Self-sustainable Decentralized Governance by Blockchain

[Ryan Taylor]

No. That's only part of the reason. There was no clear information about this available; neither about how to donate, donation addresses, and donation causes. Do not expect people to donate unless it's easy, clear, and well communicated (both the goals and the results). We were lacking in ALL of these.

But I agree, even if everything about the donation was done perfectly still only a part of MN owners would have donated.

I was actually under the impression (though I could be wrong) that the donation feature didn't work with multi-sig addresses. I wanted to set up donation to the foundation, but I couldn't figure out if it would work. There really needs to be better information on this feature before you can expect anyone to use it. I never was able to confirm if it would work with multi-sig.

 

[darkwing]

'wont' and 'need' are unproven and IMO unfounded assumptions there. Got anything against testing? Can Tungfa's Great Vegas Binge not wait a few weeks?




I'm up for it. Since Tungfa has bagged Vegas.

You could always write a proposal for going to vegas that promises better outcomes.

Tungfa vs LoneCrouton vegas trip - vote

For some some things people can help out.

For other things kickstarter type approach why not - eg. point of sale nfc dash card/mobile reader
That would take serious capital and require a company not part of Dash

Let's say you had a project you wanted to do for your own benefit but with massive benefit for dash. It requires a licence that costs X
You start a thread here and on btctalk and go hey please donate to my fund for the megaawesome Crouton idea!
response: Um how do we know you are going to do it? Who is going to escrow etcetc.
You repeatedly post. Those of open wallets donate. Some tell you to get lost or stop pestering.
Advantage: No voting. If you get the money you get on with it.
Disadvantage: Pestering for donations again. Failure means people lose money directly from their pocket and may never donate again

As opposed to proposal. Clear benefit for dash. Vote. Get on with it. If you don't lose trust etc - but nobody is put off donating again.
Advantage: Get on with it
Disadvantage requires proposal and for people to vote

 

[Ryan Taylor]

No. That's only part of the reason. There was no clear information about this available; neither about how to donate, donation addresses, and donation causes. Do not expect people to donate unless it's easy, clear, and well communicated (both the goals and the results). We were lacking in ALL of these.

But I agree, even if everything about the donation was done perfectly still only a part of MN owners would have donated.

I was actually under the impression (though I could be wrong) that the donation feature didn't work with multi-sig addresses. I wanted to set up donation to the foundation, but I couldn't figure out if it would work. There really needs to be better information on this feature before you can expect anyone to use it. I never was able to confirm if it would work with multi-sig.

 

[Ryan Taylor]

This is a complete paradigm shift in crypo and I personally think it is brilliant. I totally see crouton's point about a "tax" being unfair, but I view it very differently.

Bitcoin got a lot of things right, but one thing they got wrong was allocating every single coin generated to the task of mining (e.g., securing the network). I read an article yesterday that pointed out that the computing hashing power of bitcoin's network is now 100 times the computing power of Google. Suffice it to say, bitcoin is plenty secure with 1/100th the current resources devoted to this "securing the network task". Meanwhile, their development team is destitute, their foundation is broke, and the number of full nodes keeps dropping. We ALREADY HAVE PROOF that voluntary contributions don't work to support the network development. Think of the billions of dollars that early bitcoin adopters have made, yet no one is donating. Not early bitcoin adopters, not venture capitalists with bitcoin-based ventures, not charities, not miners. They are destitute.

Bitcoin SHOULD HAVE allocated those resources to where they are needed... yes, SOME for securing the network, some for incentivizing full nodes, some for development, some for other functions or yet undreamed of capabilities. We have already solved the issue for full nodes. And guess what? We will have the decentralized governance to change those allocations over time or add new allocations to solve future problems or go after growth opportunities.

What about lonecrouton's argument? It it "fair" to "tax" masternodes? Well, here's a few things to consider:
1) Masternode owners will decide the tax rate
2) Masternode owners directly benefit from the expenditures or at least will have to believe that the benefit outweighs the cost (or else they wouldn't approve the spend, right?)
3) This makes the entire funding process more efficient, which thus makes the entire team more productive
4) Is a "tax" more or less "fair" than a system in which only some pay and the rest of the "free-riders" benefit?
5) The one I think is most important... it should make the entire system more efficient by
- Making the cost/reward positive for more projects (imagine you are a MN owner considering a project. To get it funded you need x coins. There are 100 MN owners willing to donate. The benefit of the project per MN must be at least x * 100 / (total MNs) before you would rationally donate. If all MNs are forced to donate equally, it will exponentially expand the universe of positive return projects)
- Making the team spend less time crowd funding
6) It allows us as a community to remain independent
7) It isn't really taking ANYTHING away from current MN owners. If the reward schedule continues up to 60%, the result will simply be more nodes (which we need less than we need development funding now), NOT more rewards per MN. More nodes is a huge unnecessary expense right now... we have plenty.

So, if it is proven that donations won't work and are inefficient (do we really want the core team spending 20% of their time begging for funds?), why not try something revolutionary? Bitcoin already has a "tax" on every single holder of the coin in the form of dilution of his holdings through the creation of new coins. Just like a company issuing new shares of stock dilutes other shareholders. It's just that their protocol allocates 100% of this "tax" to miners.

Dash in contrast is essentially saying "look... we don't think that's efficient or desirable. We think "taxes" should go to where they are needed. Need more MNs? Allocate more "tax" to those owners and more will spring up. Need development more? Reallocate. Need more network security, allocate more to miners. Bottom line is this is going to make us the most efficient crypto network, hands down, and the most adaptable to needed change. It is brilliant.

 

[fernando]

Really? Could I suggest for all testers and anyone else who has volunteered on the project to be paid?
This is getting more and more like something that it wasn't intended for when Evan created this coin...

You would be able to make a proposal with whatever content you want. If it gets passed, everyone who has volunteered is happy. From another post of yours I see that when you refer to a list in which tungfa and Minotaur are included you say so because the draft has an example that mentions marketing... I still don't see any name there, you could submit a proposal to organize marketing yourself. No reserved spaces or limits. Whatever you are able to convince the masternodes is the limit.

I don't know what Evan intended when he created this coin. Only him can answer that, but even if it wasn't, ideas evolve.

 

[Minotaur]

Personally, 'free riders' are a lesser evil than enforced taxation.

There is no enforced taxation, you are making a fundamental oversight. All of the rewards belong first and foremost to the network itself. The network then has a series of needs, so to ensure its long term survival it promises to reward those that can provide the services that it needs, it is part of the design. There are three on-going needs: development/promotion, mining and masternode operation. Under the proposed new model, the masternodes get 45% of the block reward for their services, the miners 40% and it keeps 15% for its ongoing development and promotion need. Since the network is not yet a sentient being, it then places the responsibility of executing those funds in those that signed a bond of trust with the network through a collateral. In that sense the masternode operators act as stewards and release the funds to the development team in a controlled and decentralized way, this model is way superior than a foundation, as the execution of the initiatives and the funding are separated and there is a check and balance, as the funds can be retired from a misbehaving project.

As I remember you never have had a problem at all with the miners being "taxed" so you can profit with your masternodes. I believe this attitude towards change, where it does not directly benefit you is highly hypocritical, when you already supported others sharing their rewards for your benefit. Plus is super short sighted as is in the best interests of everyone.

The business proposal is what is changing, you can not tax someone when they don't own those funds. The masternode operators are currently making 42.5%, that would still go up to 45%. The Dash model to a masternode operator would then be: If you set up a masternode and buy collateral to establish trust you get 45% direct reward and voting rights to reinvest 15% in the development of the ecosystem you benefit from. It is exactly the same and no different than the change in the business proposal to miners when they were getting 100% of the reward, miners were told: the model of this coin is changing, you will keep only 40% of the reward and masternodes will get 60%. Not only that, in the beginning it was proposed to be 10%, then 20% and finally a sliding schedule up to 60%. Why is that? because the network was finding its balance. And it still is and the new proposed model seems to cover the needs of the project better than the previous one. There is no difference between the change in business model for miners and this proposed change of business model to operators, none. Just like the first change, it is for the common good and everyone would benefit through the creation of value to the project.

 

[fernando]

I will be voting No With Extreme Prejudice to all of the above. Unless of course the proposal involves sending me to Vegas. :grin:

No, when specific projects were proposed, like the Kristov Atlas code review and the promo video, funding was
supllied in short order. And while I am unable to prove it, I believe the vast majority of that funding came from MN ops.

70% of Kristov's Atlas donatations came from 6 addresses (one around 300 DRK, three around 100 DRK and a couple of 50 DRK, you can check yourself: https://chainz.cryptoid.info/dash/address.dws?XqHt831rFj5tr4PVjqEcJmh6VKvHP62QiM.htm). A big part of the video fundraiser I believe was paid by Evan. We can't expect the same small group of big holders to fund everything. I don't think they have 70% of the coins, so they are paying more than their fair share. And we are talking about two tiny projects, anything of significance is gonna require more than 2.5k USD (the price of the video).

 

[bertlebbert]

Just wondering... for a project to receive initial (and then continued) funding, it would need a yes majority of existing MNs or just of votes cast?

 

[thelonecrouton]

What about lonecrouton's argument? It it "fair" to "tax" masternodes? Well, here's a few things to consider:
1) Masternode owners will decide the tax rate
2) Masternode owners directly benefit from the expenditures or at least will have to believe that the benefit outweighs the cost (or else they wouldn't approve the spend)
3) This makes the entire funding process more efficient, which thus makes the entire team more productive
4) Is a "tax" more or less "fair" than a system in which only some pay and the rest of the "free-riders" benefit?
5) The one I think is most important... it should make the system more efficient by

'Is it "fair" to "tax" masternodes?' isn't my argument. All currency infrastructure providers (MNs and miners alike) are losing revenue, but it's not even that that I object to.

I object to siphoning off a large chunk of money for projects that have yet to even be proposed. I object to both/either that money being stockpiled forever, or more likely squandered on nonsense with no tangible benefit.

I would like to see a system that, if a proposal passes vote, and the costings pass vote, then the agreed amount of blockchain money is diverted for it. Keep a sensibly sized emergency warchest by all means, but cap it. The cap can always be revisited at a future date, by vote.

This way, there are still no free riders, because if 51% of MN ops vote yes, the money is deducted from all infrastructure providers, not just themselves.

 

[Ryan Taylor]

I wasn't suggesting we use kickstarter, I was pointing out that people will pay for what they want.

I don't share Minotaur's view that us MN ops are all too short sighted, parsimonious and stupid to vote for something that we think will benefit us and by extension everyone else involved with DASH.

How about we give the system a trial run first and see how voluntary funding of clearly defined and costed proposals goes before the Great Siphoning gets imposed?

I respectfully disagree. Bitcoin was the trial run and it isn't working. Bitcoin "taxes" everyone and allocate 100% of it to mining operations. They are super secure, sure, but they are broke.

 

[thelonecrouton]

I respectfully disagree. Bitcoin was the trial run and it isn't working. Bitcoin "taxes" everyone and allocate 100% of it to mining operations. They are super secure, sure, but they are broke.

See my post immediately above. Guaranteed money still gets raised, but only as actually needed. For sensible proposals, I don't see achieving 51% being at all difficult to achieve. Especially with a well thought out and easy to use in-wallet voting system. How about we try it?

Just because someone else's experiment has failed doesn't mean we should cease experimentation ourselves.

 

[Ryan Taylor]

'Is it "fair" to "tax" masternodes?' isn't my argument. All currency infrastructure providers (MNs and miners alike) are losing revenue, but it's not even that that I object to.

I object to siphoning off a large chunk of money for projects that have yet to even be proposed. I object to both/either that money being stockpiled forever, or more likely squandered on nonsense with no tangible benefit.

I would like to see a system that, if a proposal passes vote, and the costings pass vote, then the agreed amount of blockchain money is diverted for it. Keep a sensibly sized emergency warchest by all means, but cap it. The cap can always be revisited at a future date, by vote.

This way, there are still no free riders, because if 51% of MN ops vote yes, the money is deducted from all infrastructure providers, not just themselves.

Sorry, I posted that by accident before I finished typing (fat fingered something), so you didn't see the rest of the post.

Right now, we are "siphoning off" a higher and higher percent to create more and more masternodes. That's hardly something we need as a community when compared to the need for funding of various initiatives. I view the cost of running more and more masternodes as "squandering" of resources. They aren't needed.

Waiting until a need is identified may be a good way to fund SOME things, but not many. Most contractors expect at least SOME funds upfront. Also, why would they do work for an entity that can't guarantee payment? What happens if the price collapses and it would take YEARS to fund the project they just completed for us? What about things like advertising? Those costs need to be paid in advance. Conference booths need to be paid in advance. This is simply reality. We can't wait three months after a project is approved for the funds to roll in before we can start something... we'd miss out on opportunities and it would be terribly inefficient.

 

[thelonecrouton]

Right now, we are "siphoning off" a higher and higher percent to create more and more masternodes. That's hardly something we need as a community when compared to the need for funding of various initiatives. I view the cost of running more and more masternodes as "squandering" of resources. They aren't needed.

This is your opinion. Do you have empirical evidence to back up exactly now many MNs we need, given userbase numbers and tx/IX/DS volume?

Waiting until a need is identified may be a good way to fund SOME things, but not many. Most contractors expect at least SOME funds upfront. Also, why would they do work for an entity that can't guarantee payment? What happens if the price collapses and it would take YEARS to fund the project they just completed for us? What about things like advertising? Those costs need to be paid in advance. Conference booths need to be paid in advance. This is simply reality. We can't wait three months after a project is approved for the funds to roll in before we can start something... we'd miss out on opportunities and it would be terribly inefficient.

I addressed this: keep a capped warchest for such necessities, the spending of which would still require consensus.

 

[Ryan Taylor]

One thing I've seen consistently is MN owners not wanting to be taxed off the fear that their earnings will drop. This simply isn't true. The market has an expected rate of return for MN operation. As the reward increases, the number of MNs increases in tandem and each MN gets paid less often. This has been proven all along the way from 10% to the 45%, the return stays about the same. So us MN owners aren't really giving anything up by giving up a share of our rewards... they should stay roughly the same return per masternode regardless of the reward schedule. We simply provide the development team with the resources they need instead of funding the infrastructure and operating costs of more (unneeded) full nodes.

 

[fulltimegeek]

Miners were making 100% of the reward before masternodes were introduced. They don't get an option to decide they keep it, in fact when enforcement is off, everyone goes crazy. What is the difference? If it is as you say, then enforcement should be off period and miners get to decide if they share with masternodes. It just does not work that way, in this currency the rewards are divided to ensure the long term survival of the coin, and there are three pillars right now that have been identified as important: miners, development/promotion and masternodes. That balance would result in the most value produced for the most important group in the ecosytem: the end users. Value needs to be produced it is not just about sharing percentages, people need to benefit and find value from using our ecosystem as a currency not as an investment, so that the investment can also be a successful one, is not the other way around.

I believe there aren't 3 pillars but 4. Development and marketing should be handled separately IMO.

 

[Ryan Taylor]

This is your opinion. Do you have empirical evidence to back up exactly now many MNs we need, given userbase numbers and tx/IX/DS volume?



I addressed this: keep a capped warchest for such necessities, the spending of which would still require consensus.

On your first point, yes... our network transaction rate is a fraction of capacity. Evan has commented on how robust the network is many times and the fact that it can handle orders of magnitude more transactions. Most interviews he does, this issue is addressed.

On your second point, I totally agree. A warchest value could be set and changed over time to accommodate the differences between inflows and outflows, the value of which is set by consensus. I had actually been thinking about that myself, so we are totally on the same page. Once war chest is funded, additional allocations could be approved to refill approved expenditures and any increases in the war chest funding could be approved.

The only downside to this approach is if your allocations from MNs changes significantly over time, it could be difficult to stabilize the number of masternodes, but as long as the minimum needed to support the network is met, then it should be OK.

 

[Ryan Taylor]

Just wondering... for a project to receive initial (and then continued) funding, it would need a yes majority of existing MNs or just of votes cast?

I would have to assume of votes cast. Otherwise, if enough people fail to vote, there would be nothing ever approved.

 

[Ryan Taylor]

I believe there aren't 3 pillars but 4. Development and marketing should be handled separately IMO.

Not to mention that there could be more pillars in the future that we can't imagine yet. We already talked about legal expenses. What about a small charitable fund that we could use as part of outreach efforts? Or what about grants for things like research that could further our technology or for startups that could add critical infrastructure surrounding Dash that would drive demand? I don't think we really understand the power of this capability yet. Anything has just become possible as long as it's a good idea that the community gets behind.

 

[David]

Y'all, we just saw something completely humiliating yesterday. Bitcoin was created in protest of the financial bailouts of 2008, but yesterday the bitcoin development team had to themselves be bailed out by a private university. Let's try to avoid this happening to Dash.

Somebody pages ago mentioned that a currency shouldn't require continual development. This may be true for a conventional printed (fiat) currency, but is never true for software. The Linux Foundation still pays Linus Torvalds a salary to work on Linux. Development is never finished when it comes to software. There are always bugs, always new attack vectors, always new enhancements, always new responses to technology. Continual development is vital. Let's pay for it ourselves, without relying on the same dozen DASH holders every time, and without relying on universities, corporations, or governments to bail us out.

I have no problem with the 15% being "capped" at a certain amount until significantly depleted by approved projects, at which point the 15% deduction will kick back in automatically. But if the network does turn off the 15% periodically, the extra 15% must go to the miners. It must not go to MN owners, or else they will be incentivized never to deplete the reserved funds, and thus to vote no on every proposal.

 

[bertlebbert]

I would have to assume of votes cast. Otherwise, if enough people fail to vote, there would be nothing ever approved.

Okay, I was actually thinking the opposite, which would essentially mean all MNs initially vote nay by default.