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Please use this thread to post any ideas related to the Dash Economics dicussion that do not fit in other categories!
 
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p5yc071c

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Oct 10, 2016
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Should there be a 'board of delegates' to help decide the overall vision of dash? I'm imagining something similar to dash watch/Nexus where the delegates share their recommendations for each proposal as well as an overall vision/ideal division of resources/desired proposals/areas for improvement. MN's could eventually review each delegates performance and through the site send the delegate their voting key...or just use their suggestions to cast their own vote.

We might want it to be separate from watch/Nexus In case the board needed to be replaced later. I'd be willing to build the website and proposal if Ryan/other protectors are willing to be listed as a delegates ...or at least if he thought it was a good idea.

Would there be legal implications if the delegates had a combined total of 30% of the votes? 60%?
 
Aug 24, 2018
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Time locked collaterals

It is totally possible to time-lock funds within the DASH network, this means we could give a higher ROI and voting rights to these community members that would be willing to do that.

As we have observed many Masternode owners are not interested in their voting rights, while we have many active community members which would be very interested in having these rights.

The DAO could offer a staking contract that would time-lock the funds for a period of several years and the owner of these funds would have voting rights on treasury proposals and/or would gain a higher ROI than others.

The DAO could offer various timespans with different benefits. It could offer contracts for 1, 2.5 or 5 years all with a different interest rate and only giving voting rights to these contracts with 2.5 & 5 years while weighting the votes for the longer contracts heavier.

This way we would make sure that the treasury could never be compromised by short term investors making long term decisions for the DAO. We could also assure that the DAO is working in the long term interests of the network in general.
 

AgnewPickens

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Time locked collaterals

It is totally possible to time-lock funds within the DASH network, this means we could give a higher ROI and voting rights to these community members that would be willing to do that.

As we have observed many Masternode owners are not interested in their voting rights, while we have many active community members which would be very interested in having these rights.

The DAO could offer a staking contract that would time-lock the funds for a period of several years and the owner of these funds would have voting rights on treasury proposals and/or would gain a higher ROI than others.

The DAO could offer various timespans with different benefits. It could offer contracts for 1, 2.5 or 5 years all with a different interest rate and only giving voting rights to these contracts with 2.5 & 5 years while weighting the votes for the longer contracts heavier.

This way we would make sure that the treasury could never be compromised by short term investors making long term decisions for the DAO. We could also assure that the DAO is working in the long term interests of the network in general.

This, by definition, fails the Howie Test and would class Dash as a security with the SEC.
 
Aug 24, 2018
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Could you specify how that fails the test "by definition" and why you are so sure on that?

Time locking funds is already possible in bitcoin and bitcoin cash, so what exactly are you talking about?

DASH in itself is not the DAO, this system would be related to the treasury and not relevant to anyone using just DASH without being involved into the DAO.

How can DASH be classified as a security for something related to just the governance?

The DAO governance is like a third party service.
 

AgnewPickens

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OK, Howey test, but creating the equivalent of a Dash treasury bill, which would ultimately end up being tradable would fail the SEC sniff test. The DAO has made it pretty clear that it wants to steer clear of anything that could class Dash as a security, and you are getting abusive in this post.
 

AgnewPickens

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I have talked about this in chats before, but one of the advantages fiat has over crypto right now is that it inherited a fixed price retail sector that backs up its value. Fiat users can price goods and services reliably in a sound economy. Would it be possible to create a website that offered goods desirable to Dash users that are fixed in Dash price and not the fiat price? The biggest problem I see with the entire crypto sector is that it lacks this fixed price retail system that fiat inherited.
 
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Ryan Taylor

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Should there be a 'board of delegates' to help decide the overall vision of dash? I'm imagining something similar to dash watch/Nexus where the delegates share their recommendations for each proposal as well as an overall vision/ideal division of resources/desired proposals/areas for improvement. MN's could eventually review each delegates performance and through the site send the delegate their voting key...or just use their suggestions to cast their own vote.

We might want it to be separate from watch/Nexus In case the board needed to be replaced later. I'd be willing to build the website and proposal if Ryan/other protectors are willing to be listed as a delegates ...or at least if he thought it was a good idea.

Would there be legal implications if the delegates had a combined total of 30% of the votes? 60%?
Delegated voting is absolutely possible today, since the keys for voting are separate and can be changed / revoked at any time. It could take an informal form if well-respected community members proposed their own priorities and lobbied MNOs to entrust them with their voting keys, or it could be formalized by community members seeking to create a voting block to represent the interests of an organized group of MNOs. This would be very similar to a shareholder group that coordinates their votes to facilitate change with respect to a company. As long at the voting keys can be revoked if bad outcomes resulted, I would think there would be more benefit than good from organizing this type of arrangement, but there are clear downsides.

Pros:
Delegates would most likely be expected to more closely monitor the funded proposals and perform deeper research than typical masternode owners, so vote quality might improve.
Vote turnout would likely improve because MNOs that don't normally vote might be willing to delegate their vote.
Coordinated groups might be capable of directing the available funds in a more strategic manner than would otherwise be possible.

Cons:
Less independent thought going into the votes.
Consolidation of decision making power... dependency on fewer people making the right decisions.

I personally would feel uncomfortable functioning as both the CEO of DCG and directing the allocation of votes, so under no circumstance would I consider becoming a delegate myself. And I assume many community members would be uncomfortable with it if I did (and I think rightfully so).
 

Ryan Taylor

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Dash Core Team
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Time locked collaterals

It is totally possible to time-lock funds within the DASH network, this means we could give a higher ROI and voting rights to these community members that would be willing to do that.

As we have observed many Masternode owners are not interested in their voting rights, while we have many active community members which would be very interested in having these rights.

The DAO could offer a staking contract that would time-lock the funds for a period of several years and the owner of these funds would have voting rights on treasury proposals and/or would gain a higher ROI than others.

The DAO could offer various timespans with different benefits. It could offer contracts for 1, 2.5 or 5 years all with a different interest rate and only giving voting rights to these contracts with 2.5 & 5 years while weighting the votes for the longer contracts heavier.

This way we would make sure that the treasury could never be compromised by short term investors making long term decisions for the DAO. We could also assure that the DAO is working in the long term interests of the network in general.
Time locked inputs may be needed for shared masternodes to function, so this is being discussed. Naturally, collateral shares that are locked for longer periods would be more desirable for a shared MN operator to leverage than short-term ones. Because long-locked share would be more desirable, MN operators would be willing to share more of the MN rewards (higher ROI to the holders), and be more likely to be selected for collateralizing a node (earning more often). So this concept is getting serious discussion internally and would result in a "market" that rewards longer lock periods over shorter ones.

I'm wary of setting an "interest rate" centrally because it lacks the attributes of a self-adjusting market. I believe it would be better to set up a free market approach and allow collateral to flow where it is most valued (e.g., PoS staking, MN collateral, MN shares, etc).

Voting adds a whole other level of complexity to implementation. Likely we would not be able to incorporate that quickly on shared MNs or staked coins. I do think it would be possible on shared masternodes if we incorporated minimum share sizes like 100 Dash.
 
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Ryan Taylor

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This, by definition, fails the Howie Test and would class Dash as a security with the SEC.
It wouldn't necessarily make Dash a security, but it would push it in that direction as it would add attributes of securities to Dash. Any locking would need to fulfill a purpose / job on the network to fully avoid this treatment (which I still don't think would result in Dash being considered a security btw), and time locking would actually be needed for masternode shares. If any participant of a shared MN could exit at and time, it would cause shared MNs to stop operating way too often, and would create a bad experience for the operators and share participants (because they would often not be paid for their work). Locking the UTXOs would be needed to ensure the inputs were stable.
 
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AgnewPickens

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It wouldn't necessarily make Dash a security, but it would push it in that direction as it would add attributes of securities to Dash. Any locking would need to fulfill a purpose / job on the network to fully avoid this treatment (which I still don't think would result in Dash being considered a security btw), and time locking would actually be needed for masternode shares. If any participant of a shared MN could exit at and time, it would cause shared MNs to stop operating way too often, and would create a bad experience for the operators and share participants (because they would often not be paid for their work). Locking the UTXOs would be needed to ensure the inputs were stable.
I wasn't speaking specifically about timelocks but the idea of assigning different voting weights to fixed terms of timelocks, looks very much like a security to me, I think timelocks can be implemented, but we have to tread carefully on how we put them in place.
 

techwith1

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Dec 18, 2019
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Delegated voting is absolutely possible today, since the keys for voting are separate and can be changed / revoked at any time. It could take an informal form if well-respected community members proposed their own priorities and lobbied MNOs to entrust them with their voting keys, or it could be formalized by community members seeking to create a voting block to represent the interests of an organized group of MNOs. This would be very similar to a shareholder group that coordinates their votes to facilitate change with respect to a company. As long at the voting keys can be revoked if bad outcomes resulted, I would think there would be more benefit than good from organizing this type of arrangement, but there are clear downsides.

Pros:
Delegates would most likely be expected to more closely monitor the funded proposals and perform deeper research than typical masternode owners, so vote quality might improve.
Vote turnout would likely improve because MNOs that don't normally vote might be willing to delegate their vote.
Coordinated groups might be capable of directing the available funds in a more strategic manner than would otherwise be possible.

Cons:
Less independent thought going into the votes.
Consolidation of decision making power... dependency on fewer people making the right decisions.

I personally would feel uncomfortable functioning as both the CEO of DCG and directing the allocation of votes, so under no circumstance would I consider becoming a delegate myself. And I assume many community members would be uncomfortable with it if I did (and I think rightfully so).
 

Levi

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Dec 19, 2019
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I think it could be yousefull to implement a DIP similar to the EIP 1559. In the EIP 1559 that will be implemented on the ETH protocol, part of the transaction fees are burned. In this way users will pay the network for using the network.
 
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Levi

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Second idea , once the "DIP 1559" is implemented, the calculation of the fees could change from a transaction based cost to an import based cost. For example the cost could be the 0.1 % of the total import of the transaction. A maximum and a minimum value of the fees could be also implemented as a mitigating factor.
 

Ryan Taylor

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Dash Core Team
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I think it could be yousefull to implement a DIP similar to the EIP 1559. In the EIP 1559 that will be implemented on the ETH protocol, part of the transaction fees are burned. In this way users will pay the network for using the network.
The net effect would be less dilution for everyone else (by a tiny amount). It's interesting, but it creates some weird incentives. For example, it means that all holders "net dilution" or the effect of coins being created and "burned" is unpredictable. My share of the currency is dictated by how much burning is occurring on the network. I'm not sure what the goal of that is... perhaps it is to provide a TINY reward for hodlers? Seems a bit like a gimmick to me with no clear objective / benefit. Honestly, lost coins probably dwarf whatever fees this mechanism would burn anyway, making this nothing more than a rounding error of exiting supply. Am I missing something?
 

p5yc071c

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Oct 10, 2016
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Delegated voting is absolutely possible today, since the keys for voting are separate and can be changed / revoked at any time. It could take an informal form if well-respected community members proposed their own priorities and lobbied MNOs to entrust them with their voting keys, or it could be formalized by community members seeking to create a voting block to represent the interests of an organized group of MNOs. This would be very similar to a shareholder group that coordinates their votes to facilitate change with respect to a company. As long at the voting keys can be revoked if bad outcomes resulted, I would think there would be more benefit than good from organizing this type of arrangement, but there are clear downsides.

Pros:
Delegates would most likely be expected to more closely monitor the funded proposals and perform deeper research than typical masternode owners, so vote quality might improve.
Vote turnout would likely improve because MNOs that don't normally vote might be willing to delegate their vote.
Coordinated groups might be capable of directing the available funds in a more strategic manner than would otherwise be possible.

Cons:
Less independent thought going into the votes.
Consolidation of decision making power... dependency on fewer people making the right decisions.

I personally would feel uncomfortable functioning as both the CEO of DCG and directing the allocation of votes, so under no circumstance would I consider becoming a delegate myself. And I assume many community members would be uncomfortable with it if I did (and I think rightfully so).

Guys, I've posted this idea to Nexus...please comment there if you're interested. https://app.dashnexus.org/proposals/dash-town-hall/overview
 
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TheSingleton

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Mar 27, 2017
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As anybody given any thought to just reducing the ammount of dash created? Instead of worrying how to best distribute the created Dash we could just not create it at all.

Not sure if that is a good idea (its' definitelly controversial) but i think it's at least an option to consider.

We have the ability to change how much Dash is created. I mean the treasury already does this to some extend if not enough proposals get enough votes we just create less Dash.
So i think extending this to mining and Masternodes makes sense. Only create as much Dash as is required for that part of the network to function properly:
We pay miners to secure the network and Ryan said that about 10% of the current reward would be enought to maintain X11 lead. So reduce the created Dash slowly to that level.
We pay MNs to provide services and personally i would be fine with reducing my reward a little if it improves the economics of dash.
Because a better dash price is worth more then a higher share of the created Dash. And eventually the main Income for Masternodes should be from fees anyway.

So I don't see the value of creating dash and then broadly distributing it. Technically it should be easier to just create less dash than trying to distribute it fairly. The 2 main options for this seem to be a Deterministic Staking List or Masternode Shares.
A Deterministic List it seems would require a Minimum dash ammount to scale decently -> poor people might not benefit.
Masternode Shares might require to time lock the dash -> again poor people might not have that option

While this does ecourage holding dash it doesn't solve the inflation problem for poorer people which is not optimal. Also creating Dash to give it to people holding Dash to encourage them to keep holding doesn't seem economically sound.
If on the other hand we just create less Dash this benefits all equally. And improved economics on their own should already be a good enough encouragement to hold dash.
 

AndyDark

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Sep 10, 2014
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As anybody given any thought to just reducing the ammount of dash created? Instead of worrying how to best distribute the created Dash we could just not create it at all.

Not sure if that is a good idea (its' definitelly controversial) but i think it's at least an option to consider.

We have the ability to change how much Dash is created. I mean the treasury already does this to some extend if not enough proposals get enough votes we just create less Dash.
So i think extending this to mining and Masternodes makes sense. Only create as much Dash as is required for that part of the network to function properly:
We pay miners to secure the network and Ryan said that about 10% of the current reward would be enought to maintain X11 lead. So reduce the created Dash slowly to that level.
We pay MNs to provide services and personally i would be fine with reducing my reward a little if it improves the economics of dash.
Because a better dash price is worth more then a higher share of the created Dash. And eventually the main Income for Masternodes should be from fees anyway.

So I don't see the value of creating dash and then broadly distributing it. Technically it should be easier to just create less dash than trying to distribute it fairly. The 2 main options for this seem to be a Deterministic Staking List or Masternode Shares.
A Deterministic List it seems would require a Minimum dash ammount to scale decently -> poor people might not benefit.
Masternode Shares might require to time lock the dash -> again poor people might not have that option

While this does ecourage holding dash it doesn't solve the inflation problem for poorer people which is not optimal. Also creating Dash to give it to people holding Dash to encourage them to keep holding doesn't seem economically sound.
If on the other hand we just create less Dash this benefits all equally. And improved economics on their own should already be a good enough encouragement to hold dash.
"As anybody given any thought to just reducing the ammount of dash created?"

Yes of course, this is fundamental to cryptos going back to the birth of Bitcoin. As opposed to fiat currencies, cryptos have predetermined supply curves, so everyone who mines or buys that crypto along the curve is buying into a social-contract where an algorithm that everyone can read determines the growth in monetary supply and not a centralized party. Included in that is existing holders who (if interested in short-term gains) will think to reduce the amount of future coins produced to increase the nominal value of their holdings.

Breaking of that social contract once the crypto is established is pretty much the worse thing a crypto can do to itself because people will lose confidence because the algorithm that controls of monetary supply when they entered is being undermined, it's as bad as rolling back the blockchain or reversing transactions, it undermines the type of decentralization and security that cryptos were created to provide. Existing holders might be happy that their nominal value has increased, but nominal value is pretty much irrelevant in cryptos today because they are in a stage where their value is 99% speculative based on the expectation that some mainstream uptake will take place in the future. Therefore breaking the social contract reduces the confidence and attractiveness for new people to use and hold the currency i.e. it reduces demand, which is the only thing that really matters at this stage, i.e. the value of a crypto token against other assets and not the nominal quantity anyone is holding or being rewarded.
 
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qwizzie

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Aug 6, 2014
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"As anybody given any thought to just reducing the ammount of dash created?"

Yes of course, this is fundamental to cryptos going back to the birth of Bitcoin. As opposed to fiat currencies, cryptos have predetermined supply curves, so everyone who mines or buys that crypto along the curve is buying into a social-contract where an algorithm that everyone can read determines the growth in monetary supply and not a centralized party. Included in that is existing holders who (if interested in short-term gains) will think to reduce the amount of future coins produced to increase the nominal value of their holdings.

Breaking of that social contract once the crypto is established is pretty much the worse thing a crypto can do to itself because people will lose confidence because the algorithm that controls of monetary supply when they entered is being undermined, it's as bad as rolling back the blockchain or reversing transactions, it undermines the type of decentralization and security that cryptos were created to provide. Existing holders might be happy that their nominal value has increased, but nominal value is pretty much irrelevant in cryptos today because they are in a stage where their value is 99% speculative based on the expectation that some mainstream uptake will take place in the future. Therefore breaking the social contract reduces the confidence and attractiveness for new people to use and hold the currency i.e. it reduces demand, which is the only thing that really matters at this stage, i.e. the value of a crypto token against other assets and not the nominal quantity anyone is holding or being rewarded.
I can understand how reducing the amount of dash created can be viewed as 'breaking the social contract'. But how do you feel about lowering the miners part of the block reward and shifting most of it towards either Masternode Shares or Deterministic Holders List? Should that also in your view be considered as 'breaking the social contract' ? Or is that different ?

Something else to consider : should we uphold a social contract, when that social contract over time gives us increased risk of (miners) centralization ?
 
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AndyDark

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Sep 10, 2014
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I can understand how reducing the amount of dash created can be viewed as 'breaking the social contract'. But how do you feel about lowering the miners part of the block reward and shifting most of it towards either Masternode Shares or Deterministic Holders List? Should that also in your view be considered as 'breaking the social contract' ? Or is that different ?

Something else to consider : should we uphold a social contract, when that social contract over time gives us increased risk of (miners) centralization ?
great questions @qwizzie :)

..how do you feel about lowering the miners part of the block reward and shifting most of it towards either Masternode Shares or Deterministic Holders List? Should that also in your view be considered as 'breaking the social contract' ?
no, adjusting reward allocation doesn't effect the emission curve. But there could be other issues within that... for example allocating more % to the treasury can have a centralizing effect as it can reduce the market pressure on large DAOs to optimize and streamline / deliver (similar to governments growing bigger and bigger and less efficient through higher taxation). Adjusting the rewards between block production / provision (currently 50/50) could have unkonown impacts on either security or availability. Eliminating the mining market (and its capital investment / ecosystem) could have unforseen consequences and impact our security and be centralizing in my opinion (far more than pools / asics and now we have Chainlocks to counter miner centralization). But none of that breaks the social contract at least.

My main observation is that all of these changes introduce risks and my question would be why introduce these risks... for example PoS - why not wait for Ethereum to go first and see what happens :). Then we can focus on our new feature (feature #5 in Dash's history after PS, IS, Governance, Chainlocks), it took a long time coming but its here and its the key feature for Evan's vision to get mainstream users onto crypto.. Platform) so why not focus on one thing at a time and do it well :)
 
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TheSingleton

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Mar 27, 2017
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@AndyDark That's pretty much the reaction i expected. While i would never advocate for increasing the Block Rewards decreasing them seems acceptable to me. But of course just because i find it acceptable doesn't say anything about what others or the market as a whole thinks.

So i would say my solution is the best assuming humans are reasonable which they aren't.
 

p5yc071c

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@AndyDark I agree with your idea about doing it super slowly and waiting for Ethereum to test the waters. What kind of a schedule do you think would be appropriate? Do you have any thoughts on how a consensus should/could be reached prior to implementing?
 

stan.distortion

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Oct 30, 2014
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A point on how natural economies differ from financial economies. The value of money sits on a knife edge, when falling more and more will be exchanged for something more stable, when rising more and more will be hoarded. This effect also has positive feedback, amplification. As more is brought out of savings and onto markets the value of that already in circulation falls, as more is taken out of circulation the value of that remaining rises. That amplifying effect is what allows hyper inflation or deflation, it turns what would be erratic behaviour into total collapse.

This situation doesn't exist in nature, when it does it results in extinction. Take soil nutrients or fish population, less nutrients and less plants grow, more and they flourish, less fish and their predators die out, more and the predator population grows and keeps the fish population in check. Always slight variation, even ice ages are only a few degrees difference.

This is why monetary systems fail time after time, they're always based on a principle that's headed for extinction. I've no idea how this can be applied to cryptocurrency, I belive money has to be both created and destroyed, exist for a limited duration rather than indefinitely but I've no model of how that would work.
 

DashNstash

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Please use this thread to post any ideas related to the Dash Economics dicussion that do not fit in other categories!
Please use this thread to post any ideas related to the Dash Economics dicussion that do not fit in other categories!
Please help us get Dash on Localcryptos, we only need you to cast your vote for Dash, and share the link to as many as possible in order to overtake Litecoin on this ballot.
We are over 34.000 members in this channel and we are only 100 votes down, so come on! Help us introduce Dash in this peer to peer exchange, proving we are far better, stronger and popular than Litecoin.

https://localcryptos.com/vote-for-the-third-crypto

Coins are for collectors, DASH is King!
 

DashNstash

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Please use this thread to post any ideas related to the Dash Economics dicussion that do not fit in other categories!
I am no expert, 100 % enthusiast... "DASH Debit"
Give me a routing and account #, with spend/save/growth account and convenient app, that I can use to accept my payroll direct deposit, this app I will use as my DASH exchange, buying and selling DASH as desired from my new DASH Debit Exchange Card.... cash and DASH in one place.
Am I crazy?

Coins are for collectors, DASH is King!
 

forro

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