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  1. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Economics Discussion Series

    We will assess it on an ongoing basis and will publish a range of expected growth that we can measure against (this will be included in the proposal). If it deviates from the expected range for an extended period of time, or by an extreme amount, we can develop an appropriate course of action.
  2. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Economics Discussion Series

    Is it possible to change the block reward? Yes, of course. Would it permanently solve for the circulating supply growth rate by simply changing the supply? No. This may seem counter-intuitive, so let me explain further. Increasing the block reward would cause ROI of masternodes to increase, so...
  3. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Economics Discussion Series

    This idea has been suggested. There are several pros and cons. Because miners are ultimately making a bet on Dash, they have significant interest in seeing Dash succeed, not just masternode operators. The approach we've suggested in which the cost of proposals reduces both masternode and miner...
  4. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Economics Discussion Series

    If approved, we would incorporate the changes into the Core product roadmap. Given these changes would require a protocol change, the new functionality would likely be included in a major release. Our Core software typically has a major release every 4-8 months, depending on the volume of...
  5. Ryan Taylor

    Temporary Measures / Quick Wins

    Miner economics don't really work that way... the "cost" of a transaction to any Bitcoin-based network is the size of the data needing processing and storing. If you price Dash transactions in another way (e.g., as a % of the transaction), then other networks could underprice Dash fees...
  6. Ryan Taylor

    Temporary Measures / Quick Wins

    I would say we have "more than we need" but there is little downside to having more than we need. The biggest downside is that the network becomes slightly less scalable and slightly slower the larger it gets. However, the effert is logarithmic rather than linear. This means the impact is pretty...
  7. Ryan Taylor

    Minimum Fees

    Yes, changing the fee is simply an optimization. It isn't a solution to any of the issues I raised (at least not in the short term and not on its own). ASU is actually engaged in research on the minimum size of the MN network to ensure high security. The transaction fees should eventually cover...
  8. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    Locked inputs would be locked when formed. For example, there could be a button in a wallet that says "stake masternode collateral" or something to that effect. The user would click and be asked a series of questions. How much do you want to stake? How long do you want to lock it? What is the...
  9. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    "Price" would be the wrong metric to use, because many many things can affect the price. Because the goal is to reduce the effect of inflation for users, I would measure the growth rate of circulating supply. If the approach is working, circulating supply growth would slow down. We are model...
  10. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    Yes, definitely a lot more work to introduce a completely new security model... especially when you consider our current model is already highly secure it would be hard to justify such an undertaking. We do need to improve our PoSe scoring at some point in the future to make the network more...
  11. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    The long-time "pure monetary" coins like Bitcoin, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash (whose chain goes back to Bitcoin's origin), Bitcoin SV (whose chain goes back to Bitcoin's origin), Monero are all around now for a long time. As a consequence, their emission rate has already fallen relative to the number...
  12. Ryan Taylor

    Temporary Measures / Quick Wins

    1) I'm not sure if by "this" you are referring to the DIF idea or the idea I posed. I personally wouldn't support the DIF, DCG, or any other entity getting all the "unused" funds. It sets up some weird situations like MNOs voting for things they don't support because they don't want the DIF to...
  13. Ryan Taylor

    Source of Entropy

    If we don't go to PoS, this threat becomes much less relevant toward developing a solution. That said, PoW is not a perfect source of entropy or "randomness". Why? Because technically, a miner could throw away successful hashes in search of one that is more advantageous (such as one that ensures...
  14. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    Likely, an MNO wishing to use other's collateral it would simply be part of the ProRegTx. They would probably need to provide 10% or 20% of the collateral themselves (to align their incentives with the other participants to keep the node operating / earning, and to prevent them from controlling...
  15. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    To be clear, I'm not proposing PoS. We think it will be a long time before PoS can be made adequately secure. I tried to articulate in the presentation that I gave that PoS was included because it illustrates the maximum extent to which PoW could be reduced (to zero) to demonstrate the maximum...
  16. Ryan Taylor

    Temporary Measures / Quick Wins

    If If we moved to a system that simply deducted approved budgets from the block reward for the following month, the coin supply would be fully utilized either for budget or provided to MNs and miners. In other words, if we did away with the 10% allocation and allowed that to flex and directed...
  17. Ryan Taylor

    Temporary Measures / Quick Wins

    I would be reluctant to make an abrupt change unless the consensus mechanism changed with it. We've seen what happened in the past... unless it changes SLOWLY to allow for market forces to adjust, reward reallocation can have unintended consequences.
  18. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    The deterministic masternode list (DML) currently only records less than 5,000 masternodes and was designed for that type of scale. A deterministic holders list (DHL) would probably need to hold hundreds of thousands of records if we had no restrictions on it, a scale at which the system...
  19. Ryan Taylor

    Community Ideas

    The net effect would be less dilution for everyone else (by a tiny amount). It's interesting, but it creates some weird incentives. For example, it means that all holders "net dilution" or the effect of coins being created and "burned" is unpredictable. My share of the currency is dictated by...
  20. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    If they happened to base an investment decision on that basis, that is simply a purchase made on the basis of poor rationale. Dash does not accrue value because of the costs it incurs. It is valuable despite the costs it incurs. The costs are necessary to provide security (which is necessary to...
  21. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    At least as far as delivering an initial version, I would not anticipate including voting rights. I would be reluctant to include voting rights AND continue requiring 10% net votes for proposals to pass, because I think it's unlikely that a population of 10 Dash collateral holders would vote...
  22. Ryan Taylor

    Minimum Fees

    I assumed that 50% of the transaction fee went to masternodes and that masternodes would value the incremental income in line with historical ROI demanded by the masternode market of about 6.3% (latest number from Q3). I also assumed about 15,000 transactions per day. The math itself is pretty...
  23. Ryan Taylor

    Minimum Fees

    1) I don't think it needs to be perfectly aligned to be effective, at some point you are just splitting hairs and I'd be really happy with 97% accuracy. It also varies with the number of nodes storing the data (you need to ensure the fee is high enough to incentivize "enough" nodes to exist...
  24. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    Masternode costs have nothing to do with the value they provide. Costs are not an input to value. The fact that they have high profit margins provides them with the option to not have to liquidate most of their earnings if they don't desire to. Increasing the masternode's cost of operating does...
  25. Ryan Taylor

    Consensus Mechanisms

    I have been reviewing the comments here and in discord, as well as working with our developers to assess various options for the consensus mechanism. There are clearly some very good reasons that both pure PoS and hybrid PoW / PoS would be problematic. There are very good reasons why Ethereum is...
  26. Ryan Taylor

    Community Ideas

    It wouldn't necessarily make Dash a security, but it would push it in that direction as it would add attributes of securities to Dash. Any locking would need to fulfill a purpose / job on the network to fully avoid this treatment (which I still don't think would result in Dash being considered a...
  27. Ryan Taylor

    Community Ideas

    Time locked inputs may be needed for shared masternodes to function, so this is being discussed. Naturally, collateral shares that are locked for longer periods would be more desirable for a shared MN operator to leverage than short-term ones. Because long-locked share would be more desirable...
  28. Ryan Taylor

    Community Ideas

    Delegated voting is absolutely possible today, since the keys for voting are separate and can be changed / revoked at any time. It could take an informal form if well-respected community members proposed their own priorities and lobbied MNOs to entrust them with their voting keys, or it could be...
  29. Ryan Taylor

    Flexible Proposal System

    I struggle to accept the “paid voting” idea, because it is likely to incentivize bad behavior. For example, minutes before the deadline a mno is incentivized to vote without evaluating the proposals. They are rewarded for voting “yes, no, yes, no, yes, no” which actually causes damage to the...
  30. Ryan Taylor

    Minimum Fees

    I’d say if the transaction has no economic purpose (e.g., stress tests) for the user making the transaction, that is a good threshold for defining spam. Maybe trying to define what constitutes spam is irrelevant. As long as the cost of a transaction (primarily data storage costs) is covered by...
  31. Ryan Taylor

    Ryan, good luck at consensus. Please throw down the gauntlet.

    Thanks! Bob and I are planning a great joint presentation.
  32. Ryan Taylor

    What's this Trust Protector thing all about? Let's meet them and chat about Dash stuff.

    The trust document can be found in the legal structure announcement. The link is near the bottom of the original post. https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/dash-core-group-legal-structure-details.39848/
  33. Ryan Taylor

    Planned Reduction

    As we shared on the last quarterly call, Dash Core Group was faced with some tough decisions to maintain financial stability in light of the current market. Although much of the impact from price reduction has already been absorbed by a combination of compensation fund buffers, voluntary pay...
  34. Ryan Taylor

    Network Elected Trust Protectors: Closing the Governance Loop

    Below is a link to our Medium post outlining the election process for The Dash DAO Irrevocable Trust. This notice of the election process is required by the Trust Deed of Settlement dated December 22nd, 2017. Elections are required to be held by March 31st, 2019. Special thanks to @fernando for...
  35. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details

    Adding redacted document for reference. The original is on file at the offices of TCA Asset Management S.A. in Switzerland. A link was also added to the original post. https://www.dropbox.com/s/op9q9gd5la3b0t9/Dash Core Group, Inc. - The DASH DAO Irrevocable Trust - 12-22-17 Redacted.pdf?dl=0
  36. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details

    Elections for the trust protectors are currently slated to be held annually, and I suspect many community members will plan to run for these positions. MNs will vote and decide. The current overlap between the trust protectors and the DCG board will cease after the first election.
  37. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details

    Yes, the intent is to enable IP to be held directly by the trust once things like patents are awarded to DCG. As far as the operational tools used by DCG, I don't think every asset needs to controlled by the trust itself. It should be a function of practical considerations such as the "risk" of...
  38. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details

    The minimum requirements will be basic and restricted to legal requirements to fill the role (e.g., must be legally an adult, willing and able to provide identity information required by New Zealand trust laws, etc). Outside of that, the MNs will decide the extent to which they value masternode...
  39. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details

    Great question. In the event of a hard fork event, the trust protectors would have authority to evaluate the situation and make decisions in light of their duty to the MN owners at the time that the fork occurred. Ownership of DCG would most likely be assigned to one of the two forks. However...
  40. Ryan Taylor

    Dash Core Group Legal Structure Details

    It will be published on our public wiki. I will also publish a link to the document here in the original post above after I get the chance to redact. Should be within the next week.