Proposal "TREASURY-REALLOCATION-60-20-20" - DashCentral.org
Block Reward Reallocation: Increasing MNO rewards - Doubling Treasury - Reducing Miner rewards 60-20-20 Split
www.dashcentral.org
PROPOSAL “TREASURY-REALLOCATION-60-20-20“ (ACTIVE)
- Thread starter AgnewPickens
- Start date
www.dashcentral.org
TheNetworkIsBiggerThanYou
Active member
why did you post this? Because you are shocked that Sam would request such a massive change without more than 13 days on dashcentral and no pre-discussion?
TheNetworkIsBiggerThanYou
Active member
There is absolutely nothing funny about this
I propose:
- miners 49%
- treasury 5%
- masternodes 1 DASH, 1 vote, fixed rate until the treasury has insufficient funds.
- remaining dash is burned / never disbursed.
This way we are not incentivizing or dis-incentivizing masternode owners. You know what you get, you take it or leave it.
Not saying I'm correct, just starting the conversation that never happened for this proposal.
- miners 49%
- treasury 5%
- masternodes 1 DASH, 1 vote, fixed rate until the treasury has insufficient funds.
- remaining dash is burned / never disbursed.
This way we are not incentivizing or dis-incentivizing masternode owners. You know what you get, you take it or leave it.
Not saying I'm correct, just starting the conversation that never happened for this proposal.
qwizzie
Well-known member
I don't see much point in having a pre-discussion here, when the actual decision proposal is just dumped on the network by Sam already.
This decision proposal has been hastily prepared, lacks pre-discussion and comes across as a desperate move to keep DCG funded during a time they have way too high of a runrate (33 paid devs - runrate $180,000 - only 2 months of reserves left), have not delivered Platform to Mainnet, avoided any questions on when Platform will be released on Mainnet and never addressed the issues that keep causing their delays in Platform.
I told Sam 6 months ago that he better have a plan in place for when DCG runs out of funding, as i could totally see this coming (DCG running out of funding before being able to release Platform to Mainnet, due to their constant Platform delays and Dash price below $100 for a year already back then). I should not have been surprised that he comes up with this plan, instead of actually addressing DCG high runrate and their inability to keep their delays under control.
I will be voting NO on this decision proposal to raise the Treasury to 20% so that DCG can claim higher budget from the Treasury (backed by masternode whales) and can thereby avoid having to re-organize DCG to better cope with changing market conditions (bear markets) and make better estimates for their future releases.
This decision proposal has been hastily prepared, lacks pre-discussion and comes across as a desperate move to keep DCG funded during a time they have way too high of a runrate (33 paid devs - runrate $180,000 - only 2 months of reserves left), have not delivered Platform to Mainnet, avoided any questions on when Platform will be released on Mainnet and never addressed the issues that keep causing their delays in Platform.
I told Sam 6 months ago that he better have a plan in place for when DCG runs out of funding, as i could totally see this coming (DCG running out of funding before being able to release Platform to Mainnet, due to their constant Platform delays and Dash price below $100 for a year already back then). I should not have been surprised that he comes up with this plan, instead of actually addressing DCG high runrate and their inability to keep their delays under control.
I will be voting NO on this decision proposal to raise the Treasury to 20% so that DCG can claim higher budget from the Treasury (backed by masternode whales) and can thereby avoid having to re-organize DCG to better cope with changing market conditions (bear markets) and make better estimates for their future releases.
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vazaki3
Well-known member
Come on! Why are you telling lies?
Of course there is a pre-discussion!
Miner reallocation2 / DAO refill
Currently the DAO is set to 10% of the block reward, how would you feel about about lifting that to 20% by reducing the reward paid to miners by the same amount. Therefore the coin emission would remain the same overall and the final expected coins in circulation would also be the same...
www.dash.org
qwizzie
Well-known member
I rather see pre-discussion started by the proposal owner himself / herself and with a topic this important also on several Dash channels, not just the dash.org/forum. Back then it just came across as an idea that kxcd floated around, to measure interest. Not much interest among the 23 participants for raising the Treasury to 20% by taking 10% away from miners, as i recall. We will see how this works out in Sam's decision proposal.
If the pre-discussion came from DCG, i suspect a lot more people would have participated and the pre-discussion itself would not have gone that much off topic.
If the pre-discussion came from DCG, i suspect a lot more people would have participated and the pre-discussion itself would not have gone that much off topic.
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*Copied from DashCentral*
Why are you ignoramuses who oppose this proposal (Quizzie, GMD, Socrates, itsdemo) unwilling to join the weekly Afterparty jitsi discussion that we have every Friday afternoon to come talk about this?
It is objectively absolutely a completely better use of Dash's excess (wasteful) portion of block reward, which is currently overfunding mining, to instead go toward incentivizing productive, value-creation (Treasury; optionally-approved, otherwise those Dash funds are not created) and supply collateralization & proof-of-service (Masternodes).
Chain-locks provide extremely reliable security from a 51% mining attack on Dash. Therefore, paying for excess hashing power (above the minimum amount we need) is very unnecessary and completely counterproductive to Dash's success. The excess Dash funds become pure selling-pressure on the price of Dash: they are sold/dumped to pay for mining equipment and operational costs. This is very simple logic: the excess allocation of block reward that overfunds mining HARMS DASH. (It also unnecessarily wastes energy.)
As a DAO, Dash is able to effectively alter and optimize itself to be better. This is a right idea. And it is VERY important. We MUST vote yes. We need this now.
Circulating-supply inflation is what has been killing us. In the past 5 years our circulating supply went from 3.6 Million Dash to 8 Million Dash. Do you realize what a relative disadvantage that has given us? We've faced the burden of swimming against a river with a very strong current: Dash's circulating supply is only a fraction of all the Dash that exists, but it has been facing the full inflation issued upon the greater entire supply. Plus even more - because there is an annual 7% reduction in masternode-count (because of 7%-declining rewards), so hundreds of thousands of more Dash get uncollateralized and sold into circulating supply each year. It's quite a daunting flow.
In order to revive the price of Dash, we need to succeed in creating demand for buying-pressure, AND we also critically need to reduce the constant selling pressure from Dash's heavily-inflating circulating supply. Especially from the completely wasteful excess allocation to mining. This proposal moves us in the right direction. Vote yes.
Why are you ignoramuses who oppose this proposal (Quizzie, GMD, Socrates, itsdemo) unwilling to join the weekly Afterparty jitsi discussion that we have every Friday afternoon to come talk about this?
It is objectively absolutely a completely better use of Dash's excess (wasteful) portion of block reward, which is currently overfunding mining, to instead go toward incentivizing productive, value-creation (Treasury; optionally-approved, otherwise those Dash funds are not created) and supply collateralization & proof-of-service (Masternodes).
Chain-locks provide extremely reliable security from a 51% mining attack on Dash. Therefore, paying for excess hashing power (above the minimum amount we need) is very unnecessary and completely counterproductive to Dash's success. The excess Dash funds become pure selling-pressure on the price of Dash: they are sold/dumped to pay for mining equipment and operational costs. This is very simple logic: the excess allocation of block reward that overfunds mining HARMS DASH. (It also unnecessarily wastes energy.)
As a DAO, Dash is able to effectively alter and optimize itself to be better. This is a right idea. And it is VERY important. We MUST vote yes. We need this now.
Circulating-supply inflation is what has been killing us. In the past 5 years our circulating supply went from 3.6 Million Dash to 8 Million Dash. Do you realize what a relative disadvantage that has given us? We've faced the burden of swimming against a river with a very strong current: Dash's circulating supply is only a fraction of all the Dash that exists, but it has been facing the full inflation issued upon the greater entire supply. Plus even more - because there is an annual 7% reduction in masternode-count (because of 7%-declining rewards), so hundreds of thousands of more Dash get uncollateralized and sold into circulating supply each year. It's quite a daunting flow.
In order to revive the price of Dash, we need to succeed in creating demand for buying-pressure, AND we also critically need to reduce the constant selling pressure from Dash's heavily-inflating circulating supply. Especially from the completely wasteful excess allocation to mining. This proposal moves us in the right direction. Vote yes.
You objectivity ignores the positive impact it would have on price if the supply was further reduced instead of re-distributed via miners, MNOs and treasury. Burned / not produced vs moved to a different outlet. What makes you think MNOs aren't buying bitcoin (or other shitcoins) with their rewards? There is no increase in hosting costs for a regular masternode so how can you be sure they wouldn't just sell their extra discretionary income?
TheNetworkIsBiggerThanYou
Active member
put a proposal in with 13 days and little forewarning. then suggest it is the fault of not joining a call. wtf?
qwizzie
Well-known member
Higher Treasury --> Higher amounts of requested budget funding from DCG (who are initiating this, because they running out of reserves) --> More sell pressure when all those developers convert their received dash (their salary) to fiat, or when DCG converts it for them.
Miners selling to fiat causing sell pressure or developers selling to fiat causing sell pressure, take your pick.
Sell pressure remains and is not getting lowered this way, through this proposal.
Miners selling to fiat causing sell pressure or developers selling to fiat causing sell pressure, take your pick.
Sell pressure remains and is not getting lowered this way, through this proposal.
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vazaki3
Well-known member
I am not opposing the proposal. I vote YES, but my YES means 2.
Because I am not voting characters (or persons), I am voting numbers.
A total YES vote means 2, which refers to the ALLOCATION 60/20/20.
A total NO vote means 0, which refers to the CURRENT ALLOCATION 52.38/37.62/10.
But we dont have a total YES=2 vote , neither a total NO=0 vote!
According the mean average, we have 1.14, as you can see in the below link.
IF 0 is (52.38/37.62/10) and 2 is (60/20/20), then 1.14 how much is it?
52.38+(60-52.38)X1.14/2=56.72
37.62+(20-37.62)X1.14/2=27.58
10+(20-10)X1.14/2=15.7
SO IF (ACCORDING THE AVERAGE RULE) THE OUTCOME REMAINS AS IT IS RIGHT NOW (1.14)
THEN THE ALLOCATION SHOULD BECOME (56.72/27.58/15.7)
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qwizzie
Well-known member
Since MNO's / delegated voters can only vote yes/no/abstain in Dash Governance system in accordance with approving a proposal (yes), denying a proposal (no) or formally decline to vote either for or against a proposal (abstain), vazaki3/itsdemo is not actually participathing in Dash Governance voting system. He is effectively a non-voter.
Because he is tying his vote to his own little customized rules and promoting those little customized rules everywhere. Which causes confusion to his votes and nullify it.
To be honest i am not even sure he has a masternode or has delegated voting rights. He has been whitelisted on Dash Central because of his budget proposal for MNOwatch.org
Because he is tying his vote to his own little customized rules and promoting those little customized rules everywhere. Which causes confusion to his votes and nullify it.
To be honest i am not even sure he has a masternode or has delegated voting rights. He has been whitelisted on Dash Central because of his budget proposal for MNOwatch.org
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vazaki3
Well-known member
YES=2
ABSTAIN=1
NO=0
The semantics will be changed, and the numbers will be voted, no matter how much you are trying against it!
Of course I do not agree to the way @QuantumExplorer casted his proposal, but I still vote YES=2 to it because this proposal is a good start. The correct thing to do is to cast 2 numerical proposals. The first proposal will define the percentage of the governance budget compared to the rewards (you just need to vote only for the budget, so the remaining percentage is the rewards) and the second proposal (depends on the result of the previous remaining percentage of the rewards) will define the inner percentage among the miners and the masternodes (you just need to vote for the rewards of the masternodes, so the remaining percentage is for the miners). The above method is an alternative way to implement voting numbers by using sliders.
In mnowatch.og (if we are asked to do it) we can customize the above two numerical proposals to look as shown below . The below image shows a possible vote for the reallocation (50/25/25), after the mnowatch customization.
So we need to cast 2 numerical proposals in the blockchain. If we accept 3 digits granularity (this means that we divide 100 to 26 chunks of 3.84 each) it will be 6 proposals, that will cost 6 dash proposal fee.
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Copy of my post from the Dashcentral
Hey Dash Community,
After contemplating this for a while, I would like to share my opinion too.
I am torn, because I like the idea of increasing treasury budget. But the rationale offered by the PO, proposed implementation timelines and new split between miners and MNOs is hardly to accept to me.
Let me briefly explain my thoughts.
1. Rationale of relatively quick change in the protocol, due to the internal problems of DCG, is not acceptable to me. Changes in the protocol should be driven by the network needs.
2. Increasing treasury budget won't resolve any problems that DCG has (since years). It will just make an ineffective company exist longer. DCG has to resolve their issues with personnel, low effectiveness, low morale, extremely low predictability. Keeping status quo is a mistake imho. If you don't know how - hire an external management consultant. It will be money very well spent (much better than keeping broken personnel imho). Stop being sentimental and compassionate, if comes to the company and team management.
3. As I understand, this change is proposed to be implemented together within the same software package as Evo. Combining change in the protocol within the same version as Evo is EXTREMELY bad idea to me.
- on one side, it looks like blackmailing ("there will be no Evo, if you won't accept this change")
- on the other side, miners have the right to not accept this change and not implement it. In case they are rejecting it, there will be no Evo neither.
4. We have no idea how the market is going to react to Evo. Let them try. If Evo is going to be a success, Dash price will be higher and the treasury budget in fiat value increases anyway. If market won't care about Evo, it means we were all wrong and it doesn't make any difference if DCG exists or not. Harsh reality that we need to accept.
5. I would rather cut the reward proportionally from MNs and miners atm. At this time we have no idea what the future is bringing. IF Evo is a success, and Evonodes will be actually needed, and miners role really lower, then I would ask for the change - based on facts. Not now, based on highly theoretical predictions.
Considering the above (and every argument I have read on the forum and Dashcentral), I intend to vote "ABSTAIN" or "NO" to this proposal.
PS. I would like to suggest to the DCG leadership implementing necessary changes in the structures and personnel immediately. Without remorse. Otherwise you won't survive, even if this proposal is accepted. Same people will be doing the same mistakes and causing the same problems - I guess you know it well after so many years.
PS2. Instead of so rushed change in the protocol, I would rather suggest asking MNOs for donations for the development efforts (and commitment to execute).
Hey Dash Community,
After contemplating this for a while, I would like to share my opinion too.
I am torn, because I like the idea of increasing treasury budget. But the rationale offered by the PO, proposed implementation timelines and new split between miners and MNOs is hardly to accept to me.
Let me briefly explain my thoughts.
1. Rationale of relatively quick change in the protocol, due to the internal problems of DCG, is not acceptable to me. Changes in the protocol should be driven by the network needs.
2. Increasing treasury budget won't resolve any problems that DCG has (since years). It will just make an ineffective company exist longer. DCG has to resolve their issues with personnel, low effectiveness, low morale, extremely low predictability. Keeping status quo is a mistake imho. If you don't know how - hire an external management consultant. It will be money very well spent (much better than keeping broken personnel imho). Stop being sentimental and compassionate, if comes to the company and team management.
3. As I understand, this change is proposed to be implemented together within the same software package as Evo. Combining change in the protocol within the same version as Evo is EXTREMELY bad idea to me.
- on one side, it looks like blackmailing ("there will be no Evo, if you won't accept this change")
- on the other side, miners have the right to not accept this change and not implement it. In case they are rejecting it, there will be no Evo neither.
4. We have no idea how the market is going to react to Evo. Let them try. If Evo is going to be a success, Dash price will be higher and the treasury budget in fiat value increases anyway. If market won't care about Evo, it means we were all wrong and it doesn't make any difference if DCG exists or not. Harsh reality that we need to accept.
5. I would rather cut the reward proportionally from MNs and miners atm. At this time we have no idea what the future is bringing. IF Evo is a success, and Evonodes will be actually needed, and miners role really lower, then I would ask for the change - based on facts. Not now, based on highly theoretical predictions.
Considering the above (and every argument I have read on the forum and Dashcentral), I intend to vote "ABSTAIN" or "NO" to this proposal.
PS. I would like to suggest to the DCG leadership implementing necessary changes in the structures and personnel immediately. Without remorse. Otherwise you won't survive, even if this proposal is accepted. Same people will be doing the same mistakes and causing the same problems - I guess you know it well after so many years.
PS2. Instead of so rushed change in the protocol, I would rather suggest asking MNOs for donations for the development efforts (and commitment to execute).
I support this proposal for these reasons:
1) It would ease funding worries for more than just DCG, no one DFO could expect to have the entire new allocation granted to them.
2) There would be room in the budget for things like a more professional marketing DFO/firm and more DFOs overall.
3) The voters will likely not spend the entire new allocation at first and we would see Dash burned.
I think Sam needed to be more explicit about how much DCG wants allocated above its current funding levels. It's run rate is currently $175K with cuts already made and Sam has said that without this reallocation, they would need to trim back to a $125K run rate. That means that DCG would expect 40% of the extra 10% allocation, 4% of block reward, to maintain their current run rate, that leaves 6% unallocated. I think that gives the network plenty of breathing room for sorely underfunded efforts in the marketing, biz dev, and integrations area.
Already voted YES.