Measures must be effective enough to change the balance of market forces.
I would be reluctant to make an abrupt change unless the consensus mechanism changed with it. We've seen what happened in the past... unless it changes SLOWLY to allow for market forces to adjust, reward reallocation can have unintended consequences.
If we moved to a system that simply deducted approved budgets from the block reward for the following month, the coin supply would be fully utilized either for budget or provided to MNs and miners. In other words, if we did away with the 10% allocation and allowed that to flex and directed everything else toward mining / MNs, that would solve the issue of "rollover" because it wouldn't go "unused".
1) I'm not sure if by "this" you are referring to the DIF idea or the idea I posed. I personally wouldn't support the DIF, DCG, or any other entity getting all the "unused" funds. It sets up some weird situations like MNOs voting for things they don't support because they don't want the DIF to get it, for example. Also, in an ideal world, I'd like to see competing DIFs in the future so that poor performing ones wouldn't be funded. To answer the question asked, though, I don't think either option would be enough to label Dash a security from a regulatory basis because there are many reasons why it isn't a security. However, it would "nudge" things in that direction for any automated allocation to an entity like the DIF or DCG. On it's own, that wouldn't be sufficient in my opinion however.
I would say we have "more than we need" but there is little downside to having more than we need. The biggest downside is that the network becomes slightly less scalable and slightly slower the larger it gets. However, the effert is logarithmic rather than linear. This means the impact is pretty limited, and at our current transaction counts this is not an issue that keeps me up at night. So while I eluded to the effect in my presentation, I wouldn't read into that to say reducing the number of MNs needs to be a goal. I think they can be allowed to grow in number quite safely. What I wouldn't do is reduce the MN collateral requirement to intentionally make more, which is something many community members had suggested in the past. Hope that clarifies my statements, or at least puts them into clearer context.
Miner economics don't really work that way... the "cost" of a transaction to any Bitcoin-based network is the size of the data needing processing and storing. If you price Dash transactions in another way (e.g., as a % of the transaction), then other networks could underprice Dash fees, especially on the larger transaction values, which would deter the most valuable high-volume users from using the network. There may be a time in the future where the value of Dash's network (e.g., the number of services integrated and a high acceptance rate) would enable us to price that way, but in the early stages I think it is better to have attractive transaction fees to help with growth.
That would be an improvement and I would support it. We should still define what will happen to the previously unallocated funds from the current system. Its about 60,000 dash!
You do not understand what happens with unallocated funds. They are simply not created. It is better that they are not created rather than spend on some silly project that will have no impact on adoption.
I agree. The somewhat desperate machinations from our community members to me indicates we are at or near the bottom.
