Probably, but I've been around and around with it so many times, and it was back when the discussions to create the DGBB we're happening...
Anyone who doesn't have me on echo chamber preservation mode has seen me say it at least a dozen times since the beginning of 2016... It stands as common knowledge. I've said it so much, and been right about every detail, that it is the very reason for most people that have ignored me to have ignored me; mad that I called it in every detail.
But, again, this is just a distraction from the actual point.
The point being, if smart people see a car with no brake pedal, no tires, and it only turns left; they're not going to bother trying to drive it. Those too stupid to realize these defects will be the only participants, and the result will naturally be a clusterfuck because a bunch of retards are trying to drive cars that have no brakes, no tires, and only turn left... All the smart people are staying as far away from that as they can get.
Most MNOs are not dumb. Their wisdom is seen in their abstinence. MNOs look dumb, because only the dumb one's are participating.
...which is what I said would happen. And the gullible, clueless, suckernode rubes vote on...
A budget system which inherently functions as a squelch-able reimbursement system discourages no-resource, no-chops, pie-in-the-sky "fund my idea" proposals.
It shifts the burden of confidence and risk to the proposer. If your idea is so great, you front the effort, time, and money. We'll catch you on the back side, proportional to the results you achieve.
It also creates a value comparison: "is this worth taking out of the block chain?"
We see many suggestions for manual intervention to try to approximate this being proposed. Vetting parties, escrow parties, etc.
With great effort and understanding and trusted parties, the current system might be carefully handled to approximate this. But, a system which does so inherently requires no such effort or understanding. "It just works."
But, how do you abuse and manipulate a system like that? Ah, so those who would benefit from those defects definitely don't want a system absent those defects...
The essence of your complaint is that coins should not be taken from the block reward in excess of the projects that are voted in. You don't like that the budget always allocates 10% of the block reward because this apparently creates a slush fund.
You insist that there is such a gigantic, fatal difference between (1) taking out the unused portion of the 10% and not-creating the coins, versus (2) not taking out the unused portion of the 10% in the first place.
To me, this is a trivial difference and would have zero functional impact on the incentives in the budget system. The only difference being that taking the remaining coins out of circulation slightly increases deflation.
The other objection about paying before versus after services are rendered is fine, but I do not think many businesses would risk doing work using a system where there is no contract or where they may not get paid. Payment up front plus escrow seems to me the way to go.
Let me know if I am not characterizing your position accurately.