Pre-Proposal: Solving the 'Free Money' treasury problem
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I voted against the DCG plan because it was vastly inferior to the MNO plan and contained the risk of a run-away budget due to socalised spending.
stan.distortion
Well-known member
It might have stood a chance if it's proposed changes had been discussed on more than just Discord. Both plans would have but I doubt we'd have ended up with two competing proposals in that case, we'd have ended up with just one that would have stood a much better chance of passing.
Discord is turning into an echo chamber and you're kind of personifying it, I don't agree with everything you're saying therefore I'm wrong, right? Check the damn votes, I voted "no" and "no" and I'm pretty damn sure I'm not the only one. Plenty of others will have voted "yes" to one or the other and some percentage will have voted "yes" to one and "no" to the other. Blindly assuming 600 voted "for" one and "against" the other and 400 did the opposite is more hindrance than help.
@xkcd, do you have records of the final votes on the two proposals? I tried pulling them yesterday but I'm assuming historic votes are pruned out now, only current proposals listed on my client here.
Geert
Active member
@xkcd would you please explain in detail exactly what you mean when you say that the DCG plan risked "run-away budget due to socalised [sic] spending." I don't think you can because what you've written is nonsense. Just admit that you didn't like it because it was conceived by DCG.
@stan.distortion you keep imagining we didn't discuss this. We did. We just didn't do it the way you wanted with umpteen mini-votes to design it by committee. We discussed it for a long time and then RT put forth the proposal he thought was best and that could pass. Judging from the first vote, he put forth a better proposal. The "MNO rebel alliance" acted in bad faith IMHO by not admitting defeat of their proposal, FUDDing the subsequent discussion, and thereby preventing us from adopting the better proposal.
@stan.distortion you keep imagining we didn't discuss this. We did. We just didn't do it the way you wanted with umpteen mini-votes to design it by committee. We discussed it for a long time and then RT put forth the proposal he thought was best and that could pass. Judging from the first vote, he put forth a better proposal. The "MNO rebel alliance" acted in bad faith IMHO by not admitting defeat of their proposal, FUDDing the subsequent discussion, and thereby preventing us from adopting the better proposal.
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Gerhard, Ryan's proposal to lift the budget to 20% of the emitted supply while allowing the MNOs to spend 40% of someone else's money IMO would have caused continued frivolous spending into low value proposals such as DASH.Nigeria for example which recently turned into another KuvaCash, no surprise there. I felt that the only way a 20% budget uplift could be safely forked into the network is if the MNs paid it in full from their own precious rewards. This would mean on the whole any one cycle would not spend the full 20% allotment while also leaving the option to spend the entire compliment when an actual good proposal comes along such establishing a GBTC style Trust.
The report in question comes from the MNOWatch.org website and this one https://mnowatch.org/the_results_dashd_2020-11-25-08-25-44.uniqueHashVotes.314.html You will need to use the filters to get the data you want, the two search terms are:
decision-vote-improve-proposal-system-mn
decision-vote-improve-proposal-system-dc
It will show you the vote clusters and other votes cast by MNOs, the snapshot was taken at the close of voting and the numbers are as close to final as can be.
The risk of squandering away 20% of the coinbase for little to no value was too high, I'm sorry. Best to stick to 10% for the time being.
stan.distortion
Well-known member
Need to double check these but fairly sure they're right:
('DCG yes', 639)
('DCG no', 434)
('MNO yes', 421)
('MNO no', 622)
('DCG yes, MNO yes', 74)
('DCG yes, MNO no', 485)
('DCG no, MNO yes', 307)
('DCG no, MNO no', 112)
('DCG yes unique', 80)
('DCG no unique', 15)
('MNO yes unique', 40)
('MNO no unique', 25)
('DCG yes', 639)
('DCG no', 434)
('MNO yes', 421)
('MNO no', 622)
('DCG yes, MNO yes', 74)
('DCG yes, MNO no', 485)
('DCG no, MNO yes', 307)
('DCG no, MNO no', 112)
('DCG yes unique', 80)
('DCG no unique', 15)
('MNO yes unique', 40)
('MNO no unique', 25)
Geert
Active member
So let's say all the MNO proponents switched to the DCG plan:
74 + 485 + 307 + 80 - 112 -15 = 819 net votes.
The DCG was basically the same plan as the MNO except not as extreme. 60% of passed proposal funding was borne by the MNOs with the balance taken from potential miner rewards. I don't buy xkcd's argument that ONLY if we make 100% of treasury funding borne by MNOs will we get responsible spending. We risk getting the opposite problem -- irresponsible parsimony, with important initiatives like the DIF dying on the vine.
74 + 485 + 307 + 80 - 112 -15 = 819 net votes.
The DCG was basically the same plan as the MNO except not as extreme. 60% of passed proposal funding was borne by the MNOs with the balance taken from potential miner rewards. I don't buy xkcd's argument that ONLY if we make 100% of treasury funding borne by MNOs will we get responsible spending. We risk getting the opposite problem -- irresponsible parsimony, with important initiatives like the DIF dying on the vine.
stan.distortion
Well-known member
These figures are a bit more raw and include duplicates. For example, "DCG yes to proposal yes" also includes votes from "MNO no to proposal yes". If there are any figures you'd like to see more clearly defined please ask.
('proposal' is the second round, approving the plan chosen in the first round for implementation).
('For proposal', 628)
('Against proposal', 453)
('Total', 1081)
()
('DCG yes to proposal yes', 482)
('DCG no to proposal yes', 75)
('MNO yes to proposal yes', 116)
('MNO no to proposal yes', 412)
('DCG yes to proposal no', 3)
('DCG no to proposal no', 150)
('MNO yes to proposal no', 107)
('MNO no to proposal no', 63)
EDIT: 2 more figures, voting ip's not seen in the first vote :
('New yes', 66)
('New no', 278)
('proposal' is the second round, approving the plan chosen in the first round for implementation).
('For proposal', 628)
('Against proposal', 453)
('Total', 1081)
()
('DCG yes to proposal yes', 482)
('DCG no to proposal yes', 75)
('MNO yes to proposal yes', 116)
('MNO no to proposal yes', 412)
('DCG yes to proposal no', 3)
('DCG no to proposal no', 150)
('MNO yes to proposal no', 107)
('MNO no to proposal no', 63)
EDIT: 2 more figures, voting ip's not seen in the first vote :
('New yes', 66)
('New no', 278)
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Dash finally has some wind in its sails. However, the free money problem ensures ineffective spending will only increase in USD terms. We must create a sense of ownership to the treasury funds by allocating the leftover funds each cycle to the masternodes (or split with the miners).
Untill then, money will be spent poorly with little scrutiny and with little to no ROI. Dash will continue to slide down the ranking until this very fundamental flaw is addressed.
In the Q4 2020 DCG presentation, @Ryan Taylor said he would engage the community and submit a new proposal in Q1 of 2021 (this quarter).
Lets hope this really happens as we have been told.
Untill then, money will be spent poorly with little scrutiny and with little to no ROI. Dash will continue to slide down the ranking until this very fundamental flaw is addressed.
In the Q4 2020 DCG presentation, @Ryan Taylor said he would engage the community and submit a new proposal in Q1 of 2021 (this quarter).
Lets hope this really happens as we have been told.
Related to the topic, we have a new decision proposal to drop the proposal fee from 5 DASH to 1 DASH. Check it out!
DeepBlue
Active member
Thanks to @forro for inviting me to speak on this topic. This is the first time in months I've got some time to contribute.
The concept of financially incentivizing MNO to vote so that they can weed out projects, on the surface appears as though it would work by aligning a financial incentive so that non-worthwhile projects don't get through. However, on further consideration about this issue I realised that it may not actually work the way we want in practical terms. The reasons I say this are as follows:
1. I don't believe that financial incentives should be the primary motivating factor for MNOs to assess a project. The reason for this is their motive would then be purely financial driven. If a person's thinking is solely motivated by finances alone then we are unlikely to get quality decisions made, rather decisions made that would benefit the user financially. If everything comes down to finances we have a type of environment that is all about money and only money.
2. I feel the primary motive for an MNO assessing a project for funding should be driven by something more than just personal financial gain. This is a real desire by the MNO to find and assess a proposal for the benefit of the Dash project as a whole. Such people would have their true intentions of assisting the network first in the heart and mind when looking at a project and will decide on a project based on if it will definitely improve the network as a whole, and not necessarily if they will benefit financially.
3. I feel a much better way to get MNO quality decisions and assessments on projects is for MNOs with a proven track record of positive and constructive contributions to the proposals to have voting keys delegated to those MNOs and for those MNOs to make the decisions and write a report before the funding cycle the reasons why they want to vote for a particular project. An MNO who has delegated their keys can always withdraw the voting keys at any time if they are not happy with the decisions of findings of the delegated MNO.
4. I would, however, like to see a new type of fund setup, from the remaining amount of budget left over from a funding cycle to go to a special fund to create a separate development team from the DCG and that DCG could not access or use this fund. The reason I'm suggesting this is that it would diversify the development team ensuring that we have greater decentralization in the project. My concern is that DCG, and with particular reference to Ryan Taylor is having too much influence in too many management aspects of Dash. Ryan is CEO of Dash core group, he also has involvement with the Trust Protectors and now he is also a member of the DIF where he is clearly, at least from my point of view, influencing other members of the DIF to make decisions that are not in the spirit with a decentralized project. One such example Darren Tapp had formally stated in a written document that no funding would be spent by the DIF without first getting voting decision approval from the network - indeed the network had previously also successfully voted on this very point. However, a week later Darren Tapp and the entire DIF members unilaterally changed their decision and stated they will be making their own decisions without approval from the network - a 180 degree turnaround from what was voted by the network. How is that possible? Since the decision by the DIF matches exactly what Ryan Taylor had stated previously about how the DIF should operate it is clear that Ryan had a strong influence on the DIF to go against what the network had voted for and wanted. It is noted that Darren Tapp works with Arizona State University - the same university which Ryan Taylor funded for a research project that Darren Tapp was a part of if I'm not mistaken. When looking at financial incentives we need to also consider factors such as this which have been shown to have influence on people's decisions whether they wish to acknowledge it or not.
Ryan needs to appreciate and understand that he is likely undermining the reputation and credibility of DASH as a decentralized project by having so many key roles with the management of different Dash projects. I am deeply concerned about this myself. Ryan is clearly creating an atmosphere of centralization and clearly centralized decisions are now happening under Ryan's influence on other DIF members. Clearly Ryan did not like the MNO network vote against his ideas on how the DIF should operate and has now decided to get more closely involved with the DIF to ensure his views of how it should be run are actioned.
I feel we need to actively promote and encourage the creations of more decentralized development groups so that all the power and decision making is not left with just one person or small group of people in DCG. If not, Dash is in danger of becoming centralized and already I can see the the negative effects this is having on the DIF decisions.
Therefore I would really like to see the creation of a new fund to create a new independent development team of DCG and is separately funded and separately managed and is not controlled by DCG. The fund would be derived from the remaining amount of money from the treasury. The fund would not be accessible to DCG. Instead it would go toward developing another independent Dev team that could work on features that DCG does not have the time to address and look into building new functionality on the Dash platform that can increase the attractiveness of DASH as a payment system. Some examples could be creating a Directory of businesses that accept Dash as a payment from within the app.
Creating a decentralized voting system for MNOs to make decisions for the network where the only requirement is to have a Dash Masternode to vote. This could help build the Dash Decentralization Charter that I talked about in my other post here:
We need to actively work to build and protect Dash as a decentralized project. In order to do this we need funds. We could get the funds from the leftovers of a funding proposal.
This new fund could be called the "Dash Decentalizion promotion fund" which would fund dev and marketing projects completely independently managed of DCG. It would also provide a little competition towards DCG which currently enjoy a monopoly.
In addition if we were to setup an independent Dev team working on some valuable features for DASH that can increase its market penetration then MNOs could then compare the projects funded by the Dash Decentralization project Vs other independent projects and we could then chose which one is likely to give more value to the network.
My view is we have too many eggs in one basket with DCG the way that it is and at the top of the triangle of power sits one person, and we all know what road that goes down....
The concept of financially incentivizing MNO to vote so that they can weed out projects, on the surface appears as though it would work by aligning a financial incentive so that non-worthwhile projects don't get through. However, on further consideration about this issue I realised that it may not actually work the way we want in practical terms. The reasons I say this are as follows:
1. I don't believe that financial incentives should be the primary motivating factor for MNOs to assess a project. The reason for this is their motive would then be purely financial driven. If a person's thinking is solely motivated by finances alone then we are unlikely to get quality decisions made, rather decisions made that would benefit the user financially. If everything comes down to finances we have a type of environment that is all about money and only money.
2. I feel the primary motive for an MNO assessing a project for funding should be driven by something more than just personal financial gain. This is a real desire by the MNO to find and assess a proposal for the benefit of the Dash project as a whole. Such people would have their true intentions of assisting the network first in the heart and mind when looking at a project and will decide on a project based on if it will definitely improve the network as a whole, and not necessarily if they will benefit financially.
3. I feel a much better way to get MNO quality decisions and assessments on projects is for MNOs with a proven track record of positive and constructive contributions to the proposals to have voting keys delegated to those MNOs and for those MNOs to make the decisions and write a report before the funding cycle the reasons why they want to vote for a particular project. An MNO who has delegated their keys can always withdraw the voting keys at any time if they are not happy with the decisions of findings of the delegated MNO.
4. I would, however, like to see a new type of fund setup, from the remaining amount of budget left over from a funding cycle to go to a special fund to create a separate development team from the DCG and that DCG could not access or use this fund. The reason I'm suggesting this is that it would diversify the development team ensuring that we have greater decentralization in the project. My concern is that DCG, and with particular reference to Ryan Taylor is having too much influence in too many management aspects of Dash. Ryan is CEO of Dash core group, he also has involvement with the Trust Protectors and now he is also a member of the DIF where he is clearly, at least from my point of view, influencing other members of the DIF to make decisions that are not in the spirit with a decentralized project. One such example Darren Tapp had formally stated in a written document that no funding would be spent by the DIF without first getting voting decision approval from the network - indeed the network had previously also successfully voted on this very point. However, a week later Darren Tapp and the entire DIF members unilaterally changed their decision and stated they will be making their own decisions without approval from the network - a 180 degree turnaround from what was voted by the network. How is that possible? Since the decision by the DIF matches exactly what Ryan Taylor had stated previously about how the DIF should operate it is clear that Ryan had a strong influence on the DIF to go against what the network had voted for and wanted. It is noted that Darren Tapp works with Arizona State University - the same university which Ryan Taylor funded for a research project that Darren Tapp was a part of if I'm not mistaken. When looking at financial incentives we need to also consider factors such as this which have been shown to have influence on people's decisions whether they wish to acknowledge it or not.
Ryan needs to appreciate and understand that he is likely undermining the reputation and credibility of DASH as a decentralized project by having so many key roles with the management of different Dash projects. I am deeply concerned about this myself. Ryan is clearly creating an atmosphere of centralization and clearly centralized decisions are now happening under Ryan's influence on other DIF members. Clearly Ryan did not like the MNO network vote against his ideas on how the DIF should operate and has now decided to get more closely involved with the DIF to ensure his views of how it should be run are actioned.
I feel we need to actively promote and encourage the creations of more decentralized development groups so that all the power and decision making is not left with just one person or small group of people in DCG. If not, Dash is in danger of becoming centralized and already I can see the the negative effects this is having on the DIF decisions.
Therefore I would really like to see the creation of a new fund to create a new independent development team of DCG and is separately funded and separately managed and is not controlled by DCG. The fund would be derived from the remaining amount of money from the treasury. The fund would not be accessible to DCG. Instead it would go toward developing another independent Dev team that could work on features that DCG does not have the time to address and look into building new functionality on the Dash platform that can increase the attractiveness of DASH as a payment system. Some examples could be creating a Directory of businesses that accept Dash as a payment from within the app.
Creating a decentralized voting system for MNOs to make decisions for the network where the only requirement is to have a Dash Masternode to vote. This could help build the Dash Decentralization Charter that I talked about in my other post here:
We need to actively work to build and protect Dash as a decentralized project. In order to do this we need funds. We could get the funds from the leftovers of a funding proposal.
This new fund could be called the "Dash Decentalizion promotion fund" which would fund dev and marketing projects completely independently managed of DCG. It would also provide a little competition towards DCG which currently enjoy a monopoly.
In addition if we were to setup an independent Dev team working on some valuable features for DASH that can increase its market penetration then MNOs could then compare the projects funded by the Dash Decentralization project Vs other independent projects and we could then chose which one is likely to give more value to the network.
My view is we have too many eggs in one basket with DCG the way that it is and at the top of the triangle of power sits one person, and we all know what road that goes down....
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Thank you for your comment.
You wish to see MNOs grant their voting keys to MNOs who have a proven track record of making positive contributions. Sounds great. But if MNOs dont even bother to show up in the first place to give a simple yes or no on a dozen proposals, how can you expect them to begin tracking which MNOs have a good track record of making positive contributions?
Somehow we expect them to go from completely apathetic to carefully examining all proposal related conversations and deeply understanding which MNOs are constructive, and not only that, but keeping track of who was right and who was wrong over a long period of time?
How? They dont even show up in the first place!
This is why I'm pushing for direct incentivization. We need to get them to show up in the first place, before any of these other complex, pie in the sky solutions could ever gain any traction.
The clear, simple logic of giving the MNOs the leftover funds, by clear direct incentivization, will go far to cure MNO apathy. Only after they begin voting and participating in the process (motivated by their self-interest in ensuring their money is either well-spent or put in their pocket) could anything more complex be considered.
Even if MNOs show up just to vote no, more 'no' votes will surely cause proposal owners, including DCG and the DIF to be more responsive to the MNOs.
To your alternate use of the leftover funds, I believe Andy Freer's Dash Incubator is already doing what you want to see, although it is in it's infancy. When I read his current proposal I feel what he is doing could eventually supersede DCG's role, and I believe that will continue to be funded.
Geert
Active member
My advice is to stand down and let DCG handle it. Did you listen to the last quarterly call? DCG is most probably going to present this again except broken into two pieces. We could have solved this problem already but some people here decided to interfere with DCG's leadership on it.
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