TheNetworkIsBiggerThanYou
Active member
The DAO up until now has been paying mostly for labor.
The results are abysmal - Limited end user benefits. Limited effective marketing of the advancements that have come to market. A chain halt. SEC labeling dash a security. Almost complete loss of interest in Dash in the market.
Our network is run like a popularity contest or frankly at this point like a hostage-taking situation. DAOs need not be like this.
I propose that Dash takes 50% of its treasury budget and put it into escrow as a prize fund. These funds can be help by the trust until instructed by the network via a formalized treasury voting process to release to winners whom have produced delivery to the network of the requested services. Contractors can help evaluate prize bidders and prepare a voter guide for MNOs to make such votes.
This proposal addresses the sad state of affairs for Dash in a two-fold manner.
1) One of the main arguments that under-performers in the dash network and their apologists point to is the limited capital for funding. "You get what you pay for."
By effectively reducing the treasury payout every cycle by 50% we are reducing the amount of Dash sold every month. This reduction of sell pressure should rise the price every month. When the price increases, this will allow for the DAO to be able to finance more work with the same amount of Dash in the future.
If we can't force DAO fund recipients to product value to the network, we can certainly stop them from dumping on us.
2) Instead of paying for ineffective and structurally questionable network contractors, we should transition the funding system (at first only 50% and perhaps eventually 100%) to an outcome driven request for proposal (RFP) prize system. How to do this will be a question we can answer as the funds in the system accumulate.
The first RFP prize should be the completion of release 1 of the long awaited Dash Platform including whatever features are part of scope 1. In parallel with this, we must instruct DCG to open-source and make available all code and documentation that may as of yet be unpublished.
We can put all 50% of the sequestered funds into this Dash Evo prize bucket, until a process is developed on how to scope out additional RFPs.
To summarize.
1. We must stop the bleeding by cutting funding. Our current process has damaged the network by nearly every metric - price, reputation, vibrancy of the community. This funding should go into an outcome based prize fund initially for completion of Dash Evo release 1.
2. We optimize the Dash DAO spending on results not activities. A functional requirements and authentication process will need to be developed to spec out RFPs, evaluation criteria, and how the evaluations of bidders will be conducted. In an open-source world, these are surmountable problems.
The results are abysmal - Limited end user benefits. Limited effective marketing of the advancements that have come to market. A chain halt. SEC labeling dash a security. Almost complete loss of interest in Dash in the market.
Our network is run like a popularity contest or frankly at this point like a hostage-taking situation. DAOs need not be like this.
I propose that Dash takes 50% of its treasury budget and put it into escrow as a prize fund. These funds can be help by the trust until instructed by the network via a formalized treasury voting process to release to winners whom have produced delivery to the network of the requested services. Contractors can help evaluate prize bidders and prepare a voter guide for MNOs to make such votes.
This proposal addresses the sad state of affairs for Dash in a two-fold manner.
1) One of the main arguments that under-performers in the dash network and their apologists point to is the limited capital for funding. "You get what you pay for."
By effectively reducing the treasury payout every cycle by 50% we are reducing the amount of Dash sold every month. This reduction of sell pressure should rise the price every month. When the price increases, this will allow for the DAO to be able to finance more work with the same amount of Dash in the future.
If we can't force DAO fund recipients to product value to the network, we can certainly stop them from dumping on us.
2) Instead of paying for ineffective and structurally questionable network contractors, we should transition the funding system (at first only 50% and perhaps eventually 100%) to an outcome driven request for proposal (RFP) prize system. How to do this will be a question we can answer as the funds in the system accumulate.
The first RFP prize should be the completion of release 1 of the long awaited Dash Platform including whatever features are part of scope 1. In parallel with this, we must instruct DCG to open-source and make available all code and documentation that may as of yet be unpublished.
We can put all 50% of the sequestered funds into this Dash Evo prize bucket, until a process is developed on how to scope out additional RFPs.
To summarize.
1. We must stop the bleeding by cutting funding. Our current process has damaged the network by nearly every metric - price, reputation, vibrancy of the community. This funding should go into an outcome based prize fund initially for completion of Dash Evo release 1.
2. We optimize the Dash DAO spending on results not activities. A functional requirements and authentication process will need to be developed to spec out RFPs, evaluation criteria, and how the evaluations of bidders will be conducted. In an open-source world, these are surmountable problems.
