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Self-sustainable Decentralized Governance by Blockchain

You think those financial incentives are the same as those held by top management in publicly traded companies? They are dramatically different which will result in a completely different dynamic.
DASH is not a publicly traded company, and top management are renowned for their enormous self-awarded bonuses.
 
Hell, and we haven't even scratched the surface here of how to manage / pay projects or even the voting requirements (percent of participation) and probably a dozen other issues, LOL. Isn't this fun?
This thread could rival the BCT ANN thread by the time we're done...:wink:
 
@ masternode: It's abusable the same way that the whole (current) crypto ecosystem is abusable, a "dev" can come up with a seemingly genius plan that would provide a great service to our ecosystem, but the plan would of course require an upfront payment to get things rolling. The awesome plan wins the vote, dev gets paid and then we hear a lot of excuses, maybe requests for more funds, or nothing at all. Sound familiar?

And if you think SolarMiner's breakdown is biased, add some text that will make it more objective. Everything anyone posts on this forum is available for modification...
 
You completely miss the point.
I really don't think so.

The need to justify block reward diversion before it happens is simple prudence. It avoids a whole host of problems that mandatory taxation brings, which have been detailed at length and to which you have not presented any counter-argument except, "MN ops are too stupid to be trusted with a meaningful vote, so we're taking the money anyway."
 
Alex-ru,
I think you are worried about the wrong greedy party. Masternode owners will vote for valuable to DASH projects. They will not steal other members funds. They are investors and owners of the future value of DASH.

If DASH was force funneled/mandatory donated/taxed into a pot, how well do you think it would be spent? We are talking over the years and new people coming into the mix, the value of dash going up, now the pot is $1million/mo. Foundation says no more voting. Raise the tax to 20%. Travel is now a priority. Trips to Hawaii for all the members for conference xyz. Now lets open offices in 10 cities and sell T-shirts and hot dogs. I get that there are reasons to have funds available. Create a project(foundation cash or whatever) for needed funding and it gets voted on. I would hope the project is actually to do something or for something useful though.

My biggest issue is how to store excess funds from a mandatory donation model. No matter how you do it, it will be exposed to theft, loss, or misuse. Plus you have a wasted expense to manage and protect the funds. If I say Bitcoin, do you think of any problems with MtGox, Bitstamp, BFL. If it has happened so frequently in bitcoin, it could happen with DASH. Crypto value is so easy to transfer, this aspect should not be underestimated.

Actually, if you're worried about funds on the blockchain, the model could just as easily be monthly. Any monthly excess goes back to the block rewards for the following month.?? I just thought yearly would have less "waves" of uncertainty and fluctuation in numbers of miners and mansternodes.
 
My biggest issue is how to store excess funds from a mandatory donation model. No matter how you do it, it will be exposed to theft, loss, or misuse. Plus you have a wasted expense to manage and protect the funds.

Don't worry, MN consensus could manage them:

I don't yet know all the technical details, but when you look at how InstantX works (lock funds immediately on one side to avoid double spend, release them on the receiving side after 1 confirmation) you get an idea how it could be done.
 
@ masternode: It's abusable the same way that the whole (current) crypto ecosystem is abusable, a "dev" can come up with a seemingly genius plan that would provide a great service to our ecosystem, but the plan would of course require an upfront payment to get things rolling. The awesome plan wins the vote, dev gets paid and then we hear a lot of excuses, maybe requests for more funds, or nothing at all. Sound familiar?

And if you think SolarMiner's breakdown is biased, add some text that will make it more objective. Everything anyone posts on this forum is available for modification...

The same dangers exist with funding startups. Yet somehow they manage to work. It really comes down to people and execution. A good example is people in crypto will even fund anon devs. This simply doesn't happen in the real world. It's definitely not an issue with the process as it's proven to work.

Not to mention, as a group vote those projects simply wouldn't get funded, yet when presented to the crypto ecosystem they still find individuals willing to take those risks.
 
@ masternode: It's abusable the same way that the whole (current) crypto ecosystem is abusable, a "dev" can come up with a seemingly genius plan that would provide a great service to our ecosystem, but the plan would of course require an upfront payment to get things rolling. The awesome plan wins the vote, dev gets paid and then we hear a lot of excuses, maybe requests for more funds, or nothing at all. Sound familiar?

And if you think SolarMiner's breakdown is biased, add some text that will make it more objective. Everything anyone posts on this forum is available for modification...
This is most definitely a concern. This fund should avoid any lump sum up front payments to anonymous devs with no track record. People requiring this make me nervous. For these types, payment for work done, or GTFO. I understand sometimes a pre-payment is needed for some applications, but a maximum pre-payment amount needs to be set for those instances.
 
The same dangers exist with funding startups. Yet somehow they manage to work.

Most startups fail.

It really comes down to people and execution. A good example is people in crypto will even fund anon devs. This simply doesn't happen in the real world. It's definitely not an issue with the process as it's proven to work.

Not to mention, as a group vote those projects simply wouldn't get funded, yet when presented to the crypto ecosystem they still find individuals willing to take those risks.

This sounds a lot like, "I think I can get away with it as you're a bunch of gullible suckers."
 
This is most definitely a concern. This fund should avoid any lump sum up front payments to anonymous devs with no track record. People requiring this make me nervous. For these types, payment for work done, or GTFO. I understand sometimes a pre-payment is needed for some applications, but a maximum pre-payment amount needs to be set for those instances.
... And the best way to avoid any lump sum payments is to not have a fund to pay them out from!
 
One more thing I want to say is that I don't think full funding to any project should be given to anyone. I think the proposals should have milestones and those milestones should have an agreed payment amount attached to them. Then, I think the core developers or a core paid management team should have the responsibility to determine if the milestones were reached and release the funds to the developer (basic contract administration)

I think that masternodes voting each time to actually have THEIR funds removed to a project will put a heavy weight toward saying no to projects. Mostly because they'll feel the loss. They will be stingy, and slow to respond. If the % is taken from the begining, you can have much more objectivity toward the value of each project. That's why I don't think this structure will work well, if at all.
 
Not true. If so, you would point out that the 15% allocation model (that you refer to as mandatory donation model) has an extremely large pro which is that it is more aligned with the long term goals of Dash akin to a publicly traded company has a budget committee. Having people constantly vote to give up money will ultimately fail as people will tend to vote to give up less and keep more for themselves.

The long term I am thinking about is what happens in 20 years. There is no need for development and we still have this 15% donation going to projects(or probably elaborate hosted events) that are not useful. Yeah, I get that this could be adjusted with a vote. But lowering a donation is just not going to happen - I believe there are the best intentions, but just like lowering taxes....it doesn't happen.

I believe the idealogy of DASH is for a decentralized control system. Pooling funds into a central wallet is asking for trouble. There are ways to make a multisig wallet with some masternode voting key. By why make it so complicated. It just hurts thinking about all the effort that will need to go into this. And then the day when the one guy loses his hard drive and the master wallet can't be opened because it needs 1 more signer.

I would offer a better way with the vote in per project model to do this is to give/take the reward funds from the miners so the masternodes don't have an incentive to keep them. I still disagree with this and would rather the masternodes making the decisions live with the consequences. Here is why.

Masternode owners are investors. Investors want appreciation just like they want continuous income. The difference in block rewards is not much compared to their holdings. 15% of block rewards is about 0.2 DASH/day(~$20/mo) compared to a $3,200 investment. It would make more sense to increase the value of DASH they are holding for a small $20/mo. A masternode already fluctuates more than this amount in a day.
 
This isn't a comment on either route.

What I most like about the idea of all this is that
"Self-sustainable Decentralized Governance by Blockchain"
isn't in investopedia.
 
Choose a model, vote, implement, and evaluate.

This type of thing has never been done before, we're arguing based on our prior experiences.

Throw that out the window, as what we are debating is a completely different beast. I would submit that no one in this thread has the clairvoyance to see the results of either side's thinking, which both have merit.

Both sides draw up proposals, we vote, implement and evaluate on a trial basis.

If we choose the fund option, and camosoul is right it turns into a pork barrel, then we re-evaluate at the end of the term.

If we choose the no-funding option and Masternode owners do just look after number one, then we reevaluate at the end of the term.

We all know what the successful implementation of this groundbreaking program would mean for Dash, and by extention the world, so we will need real-world trials to help us mold it over time.
 
Hell, and we haven't even scratched the surface here of how to manage / pay projects or even the voting requirements (percent of participation) and probably a dozen other issues, LOL. Isn't this fun?

Camosoul quote: "You been out there with the hippies too long... :p" LOL, You know I absolutely adore you, right? But I think you're not seeing what I'm trying to say. I totally agree, spending must be curtailed if not in everyone's best interest, and no pork barrel projects. I totally agree!

I think that the best way is to emulate that which already exists. Absolute precision, front-end control. Crypto does it this way because crypto is full of people who do do everything they can to git moar any way they can. And even when they can't git moar from a coin, they're willing to sabotage it at no apparent gain simply because it makes others more valuable when one is sabotaged.

I do see your perspective. I just see the reality that even the tiniest little thing can be used, and the people of crypto WILL not hesitate to do damage any way they can. Don't give them any foothold, ever. Not even a tiny crack. The people at the top of DASH won't always be there. It's not so much about thwarting the problem people, as not giving them bait in the first place. If we can't trust politicians, how can the only people in the word worse than politicians be trusted?

If we were in fact dealing with malleable people, I wouldn't be so hardcore about this. But we're not. We're dealing with cryptotards. Give no quarter. Take no prisoners. Never forgive. Never forget. Never relax. Never sleep. Never trust. Not. Even. Once. It's that important.

It's not about "us," it's about the ever present "them." Always lurking, looking for the tiniest chink in the armor, even if it gains them nothing. This is crypto.
 
The need to justify block reward diversion before it happens is simple prudence. It avoids a whole host of problems that mandatory taxation brings, which have been detailed at length and to which you have not presented any counter-argument except, "MN ops are too stupid to be trusted with a meaningful vote, so we're taking the money anyway."
MWAH!
 
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