fund the development would certainly provide funding, but only at the cost our monetary freedom. Mandatory payment should be avoided, and I think it can be. I think implementing a system that allows the people to donate to projects that have been approved will prove satisfactory in funding of development. If a certain minimum is not met, funding from a source controlled by the foundation may be called to provide for that minimum. (The minimum would need to be defined)

Implementing a system for voting based on current stake for the lower decisions and master-node owners at the upper is a more fair and appropriate organization, IMO.

This would be similar to the US legislative body House and Senate. There could then be self-governing rules in place to act as checks-and-balances. Perhaps each house gets 50/50 vote.

On top of this, the Dash Foundation should reserve the right to propose core development and to veto decisions with a 2/3 vote majority or more.

Finally, if the people cannot get along, they may fork (revolution)?

I understand your train of thought here. Keep in mind that masternodes have 1000 DASH so they are a good sample of the investor. They are also the best to determining the tradoff between immediate rewards lost vs long term DASH value gain.

If you start having a 'voting proxy' such as a senate or house vote system, it will eventually get corrupted. Now we have bills that go through that a party contributor(name fortune 500 company here) will get a few paragraphs in it to increase their bottom line. It is really a pay per vote system to promote the biggest companies. This system may have been the best way 200 years ago when a letter and stamp was the fastest method of communication, but there is really no reason to look at this now.

I would look at this a different way. Instead of the DASH Foundation having additional rights, they should offer guidance. The Foundation can create projects to vote on. Give timelines/long term goals for what they think would be best for DASH and why. Communicate issues with code problems or changes requested by outside parties.

If the foundation has masternodes, then they vote based on how many masternodes they own. There should also be a way to vote out a project with a masternode vote, but that shouldn't only be a Foundation decision.

 

[Solarminer]

There needs to be some sort of time commitment by the masternodes that voted YES to the spending proposal or they can easily change thier vote within 2.5 minutes after all is said and done. If I was a developer with DASH payouts as my only source of income, I would need the security of knowing that I am at least getting payments of those who initially voted "YES" for the yearly, spending proposal.

This concept would give the Masternode OPs The Power Of The Purse just like congress. Either we vote to spend on the DASH government(spending proposal) or save money into an escrow for next year's spending proposal. Saving is beneficial in multiple ways, it decreases supply and also acts as a nest egg for large-scale projects if the need arises.

Edit:

Also, since only one spending proposal can be elected via votes per year, the submitter would pretty much be the point of contact as to how things are running (if they're not anonymous). He/she would most likely be the representative/face of the DASH governance for that years time. I, as a MNO, am not going to be reading about every project in the proposal but will depend heavily on the reputation of the submitter(s) of the spending proposal(i.e. Evan Duffield).

It sounds like that one proposal per year should be a good one. If it doesn't get voted on that is another year without any development. We can be much faster than this. 3 mo is about right for a 2week vote. Masternodes are already having to update nodes every few weeks and get than done in a few days. This shouldn't be an issue.

I was thinking the votes are open for 2 weeks. Then the projects move through. Projects can only be voted out with a removal proposal and a majority no vote.

Congress is broken. Please don't bring it up like it is a good idea.

 

[fulltimegeek]

It sounds like that one proposal per year should be a good one. If it doesn't get voted on that is another year without any development. We can be much faster than this. 3 mo is about right for a 2week vote. Masternodes are already having to update nodes every few weeks and get than done in a few days. This shouldn't be an issue.

I was thinking the votes are open for 2 weeks. Then the projects move through. Projects can only be voted out with a removal proposal and a majority no vote.

Congress is broken. Please don't bring it up like it is a good idea.

3 months for every spending proposal sounds okay to me. I just don't want to have to vote every day on some new project that I do not have time to study up on.

Also, I totally agree with you with the current state of congress. But, to the best of my knowledge, it did work relatively well when the Constitutional Republic first began. Of course, there are a slew of people that would 100% disagree with that statement.

 

[chatterbox]

Congress is broken. Please don't bring it up like it is a good idea.

There are problems with nearly every system, but finding the most fair is the goal. There will be no perfect system agreed by all. I think the US congressional system has been effective despite its shortcomings. I do not know of any governance that's more fair but I'm open to suggestions better.

Congress is not broken, but the politicians. That's what happens when you trust liars.

 

[Solarminer]

One example. Why did the tax on internet service get implemented this year? Was it because of a public vote? Was there a need for some critical infrastructure improvement? Was there an additional service added? NO. Pork Barrel.

Humans in charge = Pork Barrel. Enough said.

Distributed voting = masternodes only. Done. No humans in the middle to screw it up.

 

[camosoul]

The title of the thread does contain the word "governance" for a reason...

The objective is to create a ruleset that assures that there isn't that potential for abuse, even if all the MN operators are scum.

MN operators are meant to fulfill a new role in this proposal. The added burden expected of them only makes sense to keep the payment schedule as it was, and let them decide if the money is worth it.

Again, we see the bullshit argument of "all the masternodes will just vote no all the time" tossed around. Masternodes don't make any money if the coin sucks... If they stifle their own progress, they end up surpassed by another project. Pretending not to see this in order to propagate an empty argument is a waste of everyone's time.

It's not a full-on government. It's just a project determination team. They'll be taking a lot of time out of their lives to read proposals and weigh their worth. And the choices they make directly affect their value. A lot more than they affect the value of people who can't afford a masternode... There is a motivation coupled with an obligation, and in my proposal, no pork barrel to abuse.

If you don't mine, funds are not held in escrow until your internet connection comes back up.

If your MN daemon crashes, you don't get paid for week after week of not providing service.

This isn't about the output, but the input. I think that is where the disconnect is coming in most of this debate. It's not about where the money is going, but where it comes from.

Money is not taken from the block reward when your MN isn't providing service. Money is not taken from the block reward when you're not mining. There's a reason this model exists. Abuse.

Money should not be taken from the block reward when there's no job to do.

Governance. Government... The most corrupt, and abuse-prone environment of all time. And add to it, cryptotards... To establish an abuse-able model of governance under such extreme circumstances is unforgivably, magically stupid. If it was a bad idea in MNs and Mining, how could it be a good idea in a position of much easier, and assured, abuse?

If it doesn't make sense to shoot yourself in the foot, how can it make sense to nuke yourself in the brain? It's the typical democrat argument: "The reason our crazy, dumbass plan isn't working, is because we haven't made it dumb and crazy enough! If everyone who disagrees would just let us go completely off the deep end, we'd have utopia within a week!"

Removal of the pre-determination of block reward model makes no sense in carefully code-controlled scenarios. Giving some of that control to humans only makes it that much more important to maintain such control, not let loose the reigns and trust that there aren't any bad people in crypto...

We're trying to turn the greed into a productive measure by forcing the only way to profit from it to be benefiting the whole project. Peeling off block rewards in advance and sticking them in a pork barrel just creates an opportunity to abuse and funnel block rewards straight into your pocket without doing anything. This defeats the whole point of keeping block rewards in the block without proven, verified REASON BEFORE THEY ARE removed from the block.

!!!Absolutely NOTHING is worth compromising the integrity of that model!!!
​

We can rebuild it, we have the technology... And since MN operators are obligated to no be dumbasses for their own good, that means 6 million dollar masternodes.

 

[Solarminer]

Your post keeps getting better the longer I look at it. I figured saying Pork Barrel would bring you back.

 

[poiuty]

Hey guys.
Sorry for the bad english.
Voting rights should be available to all users. If it goes through the mechanism masternodes, we need to reduce the requirements to 1000DASH to 100 ~ 10DASH.

I think that at the moment we have a large percentage of central masternodes.
I find this when I wrote statistics => http://p2pool.pl/dash/pages/stats.php#masternode
A large number of MN is placed on the same subnet => there are about 806.

82.211.21.0/24 => 228
93.127.247.0/24 => 76
91.108.83.0/24 => 64
5.135.104.0/24 => 63
37.59.212.0/24 => 63
178.33.144.0/24 => 63
176.31.145.0/24 => 61
93.127.226.0/24 => 44
185.77.129.0/24 => 40
179.43.128.0/24 => 40
104.255.33.0/24 => 34
151.80.5.0/24 => 27
37.59.247.0/24 => 23
178.33.98.0/24 => 23
46.228.193.0/24 => 21
192.99.184.0/24 => 20

Some use a single server. For example network 82.211.21.0/24 (228MN)
You can check this by making the trace. ICMP from this server is turned off.

82.211.21.184

                                           My traceroute  [v0.85]
p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:03:51 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     5    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. 37.187.9.253                                                    0.0%     4    0.4   0.4   0.3   0.4   0.0
3. gra-g2-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     4    2.0   1.5   0.8   2.2   0.0
4. 37.187.36.49                                                    0.0%     4    2.5   2.4   2.4   2.5   0.0
5. fra-5-6k.fr.eu                                                  0.0%     4   10.1  10.3  10.1  10.5   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     4   10.3  17.1  10.2  37.7  13.7
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     4   10.5  10.4  10.3  10.5   0.0
8. ???

82.211.21.185

p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:04:13 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     3    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. ???
3. gra-g1-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     3    0.9   0.8   0.7   0.9   0.0
4. 37.187.36.47                                                    0.0%     3    3.9   2.8   2.2   3.9   0.7
5. fra-1-6k.de.eu                                                  0.0%     2   10.3  10.3  10.2  10.3   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     2   10.2  10.2  10.2  10.3   0.0
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     2   10.9  10.6  10.3  10.9   0.0
8. ???

Moreover, several other placed on one MN IP. When I was collecting statistics, there were ~ 380.
http://pastebin.com/845FUPu8

Total 806 + 380 = 1166 MN. I think you need to reduce the requirements for MN with 1000DRK to 100 ~ 10DRK.
In this case, we will increase the number of nodes and increase the decentralization of the network MN.
And as it will give the opportunity to vote to all users.

Owner MN - easy to find. Since node runs on Public IP.
In fact, 2,500 people have openly declared that they own 50-60% of the volume of all the coins in the DASH.
What will happen when the price rise? Maybe someone interested in these people?
What prevents confiscate or take away from them, these coins?


P2Pools useful for the network.
A large network is better protected against attacks than a centralized pool
P2Pool will protect network from centralizes pools. And cant get 51%
Money for dotane p2pool suggest getting some of those ~ 15%

 

[thelonecrouton]

Hey guys.
Sorry for the bad english.
Voting rights should be available to all users. If it goes through the mechanism masternodes, we need to reduce the requirements to 1000DASH to 100 ~ 10DASH.

I think that at the moment we have a large percentage of central masternodes.
I find this when I wrote statistics => http://p2pool.pl/dash/pages/stats.php#masternode
A large number of MN is placed on the same subnet => there are about 806.

82.211.21.0/24 => 228
93.127.247.0/24 => 76
91.108.83.0/24 => 64
5.135.104.0/24 => 63
37.59.212.0/24 => 63
178.33.144.0/24 => 63
176.31.145.0/24 => 61
93.127.226.0/24 => 44
185.77.129.0/24 => 40
179.43.128.0/24 => 40
104.255.33.0/24 => 34
151.80.5.0/24 => 27
37.59.247.0/24 => 23
178.33.98.0/24 => 23
46.228.193.0/24 => 21
192.99.184.0/24 => 20

Some use a single server. For example network 82.211.21.0/24 (228MN)
You can check this by making the trace. ICMP from this server is turned off.

82.211.21.184

                                           My traceroute  [v0.85]
p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:03:51 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     5    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. 37.187.9.253                                                    0.0%     4    0.4   0.4   0.3   0.4   0.0
3. gra-g2-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     4    2.0   1.5   0.8   2.2   0.0
4. 37.187.36.49                                                    0.0%     4    2.5   2.4   2.4   2.5   0.0
5. fra-5-6k.fr.eu                                                  0.0%     4   10.1  10.3  10.1  10.5   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     4   10.3  17.1  10.2  37.7  13.7
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     4   10.5  10.4  10.3  10.5   0.0
8. ???

82.211.21.185

p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:04:13 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     3    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. ???
3. gra-g1-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     3    0.9   0.8   0.7   0.9   0.0
4. 37.187.36.47                                                    0.0%     3    3.9   2.8   2.2   3.9   0.7
5. fra-1-6k.de.eu                                                  0.0%     2   10.3  10.3  10.2  10.3   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     2   10.2  10.2  10.2  10.3   0.0
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     2   10.9  10.6  10.3  10.9   0.0
8. ???

Moreover, several other placed on one MN IP. When I was collecting statistics, there were ~ 380.
http://pastebin.com/845FUPu8

Total 806 + 380 = 1166 MN. I think you need to reduce the requirements for MN with 1000DRK to 100 ~ 10DRK.
In this case, we will increase the number of nodes and increase the decentralization of the network MN.
And as it will give the opportunity to vote to all users.

Owner MN - easy to find. Since node runs on Public IP.
In fact, 2,500 people have openly declared that they own 50-60% of the volume of all the coins in the DASH.
What will happen when the price rise? Maybe someone interested in these people?
What prevents confiscate or take away from them, these coins?


P2Pools useful for the network.
A large network is better protected against attacks than a centralized pool
P2Pool will protect network from centralizes pools. And cant get 51%
Money for dotane p2pool suggest getting some of those ~ 15%

I applaud your detective work, I had guessed that half the MNs were owned by about 6 people.

Changing the MN DASH requirement will not help the current or future distribution though. The rich will just add more MNs at a proportional rate. It would however cost Mr 806 and Mr 380 (and everyone else) a shitload of additional expense acquiring ten times as many IPv4 addresses.

Dog help you all though, your post has caused me to revisit a thought I have had before:

Reduce the MN collateral requirement to say 100 DASH and get rid of the static IP requirement. Have the network select a sufficiently sized random subset of MNs from the now 10X bigger total each block... combine this with my miner subsetting proposal ( https://dashtalk.org/threads/crouto...-exclusionary-dead-end.4735/page-3#post-52621) and the every aspect of the DASH network becomes literally unbreakable while a functional internet exists. Zero centralisation of anything.

Nakamoto > Duffield > Crouton :tongue:

 

[Minotaur]

Hey guys.
Sorry for the bad english.
Voting rights should be available to all users. If it goes through the mechanism masternodes, we need to reduce the requirements to 1000DASH to 100 ~ 10DASH.

I think that at the moment we have a large percentage of central masternodes.
I find this when I wrote statistics => http://p2pool.pl/dash/pages/stats.php#masternode
A large number of MN is placed on the same subnet => there are about 806.

82.211.21.0/24 => 228
93.127.247.0/24 => 76
91.108.83.0/24 => 64
5.135.104.0/24 => 63
37.59.212.0/24 => 63
178.33.144.0/24 => 63
176.31.145.0/24 => 61
93.127.226.0/24 => 44
185.77.129.0/24 => 40
179.43.128.0/24 => 40
104.255.33.0/24 => 34
151.80.5.0/24 => 27
37.59.247.0/24 => 23
178.33.98.0/24 => 23
46.228.193.0/24 => 21
192.99.184.0/24 => 20

Some use a single server. For example network 82.211.21.0/24 (228MN)
You can check this by making the trace. ICMP from this server is turned off.

82.211.21.184

                                           My traceroute  [v0.85]
p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:03:51 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     5    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. 37.187.9.253                                                    0.0%     4    0.4   0.4   0.3   0.4   0.0
3. gra-g2-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     4    2.0   1.5   0.8   2.2   0.0
4. 37.187.36.49                                                    0.0%     4    2.5   2.4   2.4   2.5   0.0
5. fra-5-6k.fr.eu                                                  0.0%     4   10.1  10.3  10.1  10.5   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     4   10.3  17.1  10.2  37.7  13.7
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     4   10.5  10.4  10.3  10.5   0.0
8. ???

82.211.21.185

p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:04:13 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     3    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. ???
3. gra-g1-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     3    0.9   0.8   0.7   0.9   0.0
4. 37.187.36.47                                                    0.0%     3    3.9   2.8   2.2   3.9   0.7
5. fra-1-6k.de.eu                                                  0.0%     2   10.3  10.3  10.2  10.3   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     2   10.2  10.2  10.2  10.3   0.0
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     2   10.9  10.6  10.3  10.9   0.0
8. ???

Moreover, several other placed on one MN IP. When I was collecting statistics, there were ~ 380.
http://pastebin.com/845FUPu8

Total 806 + 380 = 1166 MN. I think you need to reduce the requirements for MN with 1000DRK to 100 ~ 10DRK.
In this case, we will increase the number of nodes and increase the decentralization of the network MN.
And as it will give the opportunity to vote to all users.

Owner MN - easy to find. Since node runs on Public IP.
In fact, 2,500 people have openly declared that they own 50-60% of the volume of all the coins in the DASH.
What will happen when the price rise? Maybe someone interested in these people?
What prevents confiscate or take away from them, these coins?


P2Pools useful for the network.
A large network is better protected against attacks than a centralized pool
P2Pool will protect network from centralizes pools. And cant get 51%
Money for dotane p2pool suggest getting some of those ~ 15%

I think you may be reaching the wrong conclusion based on this analysis, what this is showing you in reality is the nodes that are run by masternode hosting services. A lot of community members do not run their own nodes, so these services, like Flare, Node40, Splawik, etc, run a lot of nodes and then people just start those nodes from their local wallets. So this info is interesting but not in the way it was thought of initially.

 

[poiuty]

Minotaur
I know about these hosting services.
This is also a problem. This centralization.
I did not write that all nodes owned by one person.

Also do not forget about this list.
http://pastebin.com/845FUPu8

 

[thelonecrouton]

Oblox found Mr 380 I think a while back:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg11090498#msg11090498
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg11099327#msg11099327

Definitely looks like a hell of a Masternode factory.

 

[camosoul]

Your post keeps getting better the longer I look at it. I figured saying Pork Barrel would bring you back.

There is some merit to your "contribute = vote" concept as well. My idea and your's can co-exist in the same model, which is why I haven't said much in response to your posts; you said it well enough already.

If you decided not to put money in, you don't get a say. Being forced is wrong. Personally, I'm willing to concede that much as long it's only shaved off when there's a valid job in queue. But, I can see how some take the hard line of opposing tax/extortion. Especially as the matter has been tabled in the OP... It's a poison pill in it's current form.

I can hodl without having an MN... And it is true; we can always dump our DASH and go do something else. If tragically bad decisions are made, that's exactly what smart money does.

 

[camosoul]

Voting rights should be available to all users.

No. The stupid, entitled brats should not be allowed to vote for free stuff. If you suck at life so bad that you can't come up with a Masternode, you sure as hell shouldn't be making choices for the future of the coin.

Only qualified, intelligent, informed people should be making these decisions. MN Operators are this demographic. Well, they're supposed to be. The Guides have tainted that, but they're learning, at least, sort of... That, notwithstanding, even the crappiest MN Operator is better than the cryptotard ouija board abbreviation hype rabble.

 

[camosoul]

Oblox found Mr 380 I think a while back:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg11090498#msg11090498
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg11099327#msg11099327

Definitely looks like a hell of a Masternode factory.

Someone forgot to include my initial harpoons...

Looks like coinmarketcap.com has picked up on the trolling bullshit and is marking DASH as a pre-mined coin to drive off market support so they can buy moar for themselves...

Bitcoin's initiation graph is much, much worse than this... In fact, it's hard to find any mine-able coin that doesn't look the same or worse... Anyways, OT.

 

[camosoul]

D'oh! I forgot, no voting system is complete without the option to vote for My Left Nut.

 

[poiuty]

No. The stupid, entitled brats should not be allowed to vote for free stuff. If you suck at life so bad that you can't come up with a Masternode, you sure as hell shouldn't be making choices for the future of the coin.

Only qualified, intelligent, informed people should be making these decisions. MN Operators are this demographic. Well, they're supposed to be. The Guides have tainted that, but they're learning, at least, sort of... That, notwithstanding, even the crappiest MN Operator is better than the cryptotard ouija board abbreviation hype rabble.

This is just your opinion.
In a decentralized network, all users have the same rights.

 

[snogcel]

The title of the thread does contain the word "governance" for a reason...

The objective is to create a ruleset that assures that there isn't that potential for abuse, even if all the MN operators are scum.

MN operators are meant to fulfill a new role in this proposal. The added burden expected of them only makes sense to keep the payment schedule as it was, and let them decide if the money is worth it.

Again, we see the bullshit argument of "all the masternodes will just vote no all the time" tossed around. Masternodes don't make any money if the coin sucks... If they stifle their own progress, they end up surpassed by another project. Pretending not to see this in order to propagate an empty argument is a waste of everyone's time.

I'm not really agreeing with your statement that this is a bullshit argument. You of all people should know that the vast majority of people are idiots (this is basically a direct quote from the last 200 posts you've made). We've seen it before with Block Enforcement, really on both sides of the equation: MN owners complaining they aren't receiving frequent payments, and earlier on miners complaining they were being taxed. With enforcement off it's typically minutes before blocks go unpaid. Such is life, but do you ever think about why people act this way? Greed and self interest.

A full 15% block reward regardless of project takes greed out of the equation, leaving only an interest in the greater good for the network. With this weight cleared from the decision making process I think it's much more likely projects will be chosen strictly on merit. I have faith in humanity, really, I do -- but only when self-serving interests are removed from the equation can this thing really work.

The sad truth is that this is and should be an all-or-nothing type of deal. Without forcing a black and white consensus self-serving interests will always prevail.

 

[masternode]

I'm not really agreeing with your statement that this is a bullshit argument. You of all people should know that the vast majority of people are idiots (this is basically a direct quote from the last 200 posts you've made). We've seen it before with Block Enforcement, really on both sides of the equation: MN owners complaining they aren't receiving frequent payments, and earlier on miners complaining they were being taxed. With enforcement off it's typically minutes before blocks go unpaid. Such is life, but do you ever think about why people act this way? Greed and self interest.

A full 15% block reward regardless of project takes greed out of the equation, leaving only an interest in the greater good for the network. With this weight cleared from the decision making process I think it's much more likely projects will be chosen strictly on merit. I have faith in humanity, really, I do -- but only when self-serving interests are removed from the equation can this thing really work.

The sad truth is that this is and should be an all-or-nothing type of deal. Without forcing a black and white consensus self-serving interests will always prevail.

^^ This

 

[TanteStefana]

Hi, I want to just be sure you all understand what I'm trying to say So I'm going to try with a little diagram. In truth, I don't like the pay as you choose model because it will likely infringe on my rewards, reducing my ROI by causing more MN owners to shortsightedly create too many masternodes, reducing everyone's ROI. Please let me explain.

Diagram 1 is my proposal:

In this example, masternode owners can be relatively certain of their ROI because their block rewards do not change. This way, only so many masternodes will be created as makes sense. Say the market thinks a 15% per year reward is good, maybe more, maybe less. Lets say those numbers land us at 3000 masternodes, and it stays there nice and steady because there are no fluctuations in the rewards.

Now at the end of the year, if the funding was not used up, the funds go back to the miners and masternodes equally. This can be distributed evenly if a portion of the excess is distributed with each block reward over the next year. The Masternodes would increase, undoubtedly, due to the increase in rewards until you hit that balance again, and the miner's hash rate would undoubtedly increase as more miners come in to mine as the rewards have increased.

In the end, Masternode owners can always expect a certain ROI, knowing that they will be able to pay their servers and still have a small profit at the end.

There is another big advantage to this funding system. It allows for savings. If there is a big project that the community wants to do, but it requires a large amount of funds, over 15%, funds could be put aside for it, and the project can eventually be achieved. Without an ability to save, this can not be done. Or else, large accounts must be entrusted with trusted people who may fail us.

Low varience
Stability
ability to plan

These are the major positives of this system. I'm sure it could be refined, but even kept as simple as this model makes it, it would work. Simple and eloquent.


The basic other proposal:

In this diagram, the masternode owners will recieve 60% of the block rewards. This will likely increase the masternodes until they feel they have an acceptable ROI, if all things were equal, we would have about 5250 masternodes with 60% of the rewards. Now, a project comes up, and it's funded at 2%, another is funded at 5% and yet another at 8% and so on until we hit the 15% limit. The masternodes, if they haven't already, are freaking out because it costs them too much to run their masternodes and they're losing money, but they have worked so hard for their masternode, nobody wants to stop them, so they all eek out, maybe enough to pay their servers.

Or, the masternode count rises and falls along with the block rewards given out. This would create a lot of volatility in service. With this much chaos, and nobody able to make enough ROI, they stop funding things. Yes, I can see it happen. And once you have that many people who struggled to get their masternodes, it'll be hard to get them to turn them off.

Now, lets say that there is an idea for a big project that would require more than 15% of the rewards. There is no savings. What would you do? Pay the project until THEY save up enough money to do it? You'd trust them? What if they (likely) run off with the funds before it starts? Who else would you like to trust the funds to? Without a DAO, you got nuthin.

Finally, the fact that you can't save at all reduces your ability to make future plans. It ties your hands.


Personally, I reject the idea that Masternode owners will vote for anything if the funds are there. Sure, if the funds are returned a year later, there is no big incentive to recycle the funds back to MN and Miners, but there is no incentive to burn up funds either.


I hope some of you can understand now the advantages of the first proposal. I honestly don't think the second proposal is stable and I suspect people think they will be able to keep more of the funds for themselves, but that surely won't be the case. Instead, you will trade it off for volatility and probably lower income. And this is why I don't like it, because I want stability and a decent rate of return on my investment. Because I am selfish!!!

Edit: Pictures were reversed, fixed
Edit 2: There was a line in the diagram that didn't belong there, fixed

 

[TanteStefana]

^^ This

Ah, yes, that! I thought I was the only one arguing this point, LOL

 

[Solarminer]

I like the flowcharts.

This is the point:
If a single person or 'vote proxy' makes a decision to implement a tax. The entire DASH ecosystem is done. It sets the stage for a bigger and bigger tax. Once in place there is no mechanism to enforce productive workers.

Decisions to spend any funds need to be directly voted in and only for a specific use.

Let me say this another way. Masternode owners are smart. There is no way they will vote in a tax donation based on a few promises and a "hope and change speech". A specific valuable project is what the masternodes want to contribute to.

 

[TanteStefana]

Why do you think that the masternodes voting on projects would be any different one way or the other? The idea is that NONE of the funds leave the account unless the Masternodes approve a project. This part is still exactly the same.

 

[Solarminer]

If the DASH is in escrow and it will be given back if no projects get voted on, than the same argument applies, MNs will vote against projects and just to keep the rewards.

So maybe we can move past the forced donation nonsense. Just take out enough funds for valuable projects that get voted in.