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Pre-proposal: Let's pay the MNOs who vote on proposals

forro

Active member
Many Masternode Owners don't take part in Dash governance. It takes time and effort to read the proposals, ask questions, debate merits, and monitor results. Those who do should be rewarded for it.

If we pay them to vote on proposals, more will come to vote. When they come to vote, they will see the proposals, ask questions, and begin to engage more with the community. They will bring fresh perspectives, new ideas, and share dash news with the rest of the world.

Let's pay them the unspent funds of each cycle, in proportion to how many 'yes' or 'no' votes they cast. Abstains wouldn't qualify.

For example, if there are 10 proposals, with 500 'yes/no' votes each, that's 5000 votes. If there are 1000 unspent dash at the end of the cycle, that's 0.2 dash per 'yes/no' vote. If an MNO voted on one proposal, they would receive 0.2 dash. If an MNO voted on 10 proposals, they would get 2 dash.

Over time, as proposals become more effective, the value of dash will rise, and that 2 dash will be worth much more.

Secondly, as all remaining funds would go to the voters, they will begin to require better proposals, more transparency, accountability, and better results. Those proposal owners who cannot provide that will not be funded and those funds would instead go to the voters.

Third, this small but important monthly 'bonus' will increase the ROI of having a masternode, and so more people will invest in MNs, locking up more coins, increasing scarcity, and further raising the value of dash for all holders.

We don't need to fear a wave of 'no' votes killing all proposals, because MNOs are heavily invested in Dash and they understand we must fund developers, marketing and other things in order for the value of dash to rise.

Incentivizing them to play a more active role will increase participation and breathe new life into the treasury, benefiting the entire community and all holders. It will become exciting again!

Keep in mind those who benefit from the current system, those who are getting easy money every month, will attack this idea with FUD. They don't care about dash, they just want their easy money. We can make this project better, let's do this!

Also posted to Reddit.
 
If this was to pass, I would have enough faith in the project to convert all of my other crypto holdings to dash for more masternodes. I'm sure that is true of other people, too. This would be a major step forward, on par with Evo itself.
 
Unfortunately, there is no longer a dash dao, only a facade. There are but a few people with enough influence to change things beyond simple Yes No questions. The dash dao needs a massive overhaul, such that you would never recognize it.

At it's root, the dash dao functions via a single dashd daemon, built by DCG without any fully independent alternatives. DCG will never allow alternatives because it would be a direct threat to their paycheck. DCG being the largest influencer get to choose what they propose and all the random rules that would decide it's outcome e.g. conveniently ignoring abstain votes. Or if they so choose, to ignore single 1K nodes, it is their prerogative.

Don't believe me? - then ask yourselves, who implemented the current Proof of Service rules without ever putting it to the masternode network? - the answer is DCG.

A few hundred individuals AT MOST get to repeatedly set the stage for everyone. Of those that can vote, a few high collateral MN whales wipe the floor, making your average pleb crowdnode vote completely irrelevant. Is a Proposal Owner ever going to represent second-place voters where their portion is significantly large? - no, they will simply choose rules and outcomes that best suits their agenda.

One solution would be to randomly designate a small group of MNs, only allowing that group to vote. This would avoid the same old voting patterns from the same people. But I feel this subset would be too small. What might work is to to allow ANY dash holder to vote so long as they have been randomly selected for jury service. Under such circumstance, I think paying them to vote might work. There is a hardcore of MNs that will argue, MN holders must have skin in the game, but I think that kind of thinking has been proved to be completely and utterly incorrect.
 
Unfortunately, there is no longer a dash dao, only a facade. There are but a few people with enough influence to change things beyond simple Yes No questions. The dash dao needs a massive overhaul, such that you would never recognize it.

At it's root, the dash dao functions via a single dashd daemon, built by DCG without any fully independent alternatives. DCG will never allow alternatives because it would be a direct threat to their paycheck. DCG being the largest influencer get to choose what they propose and all the random rules that would decide it's outcome e.g. conveniently ignoring abstain votes. Or if they so choose, to ignore single 1K nodes, it is their prerogative.

Don't believe me? - then ask yourselves, who implemented the current Proof of Service rules without ever putting it to the masternode network? - the answer is DCG.

A few hundred individuals AT MOST get to repeatedly set the stage for everyone. Of those that can vote, a few high collateral MN whales wipe the floor, making your average pleb crowdnode vote completely irrelevant. Is a Proposal Owner ever going to represent second-place voters where their portion is significantly large? - no, they will simply choose rules and outcomes that best suits their agenda.

One solution would be to randomly designate a small group of MNs, only allowing that group to vote. This would avoid the same old voting patterns from the same people. But I feel this subset would be too small. What might work is to to allow ANY dash holder to vote so long as they have been randomly selected for jury service. Under such circumstance, I think paying them to vote might work. There is a hardcore of MNs that will argue, MN holders must have skin in the game, but I think that kind of thinking has been proved to be completely and utterly incorrect.

Everything you said is a lie, buzz off!
 
Unfortunately, there is no longer a dash dao, only a facade. There are but a few people with enough influence to change things beyond simple Yes No questions. The dash dao needs a massive overhaul, such that you would never recognize it.

At it's root, the dash dao functions via a single dashd daemon, built by DCG without any fully independent alternatives. DCG will never allow alternatives because it would be a direct threat to their paycheck. DCG being the largest influencer get to choose what they propose and all the random rules that would decide it's outcome e.g. conveniently ignoring abstain votes. Or if they so choose, to ignore single 1K nodes, it is their prerogative.

Don't believe me? - then ask yourselves, who implemented the current Proof of Service rules without ever putting it to the masternode network? - the answer is DCG.

A few hundred individuals AT MOST get to repeatedly set the stage for everyone. Of those that can vote, a few high collateral MN whales wipe the floor, making your average pleb crowdnode vote completely irrelevant. Is a Proposal Owner ever going to represent second-place voters where their portion is significantly large? - no, they will simply choose rules and outcomes that best suits their agenda.

One solution would be to randomly designate a small group of MNs, only allowing that group to vote. This would avoid the same old voting patterns from the same people. But I feel this subset would be too small. What might work is to to allow ANY dash holder to vote so long as they have been randomly selected for jury service. Under such circumstance, I think paying them to vote might work. There is a hardcore of MNs that will argue, MN holders must have skin in the game, but I think that kind of thinking has been proved to be completely and utterly incorrect.
I share in your frustration, and feel this proposal gives us a good chance at moving the treasury forward. If it passes, I believe many previously absent MNOs will join the community and more positive changes will be possible.

We can't give up on it, we must unite and continue to try to improve the project.

Please consider supporting it and do what you can to draw support from other MNOs.
 
Everything you said is a lie, buzz off!
Instead of commenting to simply troll GrandMasterDash, could you voice your thoughts on the proposal?

I'm aware that you're both an MNO and occasionally a PO, so improving the treasury may cause you conflicted feelings, but consider that more participation, better results, and improved treasury tokenomics could have a positive impact on the value of dash for all holders.
 
@forro from what I see, imo it's likely too late to fix such a rigged and corrupt system. DCG's response will dictate how MNOs vote on this and subsequent changes. You will need their blessing throughout, and that they have the time, resources and the will to do it.. which they will invariably kick down the road for later consideration. Just look at the chaos when the smallest of changes are proposed. When the proposal fee went from 5 dash to 1 dash, we were told by the hardcore that the proposal system would be inundated with spam!, lol fat chance that happening, no one really knows or gives a f* about the dash dao. Almost every successful proposal had no lasting effect. None of them can produce an ongoing and sustainable business model. These shit proposals are not replacing any market need,

Good for you for trying and I wish you luck, but futile imo.
 
I have been working hard to promote Dash in China.
I have never given up;
Because I bought Dash in June 2021.
Perhaps there are surprises, perhaps the process is difficult, for oneself, and also for those who believe in Dash.
 
@forro from what I see, imo it's likely too late to fix such a rigged and corrupt system. DCG's response will dictate how MNOs vote on this and subsequent changes. You will need their blessing throughout, and that they have the time, resources and the will to do it.. which they will invariably kick down the road for later consideration. Just look at the chaos when the smallest of changes are proposed. When the proposal fee went from 5 dash to 1 dash, we were told by the hardcore that the proposal system would be inundated with spam!, lol fat chance that happening, no one really knows or gives a f* about the dash dao. Almost every successful proposal had no lasting effect. None of them can produce an ongoing and sustainable business model. These shit proposals are not replacing any market need,

Good for you for trying and I wish you luck, but futile imo.
Can I count on your yes vote(s) if I submit the proposal?
 
Many Masternode Owners don't take part in Dash governance. It takes time and effort to read the proposals, ask questions, debate merits, and monitor results. Those who do should be rewarded for it.

If we pay them to vote on proposals, more will come to vote. When they come to vote, they will see the proposals, ask questions, and begin to engage more with the community. They will bring fresh perspectives, new ideas, and share dash news with the rest of the world.

Let's pay them the unspent funds of each cycle, in proportion to how many 'yes' or 'no' votes they cast. Abstains wouldn't qualify.

For example, if there are 10 proposals, with 500 'yes/no' votes each, that's 5000 votes. If there are 1000 unspent dash at the end of the cycle, that's 0.2 dash per 'yes/no' vote. If an MNO voted on one proposal, they would receive 0.2 dash. If an MNO voted on 10 proposals, they would get 2 dash.

Over time, as proposals become more effective, the value of dash will rise, and that 2 dash will be worth much more.

Secondly, as all remaining funds would go to the voters, they will begin to require better proposals, more transparency, accountability, and better results. Those proposal owners who cannot provide that will not be funded and those funds would instead go to the voters.

Third, this small but important monthly 'bonus' will increase the ROI of having a masternode, and so more people will invest in MNs, locking up more coins, increasing scarcity, and further raising the value of dash for all holders.

We don't need to fear a wave of 'no' votes killing all proposals, because MNOs are heavily invested in Dash and they understand we must fund developers, marketing and other things in order for the value of dash to rise.

Incentivizing them to play a more active role will increase participation and breathe new life into the treasury, benefiting the entire community and all holders. It will become exciting again!

Keep in mind those who benefit from the current system, those who are getting easy money every month, will attack this idea with FUD. They don't care about dash, they just want their easy money. We can make this project better, let's do this!

Also posted to Reddit.

I think your approach is wrong. We should not pay the masternodes who vote. We should punish the masternodes who do not vote.

IMHO the solution to the problem is this:

In case a masternode does not vote for a long time (we could vote the numbers in order to define that time), his/her set of votes (at the long standing proposals) should not count into the final voting outcome until he/she returns, neither his masternode node should count when calculating the 10% net votes election method.

Similar to the POSE_BANNED masternode state, a new masternode state should be introduced, the VOTE_BANNED.
 
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Furthermore you approach is wrong because you propose something new without challenging the status quo.

You should not form a governance question demanding for something new to happen, because your brand new phantasy may be proved very difficult, very costly or even impossible to be coded. Also suppose your proposal barely passes the required 10% net votes and it is approved. Does this makes it stronger than the status quo? The proponents of the status quo may claim that the status quo is supported by a silent majority of much more than 10%, and you cannot prove them wrong. So If you want a change to occur, initially you should form a governance question ASKING THE MASTERNODES TO CONFIRM THE STATUS QUO.
That way you expose the Dash status quo, which has NEVER been voted. The Dash status quo has been decided by agents having in their mind that their red lines should never been passed.
Steps for a decent governance proposal that may lead to a change.
1) You put a governance question asking the voters to confirm the status quo.
2) If the status quo is not confirmed, obviously a change is needed, so you search someone to fund and/or to code the change.
3) After coding the change, you put into vote your governance proposal along with the required code.
When I say "put a governance question asking the voters to confirm the status quo" I obviously mean that this question should last long (at least 24 months, if not permanent). So that the supporters of the status quo do not have the excuse that they did not have time to vote. They should not be able to claim that the status quo issue did not reach the required minimum participation due to a limited voting period.


The current status quo is that the masternodes are not paid when vote, neither are banned when they do not vote for a long time.

So you should fisrt cast a proposal describing the status quo in details, in hope that the status quo will not pass the 10% net votes proposal method. And then follow the 2nd and 3rd step.
 
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