Pre-Proposal: Alternative Budget System. How much do you pay for someone to do a job?

Would you like to be able to vote how much DASH do you give for a budget proposal?


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    7

demo

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Apr 23, 2016
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Now that the price of Dash tripled in USD, some proposals that have been voted 3 months ago will get 3 times more the price they asked!!! And if the Dash price falls, some job proposals that are asking today for a specific amount of DASH will get nothing. Is that fair? Lets see how this can be solved. Apart from this alternative budget system, there is also yet another alternative budget system (initially posted here) that differs tottaly to the one the community currently uses .

how much do you pay for someone to do a job ?


This should be a subject to vote, using numbers. You may vote inbetween 0 dash, and the whole (or remaining) monthly budget (of course if someone allocates all his number vote to one proposal, there is no room for him to vote for another proposal, in the same budget cycle). Then the system calculates the mean average of all votes in order to specify the final amount the community gives, to the one who will manage to accomplish the job. And of course everyone may change his number vote whenever he/she wishes, so the system is tottaly flexible to both the expected quality of the job and the USD/DASH price fluctuations.

As you may have observed the above is a tottaly new budget system and a totally new way to deal with money allocations in the budget. There is the current budget system where someone proposes a budget allocation and receives yes/no votes for it, and there is this totally different budget system where someone proposes to the community a job that is able to accomplish, and people give him amounts of money (by using the number voting capability) they think he deserves for this job.

This alternative budget system may be used on top of the basic yes/no approval. The yes/no initial approval is essential in order to avoid troll proposals that are asking the whole budget and beeing voted by few MNOs in order to get the small fee that occurs as a result of the mean average of all numerical votes. So only in case a proposal passes the yes/no vote, will enter into this alternative budget system. Alternatively in order to avoid trolls and in case you dont want to use the initial yes/no vote, instead of using the mean average, you can use the mode average or the median average to calculate the result (and additionaly set a minimum participation in the vote, this minimum may also be valid for the yes/no vote too).

Or another alternative way is to say that each vote counts as:
"amount= 2 X allocated_budget/number_of_masternodes"
and everyone who votes for a proposal should pay with his own wallet the half of the above amount. So the persons who want to troll the system, they are actually paying for voting, so they are unable to troll!

This is a government question that will be added in the governance system if it gets support here, and if I manage to find the 5 dash proposal fee. And if it passes the governance system voting, an implementation proposal will follow.

The government question: Would you like to be able to vote how much DASH you give for a budget proposal?

P.S. This government question has been posted also here.
 
Last edited:

GrandMasterDash

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Jul 12, 2015
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You're not going to win such a change to the budget system. Imo, the best approach is to propose new systems that run in parallel with the existing system. In particular, I would like to see crowdfunding and a tender system so that people can compete for the same job.
 

demo

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You're not going to win such a change to the budget system. Imo, the best approach is to propose new systems that run in parallel with the existing system. In particular, I would like to see crowdfunding and a tender system so that people can compete for the same job.

The initial problem is that some people promise to do a Job in a specific price, and they get different money for their job because of the DASH's price fluctuations.This cannot be solved with systems that run in parallel with the existing system. The existing system will remain unjust and this unjustness will also affect all the parallel systems (which depend on the existing system).

You may say, lets all denominate in USD. But not all people are from US and they understand differently the price of DASH. They also understand in a different way how much money a job worths, and this depends to their local currency which also have price fluctuations compared to USD. There is not a common reference, the dash community is multinational, so the solution is to vote the numbers for this.
 
Last edited:
Apr 24, 2017
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Also the problem is that the actual decision making system is part of how DASH works, and as such the coins get "printed" on demand. This is both really good, and limited on how good the decision making system is. Even if we made a perfect alternative decision making system we would be dependent upon the dash programmers to implement it. And any decision taken, would still not produce any dash printed. Really, the alternative is to create a new coin which starts with a governance system. Even how many coins get printed each period should be voted. Also there should be systems in place that tries to avoid people from having too many masternodes (read votes). The whole point of the wisdom of the crowd comes from a number of papers, and those papers represented situations were each person had one vote.
 
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demo

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Even if we made a perfect alternative decision making system we would be dependent upon the dash programmers to implement it. And any decision taken, would still not produce any dash printed. Really, the alternative is to create a new coin which starts with a governance system. Even how many coins get printed each period should be voted. Also there should be systems in place that tries to avoid people from having too many masternodes (read votes). The whole point of the wisdom of the crowd comes from a number of papers, and those papers represented situations were each person had one vote.
I am looking forward for this new coin. Lets start it now, as a Dash or as a PIVX (or as a Tezos?) fork.

<vote history>
Would you like to be able to vote how much DASH do you give for a budget proposal?
*yes 2 vote(s) 66.7%
no 1 vote(s) 33.3%
other 0 vote(s) 0.0%
</vote history>
 

TroyDASH

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Jul 31, 2015
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It can't work this way because it allows for the possibility for Masternodes to vote to pay out less than the contractor is willing to accept, in which case the contractor has no obligation to actually do the work.

If a proposal owner needs their payment to be denominated in fiat, just use an escrow service.
 
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demo

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It can't work this way because it allows for the possibility for Masternodes to vote to pay out less than the contractor is willing to accept, in which case the contractor has no obligation to actually do the work.
And whats wrong with this? This is a feature, not a bug!
The MNOs vote a specific amount they want to pay for a specific job, and in case the contractor refuses to do the work, another contractor may appear!
Or if nobody appears, then the MNOs could increase the amount (by voting the numbers again)

<vote histroy>
Would you like to be able to vote how much DASH do you give for a budget proposal?
*yes 2 vote(s) 50.0%
no 2 vote(s) 50.0%
other 0 vote(s) 0.0%
</vote histrory>
 
Last edited:

TroyDASH

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And whats wrong with this?
The MNOs are paying this, and in case the contractor refuse to do the work, another contractor may appear.
Or if nobody appears, then the MNOs could increase the amount (by voting the numbers)
Why pay out the money at all though if the contractor is not going to do it?
In the current system, the proposer can always try a lower amount if they are willing to do that after their original proposal is voted down.
 

demo

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Why pay out the money at all though if the contractor is not going to do it?
In the current system, the proposer can always try a lower amount if they are willing to do that after their original proposal is voted down.
This system is not about paying out the money.
It is about to allow the MNOs to vote the numbers and say how much money the offer for a job.
Whenever someone appears and is willing to do this job for this money, then the contract is signed.

And there is an alternative implementation, a contractor to declare that he will do the job for a specific amount of money, and then the MNOs to cast a conditional number vote saying:

IF your proposal's cost will become lower than X amount of Dash, THEN I vote YES.
 
Last edited:

TroyDASH

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Jul 31, 2015
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This system is not about paying out the money.
It is about to allow the MNOs to vote the numbers and say how much money the offer for a job.
Whenever someone appears and is willing to do this job for this money, then the contract is signed.
Many projects are unique to the proposal owner -- it's not like a software project where the masternodes get to spec everything out and just anyone can do it. If someone proposes to sponsor the Crypto Show, or sponsor Dash Aerosports, or do an airdrop on Huobi, how many other people are going to come forward and say hey I can do the exact same thing for less?
 

demo

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Many projects are unique to the proposal owner -- it's not like a software project where the masternodes get to spec everything out and just anyone can do it. If someone proposes to sponsor the Crypto Show, or sponsor Dash Aerosports, or do an airdrop on Huobi, how many other people are going to come forward and say hey I can do the exact same thing for less?
Nobody is irreplaceable. If something requires someone to be irreplaceable, then this is most of the times unnecessary.

Furthermore, the usefulness of what I say refers to all the rest cases you just mentioned (development, software projects e.t.c). You voted NO in the poll, although you clearly state that this is usefull at least in some cases.

Your NO vote in the poll doesnt make sense. You are cleary suffering of voting-number-o-phobia. Go meet a doctor to cure you.

<vote histrory>
Would you like to be able to vote how much DASH do you give for a budget proposal?
*yes 2 vote(s) 40.0%
no 3 vote(s) 60.0%
other 0 vote(s) 0.0%
</vote histrory>
 

TroyDASH

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Jul 31, 2015
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Nobody is irreplaceable. If something requires someone to be irreplaceable, then this is most of the times unnecessary.

Furthermore, the usefulness of what I say refers to all the rest cases you just mentioned (development, software projects e.t.c). You voted NO in the poll, although you clearly state that this is usefull at least in some cases.

Your NO vote in the poll doesnt make sense. You are cleary suffering of voting-number-o-phobia. Go meet a doctor to cure you.

<vote histrory>
Would you like to be able to vote how much DASH do you give for a budget proposal?
*yes 2 vote(s) 40.0%
no 3 vote(s) 60.0%
other 0 vote(s) 0.0%
</vote histrory>
Sure, there are some cases where it might be useful to have a better way for the network to negotiate with proposal owners. However if I would be putting this on a priority list on a scale of 1 to 10, it would be at about 0. The current system is sufficient and there are many more important things to focus on than a total overhaul of the governance.
 

demo

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if I would be putting this on a priority list on a scale of 1 to 10, it would be at about 0.
if I would be putting this on a priority list on a scale of 1 to 10, it would be at about 12.
 

TroyDASH

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if I would be putting this on a priority list on a scale of 1 to 10, it would be at about 12.
Why? Proposal owners that need to be paid in fiat already have options to go through escrow, and proposal owners that are willing to assume the volatility risk can submit in dash. Competition is already possible because anyone can submit a similar proposal for less cost. Why should we divert resources into this instead of focusing on evolution?
 

demo

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Why? Proposal owners that need to be paid in fiat already have options to go through escrow, and proposal owners that are willing to assume the volatility risk can submit in dash.
Escrow is filthy centralized. We have to avoid centralization, this is rule number 1.
 
Last edited:

Monachilada

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Dec 20, 2017
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I'm in TroyDASH's camp. Not only many but most of the proposals seem to me to be unique to their owners, either in the sense that they are tied to a specific sponsorship of an event or action, or revolve around some form of intellectual property or concept unique to the owner and their personality, for example a youtube channel or creative concept or personal network.

If there are tasks completely specced out by the core team that need to be outsourced then that is a tender, not a proposal. It's the complete opposite direction of a proposal, in that the core is looking outwards with a defined goal in mind, rather than being pitched by people outside with different insights, skills or ideas that aren't and can't be entirely generated from within. Both have their place, but shouldn't be conflated in my opinion. If anything, an alternative process needs to exist for the tender type scenarios, but doesn't require the current proposal system to be changed or scrapped. Both could and perhaps should exist in parallel.
 

demo

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I'm in TroyDASH's camp. Not only many but most of the proposals seem to me to be unique to their owners, either in the sense that they are tied to a specific sponsorship of an event or action, or revolve around some form of intellectual property or concept unique to the owner and their personality, for example a youtube channel or creative concept or personal network.

If there are tasks completely specced out by the core team that need to be outsourced then that is a tender, not a proposal. It's the complete opposite direction of a proposal, in that the core is looking outwards with a defined goal in mind, rather than being pitched by people outside with different insights, skills or ideas that aren't and can't be entirely generated from within. Both have their place, but shouldn't be conflated in my opinion. If anything, an alternative process needs to exist for the tender type scenarios, but doesn't require the current proposal system to be changed or scrapped. Both could and perhaps should exist in parallel.
Of course I agree that the two budget systems should exist in parallel.

But I dont agree that the existing budget system should stay unchanged. Suppose that I make a proposal (a one that isnt and can't be entirely generated from within the core team). And I am asking 100 dash for it. Shouldnt the masternodes be allowed to vote that they approve this work only in case it costs 50 Dash? Why do you want to prohibit the masternodes to negotiate for a better price?
 

Monachilada

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I wouldn't want to prohibit the MNOs from seeking a better price, but again I see that as an aspect and benefit of a theoretical seperate tender process. As far as proposals go, The MNOs can already decide if a proposal budget is justified and vote it down if they don't think it's worth it. If it doesn't fit into the category of being uniquely achievable by the proposal owner, they and/or someone else could resubmit with a lower budget. Also, a well functioning pre-proposal phase can and should act as a form of negotiation for a better price, no?

What I would grant in that situation is that is currently disincentivized due to the relatively high cost of submission currently, but I think that's an issue that should be solved anyway, for more reasons other than the scenario I'm describing above.
 

demo

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I wouldn't want to prohibit the MNOs from seeking a better price, but again I see that as an aspect and benefit of a theoretical seperate tender process. As far as proposals go, The MNOs can already decide if a proposal budget is justified and vote it down if they don't think it's worth it. If it doesn't fit into the category of being uniquely achievable by the proposal owner, they and/or someone else could resubmit with a lower budget. Also, a well functioning pre-proposal phase can and should act as a form of negotiation for a better price, no?
No, because the masternodes do not participate in the pre-proposal phase.
The pre-proposal is forum related.

What I would grant in that situation is that is currently disincentivized due to the relatively high cost of submission currently, but I think that's an issue that should be solved anyway, for more reasons other than the scenario I'm describing above.
Yes, if the proposal fee were cheap, then the proposal owner could resubmit it. But it isnt, because the masternodes cannot handle too many questions. This is their reason (wrong reason, but this is another discussion) and taking into account their reason, the price should be negotiatable, this is a better solution than resubmiting the whole proposal again and re-paying the proposal fee in order to offer a better price.
 
Last edited:

Monachilada

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True, that does appear to be the case. But is there is nothing stopping them from doing so.

If not, then if the concern you raise was as big for MNOs as it is for you, I would expect more participation in the pre-proposal phase from MNOs. The fact that it isn't doesn't necessarily mean you're wrong, but also doesn't point to it as being as high on the list of priorities for most others.
 

demo

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True, that does appear to be the case. But is there is nothing stopping them from doing so.

If not, then if the concern you raise was as big for MNOs as it is for you, I would expect more participation in the pre-proposal phase from MNOs. The fact that it isn't doesn't necessarily mean you're wrong, but also doesn't point to it as being as high on the list of priorities for most others.
The masternodes do not participate in endless talks in forums. Their time is limited. They just want to vote. Vote a yes or a No, and (why not?) vote a price or a lower price.

I still wonder what is the underlying reason you want to prohibit the masternodes to vote for a price. The current budget system tends to become trust dependant and not job oriented, and this is against nakamoto principles.

I'm in TroyDASH's camp. Not only many but most of the proposals seem to me to be unique to their owners, either in the sense that they are tied to a specific sponsorship of an event or action, or revolve around some form of intellectual property or concept unique to the owner and their personality, for example a youtube channel or creative concept or personal network.
How all the above (that I highlighted) are related to a nakamoto system? Your way of thinking is tottaly opposite to the thinking of nakamoto! What are you doing here? Why you want to poison the community with your corrupted way of thinking?

Trusted Parties Are Security Holes

We are trying to built a trust-less system here. We dont like sponsorship, we don't like intellectual property, and we do not care about the personality of the proposal owner as long as he is capable to deliver the job. This is what the anonymous satoshi teached us, and regarding these issues we should follow his road , rather than your road, which is the common corrupted road that every crypto illiterate follows.
 
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arjunyg

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I appreciate the decentralized sentiment, but I think demo's implementation strays from viability. Perhaps a system where escrow DAOs are built in would serve the same purpose. Smart contracts (Ethereum-style) would immediately allow this.

Example sketch:
A fiat valuation escrow contract takes a data feed from a number of MNOs on the current Dash price. Any MNO is free to contribute data to the escrow contract on the blockchain by reporting the Dash price once per day or so. An average of the reported prices over a two week period is used to pay proposal owners according to an individual contract approved by the MNOs a proposal time. The escrow contract would charge a small fee to insure itself against price downswings, and perhaps to pay a developer group.
One of these contracts could be established for each fiat market, to provide all proposal owners convenient local fiat insurance.

That's super vague, but hopefully it gets the idea across. I feel like I had some more details, but I forgot them, so someone else can do the thinking now :p