• Forum has been upgraded, all links, images, etc are as they were. Please see Official Announcements for more information

Self-sustainable Decentralized Governance by Blockchain

One example. Why did the tax on internet service get implemented this year? Was it because of a public vote? Was there a need for some critical infrastructure improvement? Was there an additional service added? NO. Pork Barrel.

Humans in charge = Pork Barrel. Enough said.

Distributed voting = masternodes only. Done. No humans in the middle to screw it up.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
The title of the thread does contain the word "governance" for a reason...

The objective is to create a ruleset that assures that there isn't that potential for abuse, even if all the MN operators are scum.

MN operators are meant to fulfill a new role in this proposal. The added burden expected of them only makes sense to keep the payment schedule as it was, and let them decide if the money is worth it.

Again, we see the bullshit argument of "all the masternodes will just vote no all the time" tossed around. Masternodes don't make any money if the coin sucks... If they stifle their own progress, they end up surpassed by another project. Pretending not to see this in order to propagate an empty argument is a waste of everyone's time.

It's not a full-on government. It's just a project determination team. They'll be taking a lot of time out of their lives to read proposals and weigh their worth. And the choices they make directly affect their value. A lot more than they affect the value of people who can't afford a masternode... There is a motivation coupled with an obligation, and in my proposal, no pork barrel to abuse.

If you don't mine, funds are not held in escrow until your internet connection comes back up.

If your MN daemon crashes, you don't get paid for week after week of not providing service.

This isn't about the output, but the input. I think that is where the disconnect is coming in most of this debate. It's not about where the money is going, but where it comes from.

Money is not taken from the block reward when your MN isn't providing service. Money is not taken from the block reward when you're not mining. There's a reason this model exists. Abuse.

Money should not be taken from the block reward when there's no job to do.

Governance. Government... The most corrupt, and abuse-prone environment of all time. And add to it, cryptotards... To establish an abuse-able model of governance under such extreme circumstances is unforgivably, magically stupid. If it was a bad idea in MNs and Mining, how could it be a good idea in a position of much easier, and assured, abuse?

If it doesn't make sense to shoot yourself in the foot, how can it make sense to nuke yourself in the brain? It's the typical democrat argument: "The reason our crazy, dumbass plan isn't working, is because we haven't made it dumb and crazy enough! If everyone who disagrees would just let us go completely off the deep end, we'd have utopia within a week!"

Removal of the pre-determination of block reward model makes no sense in carefully code-controlled scenarios. Giving some of that control to humans only makes it that much more important to maintain such control, not let loose the reigns and trust that there aren't any bad people in crypto...

We're trying to turn the greed into a productive measure by forcing the only way to profit from it to be benefiting the whole project. Peeling off block rewards in advance and sticking them in a pork barrel just creates an opportunity to abuse and funnel block rewards straight into your pocket without doing anything. This defeats the whole point of keeping block rewards in the block without proven, verified REASON BEFORE THEY ARE removed from the block.

!!!Absolutely NOTHING is worth compromising the integrity of that model!!!
We can rebuild it, we have the technology... And since MN operators are obligated to no be dumbasses for their own good, that means 6 million dollar masternodes.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Hey guys.
Sorry for the bad english.
Voting rights should be available to all users. If it goes through the mechanism masternodes, we need to reduce the requirements to 1000DASH to 100 ~ 10DASH.

I think that at the moment we have a large percentage of central masternodes.
I find this when I wrote statistics => http://p2pool.pl/dash/pages/stats.php#masternode
A large number of MN is placed on the same subnet => there are about 806.
Code:
82.211.21.0/24 => 228
93.127.247.0/24 => 76
91.108.83.0/24 => 64
5.135.104.0/24 => 63
37.59.212.0/24 => 63
178.33.144.0/24 => 63
176.31.145.0/24 => 61
93.127.226.0/24 => 44
185.77.129.0/24 => 40
179.43.128.0/24 => 40
104.255.33.0/24 => 34
151.80.5.0/24 => 27
37.59.247.0/24 => 23
178.33.98.0/24 => 23
46.228.193.0/24 => 21
192.99.184.0/24 => 20

Some use a single server. For example network 82.211.21.0/24 (228MN)
You can check this by making the trace. ICMP from this server is turned off.

82.211.21.184
Code:
                                           My traceroute  [v0.85]
p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:03:51 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     5    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. 37.187.9.253                                                    0.0%     4    0.4   0.4   0.3   0.4   0.0
3. gra-g2-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     4    2.0   1.5   0.8   2.2   0.0
4. 37.187.36.49                                                    0.0%     4    2.5   2.4   2.4   2.5   0.0
5. fra-5-6k.fr.eu                                                  0.0%     4   10.1  10.3  10.1  10.5   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     4   10.3  17.1  10.2  37.7  13.7
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     4   10.5  10.4  10.3  10.5   0.0
8. ???

82.211.21.185
Code:
p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:04:13 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     3    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. ???
3. gra-g1-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     3    0.9   0.8   0.7   0.9   0.0
4. 37.187.36.47                                                    0.0%     3    3.9   2.8   2.2   3.9   0.7
5. fra-1-6k.de.eu                                                  0.0%     2   10.3  10.3  10.2  10.3   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     2   10.2  10.2  10.2  10.3   0.0
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     2   10.9  10.6  10.3  10.9   0.0
8. ???

Moreover, several other placed on one MN IP. When I was collecting statistics, there were ~ 380.
http://pastebin.com/845FUPu8

Total 806 + 380 = 1166 MN. I think you need to reduce the requirements for MN with 1000DRK to 100 ~ 10DRK.
In this case, we will increase the number of nodes and increase the decentralization of the network MN.
And as it will give the opportunity to vote to all users.

Owner MN - easy to find. Since node runs on Public IP.
In fact, 2,500 people have openly declared that they own 50-60% of the volume of all the coins in the DASH.
What will happen when the price rise? Maybe someone interested in these people?
What prevents confiscate or take away from them, these coins?


P2Pools useful for the network.
A large network is better protected against attacks than a centralized pool
P2Pool will protect network from centralizes pools. And cant get 51%
Money for dotane p2pool suggest getting some of those ~ 15%
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Hey guys.
Sorry for the bad english.
Voting rights should be available to all users. If it goes through the mechanism masternodes, we need to reduce the requirements to 1000DASH to 100 ~ 10DASH.

I think that at the moment we have a large percentage of central masternodes.
I find this when I wrote statistics => http://p2pool.pl/dash/pages/stats.php#masternode
A large number of MN is placed on the same subnet => there are about 806.
Code:
82.211.21.0/24 => 228
93.127.247.0/24 => 76
91.108.83.0/24 => 64
5.135.104.0/24 => 63
37.59.212.0/24 => 63
178.33.144.0/24 => 63
176.31.145.0/24 => 61
93.127.226.0/24 => 44
185.77.129.0/24 => 40
179.43.128.0/24 => 40
104.255.33.0/24 => 34
151.80.5.0/24 => 27
37.59.247.0/24 => 23
178.33.98.0/24 => 23
46.228.193.0/24 => 21
192.99.184.0/24 => 20

Some use a single server. For example network 82.211.21.0/24 (228MN)
You can check this by making the trace. ICMP from this server is turned off.

82.211.21.184
Code:
                                           My traceroute  [v0.85]
p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:03:51 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     5    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. 37.187.9.253                                                    0.0%     4    0.4   0.4   0.3   0.4   0.0
3. gra-g2-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     4    2.0   1.5   0.8   2.2   0.0
4. 37.187.36.49                                                    0.0%     4    2.5   2.4   2.4   2.5   0.0
5. fra-5-6k.fr.eu                                                  0.0%     4   10.1  10.3  10.1  10.5   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     4   10.3  17.1  10.2  37.7  13.7
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     4   10.5  10.4  10.3  10.5   0.0
8. ???

82.211.21.185
Code:
p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:04:13 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     3    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. ???
3. gra-g1-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     3    0.9   0.8   0.7   0.9   0.0
4. 37.187.36.47                                                    0.0%     3    3.9   2.8   2.2   3.9   0.7
5. fra-1-6k.de.eu                                                  0.0%     2   10.3  10.3  10.2  10.3   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     2   10.2  10.2  10.2  10.3   0.0
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     2   10.9  10.6  10.3  10.9   0.0
8. ???

Moreover, several other placed on one MN IP. When I was collecting statistics, there were ~ 380.
http://pastebin.com/845FUPu8

Total 806 + 380 = 1166 MN. I think you need to reduce the requirements for MN with 1000DRK to 100 ~ 10DRK.
In this case, we will increase the number of nodes and increase the decentralization of the network MN.
And as it will give the opportunity to vote to all users.

Owner MN - easy to find. Since node runs on Public IP.
In fact, 2,500 people have openly declared that they own 50-60% of the volume of all the coins in the DASH.
What will happen when the price rise? Maybe someone interested in these people?
What prevents confiscate or take away from them, these coins?


P2Pools useful for the network.
A large network is better protected against attacks than a centralized pool
P2Pool will protect network from centralizes pools. And cant get 51%
Money for dotane p2pool suggest getting some of those ~ 15%
I applaud your detective work, I had guessed that half the MNs were owned by about 6 people.

Changing the MN DASH requirement will not help the current or future distribution though. The rich will just add more MNs at a proportional rate. It would however cost Mr 806 and Mr 380 (and everyone else) a shitload of additional expense acquiring ten times as many IPv4 addresses. :grin:

Dog help you all though, your post has caused me to revisit a thought I have had before:

Reduce the MN collateral requirement to say 100 DASH and get rid of the static IP requirement. Have the network select a sufficiently sized random subset of MNs from the now 10X bigger total each block... combine this with my miner subsetting proposal ( https://dashtalk.org/threads/crouto...-exclusionary-dead-end.4735/page-3#post-52621) and the every aspect of the DASH network becomes literally unbreakable while a functional internet exists. Zero centralisation of anything.

Nakamoto > Duffield > Crouton :tongue:
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Hey guys.
Sorry for the bad english.
Voting rights should be available to all users. If it goes through the mechanism masternodes, we need to reduce the requirements to 1000DASH to 100 ~ 10DASH.

I think that at the moment we have a large percentage of central masternodes.
I find this when I wrote statistics => http://p2pool.pl/dash/pages/stats.php#masternode
A large number of MN is placed on the same subnet => there are about 806.
Code:
82.211.21.0/24 => 228
93.127.247.0/24 => 76
91.108.83.0/24 => 64
5.135.104.0/24 => 63
37.59.212.0/24 => 63
178.33.144.0/24 => 63
176.31.145.0/24 => 61
93.127.226.0/24 => 44
185.77.129.0/24 => 40
179.43.128.0/24 => 40
104.255.33.0/24 => 34
151.80.5.0/24 => 27
37.59.247.0/24 => 23
178.33.98.0/24 => 23
46.228.193.0/24 => 21
192.99.184.0/24 => 20

Some use a single server. For example network 82.211.21.0/24 (228MN)
You can check this by making the trace. ICMP from this server is turned off.

82.211.21.184
Code:
                                           My traceroute  [v0.85]
p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:03:51 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     5    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. 37.187.9.253                                                    0.0%     4    0.4   0.4   0.3   0.4   0.0
3. gra-g2-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     4    2.0   1.5   0.8   2.2   0.0
4. 37.187.36.49                                                    0.0%     4    2.5   2.4   2.4   2.5   0.0
5. fra-5-6k.fr.eu                                                  0.0%     4   10.1  10.3  10.1  10.5   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     4   10.3  17.1  10.2  37.7  13.7
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     4   10.5  10.4  10.3  10.5   0.0
8. ???

82.211.21.185
Code:
p2pool (0.0.0.0)                                                                     Sun Apr 26 14:04:13 2015
Keys:  Help   Display mode   Restart statistics   Order of fields   quit
                                                                     Packets               Pings
Host                                                              Loss%   Snt   Last   Avg  Best  Wrst StDev
1. ns3322796.ip-37-187-9.eu                                        0.0%     3    0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.0
2. ???
3. gra-g1-a9.fr.eu                                                 0.0%     3    0.9   0.8   0.7   0.9   0.0
4. 37.187.36.47                                                    0.0%     3    3.9   2.8   2.2   3.9   0.7
5. fra-1-6k.de.eu                                                  0.0%     2   10.3  10.3  10.2  10.3   0.0
6. decix.accelerated.de                                            0.0%     2   10.2  10.2  10.2  10.3   0.0
7. fra4.xe-0-1-0.accelerated.de                                    0.0%     2   10.9  10.6  10.3  10.9   0.0
8. ???

Moreover, several other placed on one MN IP. When I was collecting statistics, there were ~ 380.
http://pastebin.com/845FUPu8

Total 806 + 380 = 1166 MN. I think you need to reduce the requirements for MN with 1000DRK to 100 ~ 10DRK.
In this case, we will increase the number of nodes and increase the decentralization of the network MN.
And as it will give the opportunity to vote to all users.

Owner MN - easy to find. Since node runs on Public IP.
In fact, 2,500 people have openly declared that they own 50-60% of the volume of all the coins in the DASH.
What will happen when the price rise? Maybe someone interested in these people?
What prevents confiscate or take away from them, these coins?


P2Pools useful for the network.
A large network is better protected against attacks than a centralized pool
P2Pool will protect network from centralizes pools. And cant get 51%
Money for dotane p2pool suggest getting some of those ~ 15%

I think you may be reaching the wrong conclusion based on this analysis, what this is showing you in reality is the nodes that are run by masternode hosting services. A lot of community members do not run their own nodes, so these services, like Flare, Node40, Splawik, etc, run a lot of nodes and then people just start those nodes from their local wallets. So this info is interesting but not in the way it was thought of initially.
 
Your post keeps getting better the longer I look at it. I figured saying Pork Barrel would bring you back.
There is some merit to your "contribute = vote" concept as well. My idea and your's can co-exist in the same model, which is why I haven't said much in response to your posts; you said it well enough already.

If you decided not to put money in, you don't get a say. Being forced is wrong. Personally, I'm willing to concede that much as long it's only shaved off when there's a valid job in queue. But, I can see how some take the hard line of opposing tax/extortion. Especially as the matter has been tabled in the OP... It's a poison pill in it's current form.

I can hodl without having an MN... And it is true; we can always dump our DASH and go do something else. If tragically bad decisions are made, that's exactly what smart money does.
 
Voting rights should be available to all users.
No. The stupid, entitled brats should not be allowed to vote for free stuff. If you suck at life so bad that you can't come up with a Masternode, you sure as hell shouldn't be making choices for the future of the coin.

Only qualified, intelligent, informed people should be making these decisions. MN Operators are this demographic. Well, they're supposed to be. The Guides have tainted that, but they're learning, at least, sort of... That, notwithstanding, even the crappiest MN Operator is better than the cryptotard ouija board abbreviation hype rabble.
 
Someone forgot to include my initial harpoons... :p

Looks like coinmarketcap.com has picked up on the trolling bullshit and is marking DASH as a pre-mined coin to drive off market support so they can buy moar for themselves...

Bitcoin's initiation graph is much, much worse than this... In fact, it's hard to find any mine-able coin that doesn't look the same or worse... Anyways, OT.
 
No. The stupid, entitled brats should not be allowed to vote for free stuff. If you suck at life so bad that you can't come up with a Masternode, you sure as hell shouldn't be making choices for the future of the coin.

Only qualified, intelligent, informed people should be making these decisions. MN Operators are this demographic. Well, they're supposed to be. The Guides have tainted that, but they're learning, at least, sort of... That, notwithstanding, even the crappiest MN Operator is better than the cryptotard ouija board abbreviation hype rabble.

This is just your opinion.
In a decentralized network, all users have the same rights.
 
The title of the thread does contain the word "governance" for a reason...

The objective is to create a ruleset that assures that there isn't that potential for abuse, even if all the MN operators are scum.

MN operators are meant to fulfill a new role in this proposal. The added burden expected of them only makes sense to keep the payment schedule as it was, and let them decide if the money is worth it.

Again, we see the bullshit argument of "all the masternodes will just vote no all the time" tossed around. Masternodes don't make any money if the coin sucks... If they stifle their own progress, they end up surpassed by another project. Pretending not to see this in order to propagate an empty argument is a waste of everyone's time.

I'm not really agreeing with your statement that this is a bullshit argument. You of all people should know that the vast majority of people are idiots (this is basically a direct quote from the last 200 posts you've made). We've seen it before with Block Enforcement, really on both sides of the equation: MN owners complaining they aren't receiving frequent payments, and earlier on miners complaining they were being taxed. With enforcement off it's typically minutes before blocks go unpaid. Such is life, but do you ever think about why people act this way? Greed and self interest.

A full 15% block reward regardless of project takes greed out of the equation, leaving only an interest in the greater good for the network. With this weight cleared from the decision making process I think it's much more likely projects will be chosen strictly on merit. I have faith in humanity, really, I do -- but only when self-serving interests are removed from the equation can this thing really work.

The sad truth is that this is and should be an all-or-nothing type of deal. Without forcing a black and white consensus self-serving interests will always prevail.
 
I'm not really agreeing with your statement that this is a bullshit argument. You of all people should know that the vast majority of people are idiots (this is basically a direct quote from the last 200 posts you've made). We've seen it before with Block Enforcement, really on both sides of the equation: MN owners complaining they aren't receiving frequent payments, and earlier on miners complaining they were being taxed. With enforcement off it's typically minutes before blocks go unpaid. Such is life, but do you ever think about why people act this way? Greed and self interest.

A full 15% block reward regardless of project takes greed out of the equation, leaving only an interest in the greater good for the network. With this weight cleared from the decision making process I think it's much more likely projects will be chosen strictly on merit. I have faith in humanity, really, I do -- but only when self-serving interests are removed from the equation can this thing really work.

The sad truth is that this is and should be an all-or-nothing type of deal. Without forcing a black and white consensus self-serving interests will always prevail.

^^ This
 
Hi, I want to just be sure you all understand what I'm trying to say :) So I'm going to try with a little diagram. In truth, I don't like the pay as you choose model because it will likely infringe on my rewards, reducing my ROI by causing more MN owners to shortsightedly create too many masternodes, reducing everyone's ROI. Please let me explain.

Diagram 1 is my proposal:

2OC2p8.jpg


In this example, masternode owners can be relatively certain of their ROI because their block rewards do not change. This way, only so many masternodes will be created as makes sense. Say the market thinks a 15% per year reward is good, maybe more, maybe less. Lets say those numbers land us at 3000 masternodes, and it stays there nice and steady because there are no fluctuations in the rewards.

Now at the end of the year, if the funding was not used up, the funds go back to the miners and masternodes equally. This can be distributed evenly if a portion of the excess is distributed with each block reward over the next year. The Masternodes would increase, undoubtedly, due to the increase in rewards until you hit that balance again, and the miner's hash rate would undoubtedly increase as more miners come in to mine as the rewards have increased.

In the end, Masternode owners can always expect a certain ROI, knowing that they will be able to pay their servers and still have a small profit at the end.

There is another big advantage to this funding system. It allows for savings. If there is a big project that the community wants to do, but it requires a large amount of funds, over 15%, funds could be put aside for it, and the project can eventually be achieved. Without an ability to save, this can not be done. Or else, large accounts must be entrusted with trusted people who may fail us.

Low varience
Stability
ability to plan

These are the major positives of this system. I'm sure it could be refined, but even kept as simple as this model makes it, it would work. Simple and eloquent.


The basic other proposal:

b9xbvR.jpg


In this diagram, the masternode owners will recieve 60% of the block rewards. This will likely increase the masternodes until they feel they have an acceptable ROI, if all things were equal, we would have about 5250 masternodes with 60% of the rewards. Now, a project comes up, and it's funded at 2%, another is funded at 5% and yet another at 8% and so on until we hit the 15% limit. The masternodes, if they haven't already, are freaking out because it costs them too much to run their masternodes and they're losing money, but they have worked so hard for their masternode, nobody wants to stop them, so they all eek out, maybe enough to pay their servers.

Or, the masternode count rises and falls along with the block rewards given out. This would create a lot of volatility in service. With this much chaos, and nobody able to make enough ROI, they stop funding things. Yes, I can see it happen. And once you have that many people who struggled to get their masternodes, it'll be hard to get them to turn them off.

Now, lets say that there is an idea for a big project that would require more than 15% of the rewards. There is no savings. What would you do? Pay the project until THEY save up enough money to do it? You'd trust them? What if they (likely) run off with the funds before it starts? Who else would you like to trust the funds to? Without a DAO, you got nuthin.

Finally, the fact that you can't save at all reduces your ability to make future plans. It ties your hands.


Personally, I reject the idea that Masternode owners will vote for anything if the funds are there. Sure, if the funds are returned a year later, there is no big incentive to recycle the funds back to MN and Miners, but there is no incentive to burn up funds either.


I hope some of you can understand now the advantages of the first proposal. I honestly don't think the second proposal is stable and I suspect people think they will be able to keep more of the funds for themselves, but that surely won't be the case. Instead, you will trade it off for volatility and probably lower income. And this is why I don't like it, because I want stability and a decent rate of return on my investment. Because I am selfish!!!

Edit: Pictures were reversed, fixed
Edit 2: There was a line in the diagram that didn't belong there, fixed
 
Last edited by a moderator:
I like the flowcharts.

This is the point:
If a single person or 'vote proxy' makes a decision to implement a tax. The entire DASH ecosystem is done. It sets the stage for a bigger and bigger tax. Once in place there is no mechanism to enforce productive workers.

Decisions to spend any funds need to be directly voted in and only for a specific use.

Let me say this another way. Masternode owners are smart. There is no way they will vote in a tax donation based on a few promises and a "hope and change speech". A specific valuable project is what the masternodes want to contribute to.
 
Why do you think that the masternodes voting on projects would be any different one way or the other? The idea is that NONE of the funds leave the account unless the Masternodes approve a project. This part is still exactly the same.
 
If the DASH is in escrow and it will be given back if no projects get voted on, than the same argument applies, MNs will vote against projects and just to keep the rewards.

So maybe we can move past the forced donation nonsense. Just take out enough funds for valuable projects that get voted in.
 
Back
Top